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Abstract 
 
Meeting and Minding: early interactions and learning who we are 
 
 
Roderick Parker-Rees 
 
 
The works included here represent the last 10 years of a lifelong enquiry into 
the role of playfulness in communication, intersubjectivity and the co-
construction of identity. From a focus on the attentive playfulness of very early 
interactions I have gone on to explore how relaxed, social communication 
facilitates the meeting of minds and how minding, the continuing sharing, 
negotiation and recalibration of attitudes and meanings, allows us to negotiate 
the dynamic tensions inherent in our similarities and differences. My work offers 
a perspective on belonging and performance that can inform our efforts to 
support infants’ participation in the social process of minding.   
 
I have shown how infants’ sensitivity to being ‘liked’ fuels a ‘virtuous spiral’ of 
communication, as the pleasure of playful interaction builds familiarity which 
then allows nuances of attitudes to be read from differences in how routine 
behaviours are performed. I have extended this understanding of ‘liking’ to 
explore how communication between adults can also be enriched and 
deepened when we have opportunities to meet in ways that allow us to get to 
know each other beyond the superficial exchanging of words and ideas.  
 
My work is informed by two very different epistemological frames: 
developmental psychology (specifically the growing interest in work that adopts 
a ‘second person perspective’) and cultural historical theory (specifically 
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Vygotsky’s late writing on perezhivanie, the social situation of development, 
sense and meaning). Engaging with these different ways of seeing how infants 
are helped to fit in and to stand out has informed my understanding that the 
development of identity is not the ‘walling off’ of a private self so much as the 
internalisation of shared patterns of discourse. Increasing familiarity with the 
richly varied regularities of interactions enables us to feel ‘at home’ in a 
widening range of social situations. When we are able to recognise the 
significance of the nuances of individual performances, we are able to meet with 
other minds and also to notice our own attitudes. 
 
Our understanding of early interactions is framed by cultural assumptions about 
a dialectical opposition between childhood and adulthood, between the 
disruptive, unconstrained creativity of difference and the reassuring regularity of 
familiar ways of thinking and behaving. A focus on the flow of minding allows us 
to see this tension not as a problem but as a potential source of energy. 
Minding depends both on sameness, or familiarity with what people can be 
expected to do, and on the constant refraction and recalibration of this common 
understanding (Vygotsky’s znachenie or ‘meaning’) through the unique 
associations and filters of individual interpretations (smysl or ‘sense’) and 
performances.  
 
These works represent a series of stages in the development of my contribution 
to the flow of minding about how we help very young children to join in; to 
become like us but also to change what we are like. The next stage will be an 
exploration of how Vygotsky’s late works and González Rey’s model of 
subjective sense and subjective configurations can inform our understanding of 
performance and (inter)subjectivity.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction and Critical Appraisal 
 
 
 
The published works presented here are drawn from an extended exploration of 
the nature of communication, specifically the relationship between the 
ontogenetically earliest forms of interaction and the development of identity. 
Together, the works contribute to an understanding of communication, 
intersubjectivity and identity in terms of a dialectical tension between private 
and public; ‘in here’ and ‘out there’. In order to communicate and to be 
members of communities we have to be prepared to acknowledge and abide by 
some conventions and rules of practice that make us similar enough to others to 
allow us to be understood and accepted. At the same time, however, if we are 
to have anything of interest to communicate and if we are to be of use to our 
communities we also need to be different or distinctive. Between the poles of 
being the same, similar or alike and being different, individual or distinctive 
there is a social voltage that powers the activity and development of 
communities of individuals, ‘intersubjects’ (Kennedy, 2006, p.105) or 
‘collectividuals’ (Stetsenko, 2013, p.19).  
 
The publications included in this thesis were written for different audiences and 
published in different forms and this introductory chapter will outline the 
thematic links that weave them into a coherent and systematic programme of 
enquiry. All of my work has focused on the dynamic interaction between the 
affective, relational, lived experience of individuals and the generalised, shared 
ways of being, thinking and knowing which enable us to communicate and 
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share our feelings, ideas and experiences. My distinctive contribution has been 
to focus attention on the role of ordinary, unremarkable experiences in shaping 
our understanding of other people and ourselves. The following sections show 
how interactions can be understood in terms of playfulness, perspectives, liking, 
joining in, co-constructing identities, meeting with differences and, finally, 
minding; the transitive, intentional communication of attitudes, values and habits 
that enables individuals and cultures to develop and adapt. 
While each of these aspects of interaction is identified here and addressed in 
the following publications primarily with reference to what might be described as 
its 'positive' form, it is important to acknowledge that each represents part of a 
spectrum of behaviour which also includes potentially damaging and even 
abusive patterns of interaction. Instead of playfulness, for example, infants may 
encounter strict insistence on compliance. Instead of liking they may meet with 
indifference or even hostility. Instead of adaptations to enable them to join in 
they may experience exclusion and instead of sensitive, attuned minding they 
may experience isolation and neglect.  
In the past, in other cultures and, here and now, in families where caregivers 
are overstressed, under-supported or suffering from emotional or psychological 
trauma, many children have experienced what we would consider neglectful or 
abusive treatment. Children and communities are astonishingly resilient and it 
might be argued that there is a ‘ratcheting’ of progress towards more sensitive 
childcare, as most parents try to avoid what they remember as the failings of 
their own parents and to reproduce what they think of as their positive qualities. 
It is, nevertheless, important to recognise that all children will sometimes 
experience less than ideal and often potentially harmful treatment. 
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Playfulness 
The background to the papers submitted here is my earlier work on the role of 
playfulness in learning, both in early years settings (Parker-Rees 1997a,b,c, 
1999) and in the life and work of primary school teachers (Parker-Rees, 2000, 
2001). Dewey (1909, p.162) argued that ‘playfulness is a more important 
consideration than play. The former is an attitude of mind; the latter is a passing 
outward manifestation of this attitude’. Playfulness is important well beyond 
childhood as a strategy for managing the relationship between fitting in (by 
acknowledging a variety of sociocultural conventions and rules) and standing 
out (by actively exploring the ‘wiggle room’ in these public forms). Adam Phillips 
(1998, p.87) has noted the radical potential of this kind of playfulness: 
To treat an order, or any kind of rule or instruction, as merely suggestive – 
to turn it into something a little more to one’s taste – is radically to revise 
the nature of authority (obedience would be merely fear of interpretation).  
 
I argue that the professional duty to find appropriate, context- and person-
specific interpretations of policies and cultural expectations requires a form of 
critical playfulness, an ability to ‘transform constraint into opportunity’ (Woods, 
1996, p. 8) rather than passive compliance. 
 
 
Perspectives 
The works presented here were written in a decade (2007-2017) which saw a 
significant shift in approaches to the study of communication and identity in the 
fields that have most informed my work: cultural historical theory and the study 
of child development. 
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In cultural historical theory there has been a shift of focus from what Fernando 
González-Rey (2009, 2011, 2016) identified as the ‘second moment’ of 
Vygotsky’s work (1928-31), with increasing attention to the incomplete and 
unfinished fields of enquiry developed in his ‘third’ or final moment (1932-34). In 
the West, the appropriation of Vygotsky’s work - particularly from the 
translations introduced by Jerome Bruner (Vygotsky, 1962), Michael Cole 
(Vygotsky, 1978), and Jim Wertsch (Vygotsky, 1981) - resulted in an 
instrumental focus on improving pedagogical strategies by developing more 
efficient ways to hand over cultural knowledge to new generations. The focus in 
the West on scaffolding, concept formation and internalisation of Higher Mental 
Functions corresponded with the Russian reinterpretation of Vygotsky’s work, 
particularly in its interpretation by Alexei Leontiev, as the foundation for the 
development of Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) (González Rey, 2009, 
2016). 
 
While western academics continue to mine the products of the ‘second moment’ 
of Vygotsky’s short career for insights into ways of making education more 
effective and more humane, there has also been a growing interest in the ideas 
which he touched on in his first works (Vygotsky, 1971, 1993) and which he 
revisited in the last years of his life. The focus on perezhivanie, particularly in 
‘The Problem of the Environment’ (Vygotsky, 1994), marks a radical shift from 
the idea that culture is reflected in the common psychology of a community to a 
recognition of the unique ways in which every individual refracts experiences. 
Vygotsky argued that children do not simply internalise or absorb information 
about how people do things but they actively make sense, drawing on their 
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unique personal history to process experiences into perezhivaniya; their 
interpretations of sociocultural information. In his last works Vygotsky also 
returned to his earlier focus on the relationship between the public, shareable 
‘meaning’ (znachenie) of words, events and concepts and the private ‘sense’ 
(smysl) experienced by individuals as ‘the aggregate of all the psychological 
facts that arise in our consciousness as the result of the word’ (Vygotsky, 1987, 
p. 273),. 
 
In the second moment of his work Vygotsky was focused on how we come to be 
like other people, by internalising common ways of understanding our 
environment. In his third, final moment he became more interested in the 
differences which ensure that we each interpret, and relate to, our environment 
in uniquely individual ways (González Rey, 2016;  González Rey and Mitjáns 
Martínez, 2016; Fleer et al., 2017). 
 
In the field of developmental psychology, specifically in the study of early 
childhood, there has been a similar shift of focus away from what Reddy (2008, 
2011) and Schilbach et al. (2013) have characterised as a ‘third person 
perspective’, standing apart from children’s interactions and behaviour to 
observe it from outside. There has been increasing recognition that if we hope 
to understand the interests and sense-making of other people this ‘objective’ 
perspective, which Martin Buber (2004) characterised as an ‘I-it’ relationship, 
must be complemented by a more subjective ‘second person perspective’, 
corresponding to Buber’s ‘I-thou’ relationship. 
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The third person perspective, associated with a scientific understanding of 
rigorous enquiry, encourages a focus on what can be generalised and what is 
likely to be consistent across a wide range of different contexts – the znachenie 
of observable behaviours. Professional assumptions about the nature of 
rigorous observation can result in an odd discrepancy between how researchers 
make sense of observations of babies in the controlled conditions of the ’baby-
lab’ and what they know from their own experience of living with their own 
children. The epistemological challenge to this ‘spectatorial’ perspective, 
arguing that it may underestimate the part played by relational factors, 
especially in very early, preverbal forms of interaction, has come mainly from 
female researchers (e.g. Tizard and Hughes, 1984; Dunn, 1988; Engel, 2005; 
Zeedyk, 2006; Nelson, 2007; Reddy, 2008).  Even in 2005, however, Sarah 
Engel was surprised by the extent to which researchers (male and female) 
could seriously underestimate the communicative abilities of infants ‘even when 
they have some at home’ (Engel, 2005, p.42).  Second person perspective 
studies of early childhood interactions can enrich our understanding of how 
familiarity, intimacy and co-lived prior experiences contribute to the 
development of our ability to engage with, learn from and learn about other 
people. 
 
 
 
Liking  
The first paper included in this submission (Parker-Rees, 2007a) marks a shift 
of focus from playfulness in nursery and primary classrooms to much earlier 
kinds of interaction. This paper was written for a special issue of the journal 
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‘Early Years’, featuring papers from the Plymouth Early Childhood Studies 
team. Drawing on research into early, preverbal infant development (e.g. 
Trevarthen, 1995; Meltzoff, 1995, 2005; Tomasello, 1999; Reddy 
and Trevarthen, 2004; Dijksterhuis, 2005; Gallese, 2005; Hurley and Chater, 
2005) it shows that early interactions can only really be understood in terms of 
the developing relationship between an infant and a caregiver. Andrew Meltzoff 
proposed, in his ‘Like Me hypothesis’ (Meltzoff, 2005), that babies are 
particularly responsive to interaction partners who reflect their movements and 
vocalisations with attuned, contingent ‘replies’ and I argue that the pleasure 
responses of babies provide powerful rewards for caregivers, helping to 
maintain and prolong attentive interactions. I also draw on interaction research 
(Zlatev, 2002; Garrels, 2004) to show how ‘liking’, adjusting one’s behaviour to 
narrow the gap between communication partners, can contribute to a feeling of 
familiarity. As our interactions become more relaxed and enjoyable we lower the 
mask of social roles and reveal more of the differences which shape our unique 
understandings (our smysl), allowing us to get to know each other better 
(Parker-Rees, 2000).  The familiarity that is gradually developed in relaxed 
social interaction also builds our ability to interpret more subtle cues in the 
behaviour of people we know well. 
 
Unlike a mirror or a video recording, the reflection provided in the responses of 
an attentive, playful partner is enhanced by the affective relational information 
that it also offers. In social interactions we are not merely imitated or reflected, 
we are also (in varying degrees) liked. The simple evidence of how much 
another person is willing to join in a co-regulated, coordinated dance of 
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communication with us tells us about our relationship and about our partner as 
well as about how we are seen. 
 
Unless people who work with babies and infants have opportunities to 
experience the affective charge of interactions between babies and familiar 
partners, they may not be aware of how much babies can do in the context of 
an enabling relationship. Practitioners working with babies in unfamiliar settings 
and relationships can have limited opportunities to observe the ‘heroic glee’ 
(Trevarthen, 2005, p. 97) shown by infants when they are surrounded and 
supported by familiar partners who know and like them. When carers are too 
busy or too stressed to be playful with the infants in their care they may come to 
assume that it is normal for infants to behave in rather flat, passive ways so 
they may not feel any need to create opportunities for more lively interactions. 
 
This concern was developed further in a chapter written for Janet Moyles’s 
‘Early Years Foundations: meeting the challenge’ (Parker-Rees, 2007b). Here I 
argued that the greater value and status afforded to more public, formal and 
sharable kinds of knowing means that the more context specific, private, 
‘primary communication’ associated with the warmth of familiar, playful 
interactions can easily be undervalued and drowned out. Increasing 
‘professionalisation’ has put practitioners under greater pressure to focus their 
attention on how their practice may be interpreted outside the immediate 
context of their setting. Löfdahl and Prieto (2009) have shown how a 
requirement for Swedish early years settings to publish ‘Quality Accounts’ 
detailing good practice has resulted in an observable shift of focus among 
practitioners. Because they need to identify generalizable, indicators of quality 
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(znachenie) they have begun to pay less attention to more intimate, local factors 
(smysl) which cannot be made public in this way. For example, some aspects of 
work with children with additional needs cannot be included in the Quality 
Accounts because of concerns about confidentiality. Other features of close 
relationships with children may be unpublishable because they have to be felt in 
the context of second-person engagement.  
 
In another chapter (Parker-Rees, 2010 revised as 2015d), I argued that play in 
educational contexts was increasingly understood as a convenient strategy for 
enabling and accelerating children’s access to public, recordable and reportable 
kinds of knowing. I characterised this as a focus on ‘hunting’ or ‘getting in’ (the 
pursuit of generalizable knowledge which can be acquired and displayed 
beyond the immediate context) and contrasted this with ‘gathering’ or ‘letting in’ 
more tacit, often context-specific, kinds of information. This accumulation of 
more incidental knowledge, particularly social awareness, is especially well 
supported by playful interactions in relaxed settings and with familiar partners, 
as much among adults, in the form of social chat, as among children in play. 
The OECD study ‘Starting Strong II’ (OECD, 2006: 60) noted the social 
pedagogy favoured in Scandinavian countries where ‘greater emphasis is 
placed on learning to live together’. This was contrasted with the ‘schoolification’ 
found in other countries, including the UK and USA, where a ‘pre-primary’ 
approach to early education is reflected in a greater emphasis on specifying and 
documenting what children should be learning. 
Meeting  
My chapter on ‘Hunting and Gathering’ (Parker-Rees, 2010, 2015d) was 
influenced by my involvement in a long-term project which focused on opening 
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up practice in Steiner kindergartens through extended discussions between 
Steiner kindergarten teachers and teacher educators and early years teacher 
educators from outside the Steiner community. The study was particularly 
democratic, with the scope, focus, design and conduct of the research being 
discussed, negotiated and co-created during a series of day-long meetings. 
These opportunities for extended conversation allowed participants to get to 
know each other socially, echoing the focus, in Steiner kindergarten practice, on 
supporting a community in which people, children and adults, can learn to live 
together. I suggested that the book that emerged from the project should be 
entitled ‘Meeting the Child in Steiner Kindergartens’. As the book’s editor, I 
aimed to present the findings of the project in a way that would enable readers 
to experience something of the rich and complex process of meeting with a 
different way of thinking about young children’s learning. 
 
In the introduction, ‘Ways of Knowing Children’ (Parker-Rees, 2011b), the 
chapters written by other members of the project team are set in the context of 
a wider overview of ways of getting to know children. The ‘gathering’ approach 
that we observed in the Steiner kindergartens is contrasted with the ‘hunting’ 
approach to assessment that is characteristic of ‘pre-primary’ forms of early 
years provision. Margaret Carr noted that hunting for ‘observations’ can 
encourage a focus on what children cannot yet do, echoing Vygotsky’s criticism 
of planning ‘guided not by tomorrow but by yesterday, by the child’s weakness, 
not his strength’ (Vygotsky, in Fleer, 2002, p.7). There is an important distinction 
between meeting or getting to know a child and standing apart to observe and 
document what she is doing. Being observed is not experienced in the same 
way as being ‘liked’. 
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In another chapter (Parker-Rees and Rees, 2011) the focus is again on how 
Steiner kindergartens help adults and children to get to know each other. This 
chapter is grounded in extensive conversations in which Sarah Rees and I 
sought to understand some of the differences between our understandings of 
key concepts. This opportunity to explore our differences, to meet and engage 
with another way of seeing, struck us both as being interestingly similar to the 
open, receptive approach to getting to know each other which we had 
experienced in our observations in Steiner kindergartens. Observing and 
participating in Steiner kindergartens allowed me to discover parallels between 
what the Steiner kindergarten teachers described as ‘inner work’ and my own 
understanding of sympathetic accommodation or ‘liking’. Inner work includes a 
contemplative, reflective ‘stilling’ that allows what has been gathered 
unconsciously, in the course of meeting with children through the day, to 
surface in the form of a ‘picture’ of each child and what they might need. 
Several of the Steiner kindergarten teachers talked about their practice of ‘child 
study’. This is a procedure invoked when adults are concerned that a child is 
not at ease in the kindergarten environment and it involves the teacher (and 
sometimes all staff in the setting) focussing attention on this child over a period 
of a few days, noting their feelings and responses to the child. What I found 
particularly interesting was how teachers would often point out that this noticing 
could be enough, in itself, to resolve any issues. While the Steiner teachers had 
learned to understand this effect in terms of Rudolph Steiner’s anthroposophical 
beliefs, I could relate it to my understanding of ‘liking’. By paying closer attention 
to a child, and to the nature of their interactions, teachers were able to ‘tune up’ 
their relationship in ways that both child and teacher could feel and appreciate. 
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Participation in this project, and editing the book which resulted from it, provided 
me with direct experience of the value of making time to meet with other 
people’s different ways of understanding the needs of young children. This 
meeting extends beyond what can be communicated by words on a page. The 
Steiner kindergarten teachers recognised the importance of what I have 
described as ‘primary communication’ (Parker-Rees, 2007b), the knowing which 
is gathered from full engagement in interactions not just with words or ideas but 
with whole, embodied and situated people. My conversations with other 
participants, informed and complicated by the familiarity gathered from our 
extended meetings, helped me to get a feel for their understanding of Steiner 
practice but also, in the course of exploring our differences, deepened my own 
understanding of what Lois Holzman (1997, p. 87) described as ‘sharing life 
with children’. 
 
 
Joining in (becoming peer)  
The CARITAS (Collaborative Application of Research into Tutoring for 
Autonomous Study) project, on which I was Principal Investigator, involved a 
team of six colleagues from what was then the Faculty of Education, 
representing library staff and leaders of Independent Study Modules on a range 
of programmes. We worked together to develop ways of helping tutors to 
access, share and discuss research into supporting student engagement in self-
directed study. The project led to the development of a Sharepoint site for 
sharing and discussing research and to the introduction of a monthly faculty 
reading group. Joanna Haynes and I then decided to engage with students to 
 29 
 
explore their experience of the small seminar groups intended to provide 
support for their autonomous work on final stage research projects (Parker-
Rees and Haynes 2013).  
 
Although this paper is not focused on early development, it illustrates how an 
interest in ‘meeting’ informed my research into aspects of teaching and learning 
in Higher Education. The structure of the CARITAS project, with day-long 
meetings for discussion of ideas which participants had encountered in their 
own independent exploration of relevant research, drew on what I had learnt 
from the Steiner project about the value of this kind of extended interaction. The 
faculty reading group was a further extension of this attempt to acknowledge the 
social and affective aspects of meeting with other people’s understandings, 
allowing participants to explore differences in their interpretations of shared 
concepts, occasionally glimpsing the personal smysl behind the professional 
znachenie. 
 
Joanna and I were particularly interested in how students experienced the 
support provided both by their supervisors and by seminar groups – small 
groups of students supervised by the same tutor. The paper explores some of 
the issues associated with the supervisory/tutorial role such as the challenge of 
ensuring consistency of provision. We noted the tension between strategies 
introduced to ‘rule out’ too much divergence (e.g. by provision of tutor 
handbooks, induction programmes and staff-development activities) and the 
inescapably variable social dynamics of relationships between different tutors 
and students. We were also interested in the range of responses from students 
about their experience of working with peers.  While most were dismissive 
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about the value of ‘that group-work malarkey’, by the end of the year they were 
able to look back on their relationships with others in their supervisory group 
and to acknowledge that it had been ‘kind of nice’ to be able to share ideas and 
worries with peers who were going through similar experiences. 
 
These meetings with students showed that Dewey’s injunction that ‘the school 
must represent real life’ (1897, p. 3) was as relevant to work with young adults 
as to work with preschool children. Attempts to ‘rule out’ the messiness of 
students’ affective experiences, to establish walls around ‘what is to be learned’, 
can be seen as a kind of ‘schoolification’ of the university, echoing the issues 
identified by Löfdahl and Prieto (2009) in Swedish preschools. 
 
Shortly after writing ‘Informal aspects of becoming peer’ I was invited to 
contribute to a ‘festschrift’ celebrating the work of Vera John-Steiner. In her 
book, ‘Creative Collaborations’ (John-Steiner, 2000), John-Steiner presents 
detailed and sensitive accounts of the ‘behind-the-scenes’ activity which is often 
overlooked in narratives about the achievements of great scientists, scholars, 
artists and thinkers. In my letter (Parker-Rees, 2013) I wanted to acknowledge 
the importance of ‘gossip and daily-ness’ (ibid., p.97), a term used by members 
of a feminist writing collective whose work is explored in chapter 4 of ‘Creative 
Collaborations’. I related this ‘daily-ness’ to Vygotsky’s distinction between 
meaning (znachenie), the public, sharable currency of verbal communication, 
and sense (smysl), the more intimate, relational and context-specific awareness 
of ‘what we do’ –which is more felt than known. The title for my letter, 
‘Collaborative Recreation’, refers to the valuable roles played by ‘meeting’ and 
social interactions in the continuous process of re-creating shared, cultural 
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understandings. This collaborative recreation was evident in the discussions 
between participants in the Steiner and CARITAS research projects, in 
conversations between students and tutors in their seminar groups and in the 
day-to-day experience of learning to live together in early years settings.  
 
 
Co-construction of identity  
Being invited to contribute a chapter to the Sage Handbook of Play and 
Learning in Early Childhood (Parker-Rees, 2014a) provided an opportunity to 
develop research into the role of pre-verbal, primary communication in infant 
development. The original title for the chapter was ‘Playfulness and learning 
who we are’ and my intention was to review recent research into early 
development which suggests that playfulness, familiarity, intimacy and ‘daily-
ness’ provide the context in which a sense of self can be co-constructed. This 
chapter represents a meeting of insights from research in a number of 
disciplines that can inform our understanding of ‘who we are’. Vygotsky’s late 
and unfinished work on ‘The Problem of Age’ (1998/1934) introduced the ‘Social 
Situation of Development’ to explain how opportunities and contexts for social 
interaction shape the development of a child’s ability to participate and are in 
turn transformed by changes in what the child wants and is able to do. Vygotsky 
argued that before infants develop an awareness of a distinct self they live in a 
‘Great We’ (ibid., p. 232) that provides the nest where the ability to participate in 
social interactions is nurtured. I argue that it is not so much that a sense of self 
emerges out of this ‘Great We’, like Venus emerging from the sea, but more that 
the daily-ness of ‘what we do’ shapes the lens through which we refract and 
make sense of our experiences. I argue that our sense of self is, in Vygotsky’s 
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terms, a Higher Mental Function, a ‘habit of mind’ acquired through our 
participation in social relationships and interactions. 
 
Vasudevi Reddy (2008, 2011) has observed that the place of research into early 
childhood development, primarily in departments of psychology, has tended to 
privilege the more detached, ‘scientific’ third-person, spectatorial perspective 
over the more engaged, participant ‘second person perspective’. Reddy argues 
that this has made it more difficult to research the more intimate, familiar forms 
of relationship which I characterise as ‘meeting’ and which constitute the social, 
relational situations in which we can co-construct our understanding of who we 
are. 
 
I note that several key publications (Fogel et al., 2006; Seemann, 2011a; 
Schilbach et al., 2013) have brought together work by developmental and 
comparative psychologists, philosophers and neuroscientists. These 
collaborations represent another kind of ‘meeting of minds’ and a new Social 
Situation of Development which has the potential to enrich and extend our 
understanding of how we come to be who we are – not isolated individuals but 
co-participants in the Great We of a shared culture which is enriched by a 
variety of different lenses and perspectives. 
 
After writing this chapter, I was invited to contribute to a special issue of the 
Brazilian journal Perspectiva (Parker-Rees, 2014b). I am not able to include the 
paper here because it was published in Portuguese (De nós para você para 
mim: a co-construção da identidade nas interações na pequena infância - From 
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us to you to me: the co-construction of identity in early interactions). I will, 
however, outline its main argument, as this relates to the development of my 
thinking about the social processes within which identities are co-constructed. In 
this paper I referred to Karen Barad’s (2007) term, ‘agential cuts’, to highlight 
how our ways of thinking about the ‘boundaries’ between self and other are 
socially constructed, flexible and different in different cultures. In the traditional 
example of a person using a stick to probe the environment, it is not obvious 
where a cut could be made which would mark a clear boundary between person 
and environment. It is equally problematic to determine where an agential cut 
might be made between an infant and the nurturing social situation by means of 
which she is able to engage with and explore her environment. I referred to a 
study (Kärtner et al., 2013) which compared mother/infant interactions in 
German and Nso (Cameroon) families: 
By focusing their study on face to face interaction and social smiles Kärtner 
et al. may overlook the more continuous, tactile forms of intersubjectivity 
which characterise the experience of babies who are almost constantly in 
their mother’s arms. For these babies ‘interaction lacks the peaks of 
emotional excitement seen in Euro-American dyads’ (Kärtner et al., 2013, 86) 
but it also lacks the troughs – being put down in a baby chair, cot or cradle. 
Being repeatedly picked up and put down may accelerate a child’s ability to 
separate out a sense of self (German mothers expect to see social smiles at 
about 2 months while Nso mothers expect this at 7 months, on average) but 
not all cultures would recognise this as something to be desired or actively 
encouraged. (Parker-Rees, 2014b, p. 9041) 
 
I went on to suggest that Western cultural practices may privilege a ‘peaks and 
troughs’ pattern of understanding which extends into the way we think about 
attention and communication: 
                                                          
1
 I have provided quotations from Parker-Rees 20014b in English, as submitted, with 
page references to the corresponding Portuguese text in the published article. 
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Picking up and putting down objects (including babies themselves) can be 
seen as fundamental manifestations of the way people take up interest in 
things, sequentially or collectively,  and how they switch their attention to 
something else. (Parker-Rees, 2014b, p. 907) 
 
In the context of understanding how children are helped to join in with the social 
practices of their family, I argued that attention to the ‘flow’ of interaction may be 
more accessible to the infant than differentiated attention to distinct elements, 
such as sounds, words, turns or even persons. By noticing differences in how 
interactions feel babies can begin to identify the otherness of others, which in 
turn allows them to notice the otherness of themselves - how they are different 
from the people with whom they interact. 
 
One of the reasons why I am so fascinated by the study of very early 
development is that the process of examining the ways in which babies begin, 
with others, to make sense of their environment can take adults out of habitual 
ways of thinking. In this paper, I argued that there is an important distinction 
between looking in on other ways of thinking, from a third-person perspective, 
and meeting with them, through second-person perspective direct engagement: 
This sort of knowing cannot be achieved ‘from outside’, by reading or being 
told, it can only be acquired within particular forms of social interaction.  
(Parker-Rees, 2014b, p. 910) 
 
 
 
Difference  
The 4th edition of the Early Childhood Studies text-book which I first co-edited, 
with Jenny Willan and Jan Savage in 2004 was published in 2015. This book 
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was originally intended to serve three purposes: to provide a resource for 
students, tailored to the structure of our undergraduate programme; to 
encourage new members of the Early Childhood Studies team to write about 
their own areas of interest; and to highlight some of the ways in which the study 
of early childhood can help students to learn about themselves, as well as about 
the lives and worlds of young children. 
 
For the 4th edition I contributed the introduction (as I have for all editions) 
(Parker-Rees, 2015a) and two chapters. ‘Developing Communication: getting to 
know each other’ (Parker-Rees, 2015b) was updated to further emphasise the 
importance, well beyond early childhood, of the full spectrum of modes of 
communication; the whole cake of which speech is just the icing. I also 
contributed a new chapter, ‘Concepts of Childhood: meeting with difference’ 
(Parker-Rees, 2015c).  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the history of ways of understanding 
childhood, emphasising the two-way relationship between ideas about 
childhood and ideas about adulthood. I explore the dynamic tension between 
competing concepts of childhood, drawing on David Kennedy’s observations 
about the tension between the ‘same-ness’ which allows us to live together in 
large social groups and the ‘different-ness’ which sets each of us apart as a 
unique individual (Kennedy and Kohan, 2012; Kennedy, 2013a). On the one 
hand, the romantic concept of childhood celebrates the innocence, creativity 
and different-ness of childhood as qualities to be protected, preserved and 
extended into adulthood. On the other hand, more classical or empirical 
concepts of childhood focus on helping children to progress, as quickly as 
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possible, from this wild or savage condition into the civilised, well-mannered 
same-ness of adulthood.  
 
The history of childhood has tended to be characterised by ‘grand-narratives’ 
which highlight shifts, swings and transformations from one period to another 
but I argue that this tension between what William Blake might have called the 
‘contraries’ of childhood and adulthood, difference and sameness, smysl and 
znachenie is an inescapable and beneficial feature of what it is to be human. It 
is not only across time periods, between cultures or within sub-sections of a 
society that disagreements can be found between romantic and classical, pro-
child and pro-adult concepts of childhood. Similar tensions can be found within 
families (between mothers and fathers and between parents and grandparents) 
and within individuals whose feelings about childhood may vary in different 
contexts (e.g. in private and public environments) and at different times (e.g. 
when exhausted or when full of energy). Kennedy (2013b, p.38) has suggested 
that instead of attempting to rule out these tensions we should welcome and 
encourage a dialogue between the ‘emergent structure’ of the child and the 
‘relatively fixed structure’ of the adult. Individuals, families and societies benefit 
from the ‘meeting with difference’ which children can offer, in their role as 
‘valuable strangers’ (Harding, in Kennedy, 2006, p. 142). Modern communities 
are impoverished by the age-segregation that separates both the young and the 
elderly from the daily-ness of adult life. Inverting a familiar proverb, I have 
argued that ‘it takes children to raise a village’ (Parker-Rees, 2015c, p. 200). 
Minding  
From 2013 to 2017 I worked with Sandra Mathers, Jan Georgeson and Verity 
Campbell-Barr on a funded project, ‘Two-year-olds in England: an exploratory 
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study’ (Georgeson et al., 2014). I have contributed a chapter (Parker-Rees, 
2017) to the book, ‘Places for two-year-olds’, edited by Georgeson and 
Campbell-Barr, in which I further develop my focus on the role of pre-verbal 
‘meeting’ in early development. I suggest that, as well as feeding and clothing 
our infants, human parents are also responsible for minding them, not in the 
potentially derogatory sense of (merely) meeting their basic needs but in the 
much more important sense of helping them to ‘mind’. I argue that it is more 
appropriate to examine minding as a social process than to attempt to 
understand minds as independent entities. I return to the arguments I made in 
‘Liking to be Liked’ (Parker-Rees, 2007a) and in ‘Playfulness and the co-
construction of identity’ (Parker-Rees, 2014a) but with a new understanding of 
the relationships between the different-ness of personal identity and the same-
ness of cultural ‘rules’. 
 
Karen Nelson (2007) notes the distinction made by young children between the 
sameness or routine-ness implied by certain ‘present tense’ phrases (I have 
cereal for breakfast, I go to school, I put my pyjamas on before I go to bed) and 
the different-ness or specificity of ‘past-tense’ phrases (I had cereal for 
breakfast [this morning], I went to school [today], I put my pyjamas on before I 
went to bed [last night]). Awareness (albeit largely unconscious) of this 
distinction shows that even by the age of about 3 years, children are able to 
differentiate between ‘scripts’ or ‘formats’ which describe what we do (as a rule) 
and what might be described as individual instances or performances of a 
particular behaviour. Initially young children rely on the information available in 
and from contexts to ‘remind’ them about ‘what we do’ and about what they can 
do with things, so it makes very little sense to try to study or make claims about 
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what children can do when they are taken out of this familiar ‘minding’ 
environment. In time, however, ‘what we can do’ can be internalised, not in the 
form of pieces of information (hunted, caught and kept) but in the form of the 
habits, habitudes (Dewey, 1916), rituals (Gadamer, in Grondin, 2000) or habitus 
(Bourdieu, 1990, 2000) which shape the ‘lens’ through which we make sense of 
experience, refracting sensory information into perezhivanie.  Thinking about 
learning in terms of the abstraction of rules or theories about regularities and 
patterns in our experience has fuelled interest in ‘Theory of Mind’ (Premack and 
Woodruff, 1978; Mitchell, 2011) as an explanation of how children are able to 
understand other people. Lawrence Hirschfeld (2013) has argued that a ‘Theory 
of Society’ may better represent the way we come to know what we can expect 
others to do, say and think: 
In negotiating social interactions, mentalizing is less important than 
attention to the contingencies of context, normative constraints on action, 
epistemic affordances of the cultural environment, and the group dynamics 
of the social milieu. (Hirschfeld, 2013, p. 101) 
 
To describe this kind of knowing as a theory may be misleading. This is not  
knowledge owned by individuals or contained in brains but the more distributed, 
social knowledge which Shotter (after Wittgenstein) describes as ‘knowing how 
to go on’ (Shotter, 2012). In Karen Barad’s words, this kind of knowing ‘does not 
come from standing at a distance and representing but rather from a direct 
material engagement with the world’ (Barad, 2007, p. 49 original emphasis). 
 
It is in relaxed, playful, convivial interactions, such as children’s pretend play or 
adults’ social chat, that we are most able to ‘learn to live together’ because 
these are the times when minding flows and we are less cautious about how we 
present ourselves. When people are open to communication and immersed in 
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‘second-person’ relationships, their responses, attention, anecdotes and 
accounts are ‘telling’ because their choices allow others to meet their minding 
and to notice their different-ness. 
 
The process of tracing the development of my thinking about meeting and 
minding has made me increasingly conscious of the challenge of using an 
essentially ‘third-person’ medium to communicate a developing understanding 
of the social, relational and continuous nature of the undercurrents which shape 
our meaning making. While language provides a degree of ‘sameness’ which 
can allow meanings to be (more or less) shared, the tidiness of printed words, 
as presented here, can only represent the surface of the flow of our minding. In 
conversation, even the cumbersome conversation of written exchanges in 
emails, letters or postings on online forums, we can slowly begin to discover the 
person behind the concepts, recognising telling differences in the ways words 
and concepts are used. It is too easy to forget, that beneath the ‘public’ surface 
of language, stilled on the page, lie powerful affective currents of distinctive and 
intriguing attitudes. Engaging, joining in and meeting with children whose 
communication is not yet framed by language can remind us of the simple 
pleasure afforded by sharing our attention, attitudes and minding with others.  
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Liking to be liked: imitation, familiarity
and pedagogy in the first years of life
Rod Parker-Rees*
University of Plymouth, Exeter, UK
This paper offers a review of the literature on the role of imitation in the earliest stages of social
interaction between babies and familiar partners. The review focuses on the ways in which
reciprocal imitation marks familiar relationships that provide special contexts for babies to engage
actively and exuberantly in the construction of a shared culture. Because adults’ perception of a
baby’s actions and intentions are filtered by the adult’s experience of living within a particular
culture, babies can obtain valuable information about this culture from the differences between
what they do and how familiar adults respond to them. As they become increasingly interested in
the social meaning of people’s behaviour, infants also become more sensitive about how their own
actions may be interpreted, showing pride and delight when their intentions are realised and
embarrassed withdrawal when their efforts fail. When very young children are observed in
unfamiliar contexts and when they are cared for and educated in professional settings, they may
have relatively few opportunities for lively, joyful exchanges with reassuringly familiar partners and
this can distort adults’ perceptions of ‘normal’ infant behaviour. It is argued that adults’ attentive
interest in mutually enjoyable exchanges with young children is an important difference between
humans and other apes and provides an essential foundation for pedagogy and for children’s active
participation in a shared culture.
Keywords: Imitation; Familiarity; Pedagogy; ‘Like me’; Emotions of companionship
Introduction
The study of very young children’s abilities to imitate the facial expressions, gestures
and actions of others has recently become a focus for cross-disciplinary studies which
draw on psychology, sociology, neuroscience, anthropology, philosophy and other
disciplines to try to make sense of this facility (Hurley & Chater, 2005). In this
paper, I will argue that the imitative abilities of infants cannot be understood in
isolation from the cultural contexts in which they develop. What makes humans so
different from the other great apes is not just what individual infants are able to do,
but also what adults and infants like to do together. The same evolutionary processes
which led to the development of social groups, intentional communication, dance,
music and gossip also led us to enjoy conversational exchanges with our children,
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exchanges in which we imitate them as much as they imitate us. The evidence from
research on imitation may help early years practitioners, and those who prepare
people for this crucial work, to understand the mechanisms at work in our
interactions with babies and young children but we should also acknowledge the
pedagogical importance of adults’ enjoyment of these conversations.
Shifting perspectives on infant imitation
When Meltzoff and Moore (1977) first presented evidence of newborn babies’
ability to imitate facial expressions, notably tongue protrusion, their findings met
with an unenthusiastic, even cynical response from a field which was still firmly
grounded in a Piagetian model of early infancy. As Meltzoff and his colleagues,
Gopnik and Kuhl, later observed (Gopnik et al., 1999), reluctance to acknowledge
the active role of babies in communication exchanges may have reflected the fact
that, in the 1970s, developmental psychology was very much on the outer fringes of
what was still a predominantly male discipline. One can understand how men might
continue to believe that the first months of life were dominated by reflexes and an
essentially passive accumulation of knowledge about the world, but for those who
have spent time caring for and engaging with a young baby, this view could feel
incompatible with their own experiences. Reddy and Trevarthen (2004) offer the
example of Professor Elizabeth Bates who, at a meeting of the British Psychological
Society in 1993, admitted that she had been sceptical about the possibility of
neonatal imitation until she experienced it first hand with one of her grandchildren.
Bates acknowledged that the phenomenological evidence of feeling that her
grandchild was indeed engaging her in a form of conversation proved more
convincing than any number of published research findings.
While some have been persuaded by the evidence of their own interactions with
children, others have been won round by evidence from research in neuroscience—
especially since the discovery, by Rizzolatti et al. (1996), of ‘mirror neurons’ in
macaque monkeys. Rizzolatti and his colleagues accidentally discovered that specific
neurons which fired when the monkeys grasped an object were also activated when
the monkeys saw the experimenters grasping ice-cream cones (Trevarthen, 2005).
The researchers went on to identify other mirror neurons which fired both when the
monkeys performed a specific action and when they observed the same action
performed by another monkey, or indeed by a human. Other researchers have gone
on to replicate and extend these findings—in humans as well as in monkeys (Fadiga
et al., 1995; Decety et al., 1997; Iacoboni et al., 1999). Although there is still much to
learn about how the mirror neuron system works, it is now generally accepted that it
does work and research on the physiology of imitation is challenging old assumptions
about the distinction between perception and action (Prinz, 2005a) and indeed
between self and others (Gallese, 2005).
Ironically, the discovery of the mirror neuron system in monkeys has been
accompanied by a growing realisation that imitation can be seen as an almost
exclusively human phenomenon (Tomasello, 1999; Donald, 2001; Zlatev, 2002;
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Garrels, 2004). As long as we assumed that imitation was a primitive, ‘monkey-see,
monkey-do’ response, we could dismiss it as being too trivial to merit further
research. It became much more interesting once we began to understand that adults’
and children’s imitation of each other’s behaviour was almost never seen even in our
closest relatives, the other great apes. Mutual imitation might have a key role in the
rapid evolution of human culture:
imitation actually leads babies to behave in new ways that are not genetically
determined and, in fact, to behave like the adults around them. Imitation is the motor
for culture. (Gopnik et al., 1999, p. 167)
Research on other animals has confirmed that several forms of behaviour
associated with imitation, have not been recorded in other species, except,
sometimes, in individuals which have been reared and intensively trained by
humans. Wild animals do not use pointing to show interest (though some apes can
be taught to do this) (Corballis, 2002); they do not practise skills (though human-
reared bonobos have on rare occasions and Alex, a human reared African grey parrot
does practise new words—if these were first taught in the context of social
interaction with humans) (Pepperberg, 1999); they do not learn by imitation and
neither do they teach (though human-reared bonobos have been seen unsuccessfully
attempting to show wild-reared bonobos how to complete tasks) (Donald, 2001).
Perhaps most significantly for this paper, no other animals, even those who have
successfully been taught to use sign language or tokens to communicate with
humans, have ever been observed using these symbol systems to chat with each other
(Donald, 2001). The fact that human-reared animals frequently display skills which
have never been observed in the wild suggests that pedagogy, the sometimes
deliberate and sometimes unwitting efforts of adults to shape the behaviour of their
children, may explain why the emergence and persistence of culture has (so far) been
unique to human societies. Perhaps as a result of our heightened ability to infer what
other people know, think and believe, we have evolved a powerful predisposition to
enjoy communing with babies, especially our own, in ways which go beyond the
protective care shown by other species: most of us like babies and most babies like to
be liked by familiar adults.
If it acts like me, it likes me
Andrew Meltzoff has continued to research infant imitation for nearly 30 years and
has recently summarised the findings that have led him to develop his ‘Like me’
hypothesis (Meltzoff, 2005). He argues that babies are predisposed to focus their
attention on information that matches their own movements, information which is
‘like me’. A mobile suspended over a baby’s cot can become much more interesting,
for example, if it is attached to the baby’s leg, so that its movement is contingent on
the baby’s kicking. Not only will the baby explore and test this contingency with
vigorous bouts of kicking and rapt attention, but it may also begin to smile at the
mobile (Watson, 1979).
Infants’ imitative ability in a cultural context 5
While mechanical devices such as a contingent cot mobile can provide some
measure of ‘like me’ information, the great majority will come not from objects but
from people, and not from just any people but specifically from people who are
actively and deliberately engaging with the baby (Meltzoff & Moore, 1999). Much as
the exaggerated intonation of infant-directed speech can help to make utterances
targeted at a baby stand out from the relatively flat contours of ordinary speech
between adults, the communicative behaviour of an engaged adult, one who is
responding to the rhythm, intensity and style of the baby’s own movements is
highlighted and marked as particularly interesting by this ‘like me’ quality. Research
by Cohn and Tronick (1983) showed that babies quickly become anxious when this
‘like me’ information is interrupted, as when a mother withholds engagement cues
by adopting a ‘still face’. Murray and Trevarthen (1985) also showed that babies’
responses to ‘live’ CCTV images of their mother engaging with them were very
different from their responses to delayed or recorded images which still showed their
mother engaging with them but now ‘out of synch’.
Meltzoff conducted a similar experiment but using real engagement between 14-
month-olds and two adults, one of whom actively imitated the child while the other
responded contingently (in time with the child’s actions) but not performing the
same actions as the child (Meltzoff, 1990). The children looked and smiled
significantly less at the merely contingent adult than at the more ‘like me’ one. They
also engaged actively with their imitator, deliberately varying their own movements
while closely monitoring the adult’s response. In another study, after noticing that 6-
month-old infants would often look at their mothers and smile after they had
successfully imitated an action (making a light come on by touching it with their
heads), Meltzoff observed that ‘there is a social-game quality to human interaction’
(Meltzoff, 2005, p. 59). This has obvious benefits for learning, as it helps to bind
adult and child into a mutually rewarding emotional engagement, suffusing learning
with an affective component which makes it much more effective as a cultural tool.
Toddlers are not simply learning machines, as some behaviourists (and even some
Piagetians) would seem to believe. Their activity, even with inanimate objects but
particularly with interested other people, is typically, though not universally and not
always to the same extent, emotional as well as ‘cognitive’ or ‘intellectual’. Several
studies have shown that babies do not tend to imitate the actions of mechanical
devices in the same way that they imitate human models (Meltzoff, 2005). Simon
Baron-Cohen (2003) has argued that we are all at different points on a systemising-
empathising spectrum, with men being more likely to be predominantly systemisers
and women tending to favour empathising.
This suggestion clearly has implications for differences between the parenting
styles of fathers and mothers (and for the research interests of male and female
developmental psychologists) but it also highlights the fact that even babies may
display a wide range of different responses to social stimuli. For a social group as a
whole, however, a tendency for most babies to prefer interactions with people who
are interested in them, and who display this interest through contingent responses,
may confer an evolutionary advantage. As Kinsbourne (2005) points out, it may be
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unwise or even dangerous to imitate any and all available models. Infants’ choices
about how fully they will engage in imitative exchanges seem to be influenced by
their awareness of the extent to which a communication partner is ‘tuned in’ to their
own movements, rhythms and vocalisations. There is clearly a systemising
component to this ability to detect contingent behaviour but, for most children,
this is accompanied by an empathising connection which lifts the experience of
reciprocal communication to a different affective level: ‘By 14 months, infants
undoubtedly know that adults are not under their total control and part of the joy of
this exchange is the realisation that although the infant does not actually control the
other, nevertheless, the other is choosing to do just what I do’ (Meltzoff & Decety,
2003, in Garrels, 2004, p. 20).
The ability of most infants to express their own joy, interest and fascination
makes them particularly rewarding conversation partners. More experienced
and enculturated adults and older children are captivated by babies’ social
skills and willingly serve them as tutors, not in mechanical, systemised training,
but in delightful conversations fuelled by mutual enjoyment of generously
shared interest: ‘we would all prefer to be cared for by someone who enjoys our
company rather than by someone who acts out of grim duty’ (Noddings, 2002,
pp.178–9).
Adults act as social mirrors or cultural editors of infants’ actions
In choosing to do just what the infant does, adults, and especially doting parents,
hold up a ‘social mirror’ (Rochat, 2004) to the children with whom they interact.
Prinz (2005b) has suggested that this imitative mirroring allows infants to perceive
aspects of their own actions that are normally ‘filtered out’ in the early stages of
perceptual processing:
organisms are made for understanding the world surrounding them, rather than for
understanding themselves; that is, how their own bodies and their own minds work. For
instance, it has long been known that veridical perception relies on mechanisms that
subtract, from the total information available, any contributions that are due to the
perceiver/actor. (Prinz, 2005b, p. 181)
Our ability to subtract out our own actions allows us to maintain a stable perception
of our environment as we move around within it. We can differentiate between
perceptual changes resulting from our own movement, such as the saccadic
movements made by our eyes as we read, and those which are independent of our
actions, such as when an insect flies past us; however:
As a consequence of being mirrored by somebody else, the infant comes to perceive her
own actions through the other. It may be such attending to one’s own actions through
the mirror of somebody else that may counteract and eventually help to overcome the
inbuilt mechanism for cancelling the perceiver/actor and her contributions to the world
she is perceiving and acting upon. (Prinz, 2005b, p.182)
Recognising our own actions without simultaneously experiencing the familiar flow
of proprioceptive feedback about what our bodies are doing may result in a feeling of
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unease similar to the embarrassment many people experience when they see
themselves on video or hear themselves on audio recordings. We can recognise
ourselves but what we see or hear feels oddly unfamiliar. Toddlers may also show
signs of embarrassment when they see themselves in a mirror (Reddy, 2000), but in
comfortable, scaffolded interactions with familiar partners, this unease is dispelled
by the pleasure that comes from being ‘liked’. Because people tend to become
entrained by the movements and rhythms of people they like (Dijksterhuis, 2005),
being imitated in this way shows us not only that the other person is like me, but also
that they like me or, at least, that they are empathising with me. A mirror image or a
video recording may copy my actions exactly but it cannot like me.
For most people, being ‘liked’ or imperfectly imitated by a communication partner
is emotionally rewarding (we like being liked), but when babies converse with adults
or older children, who are already well versed in the ways of their culture, they also
benefit from a powerful mechanism which supports their induction into culturally
valued ways of behaving. Affiliation to a particular culture entails a progressive
adjustment of one’s action and perception processes as a result of differential levels
of exposure to ‘normal’ (relatively frequent) and ‘unusual’ events. Language learning
provides a particularly clear example of this tuning process: ‘as children acquire a
vocabulary and see the world through the language they acquire, they learn not to
see it as well, for a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing’ (Eisner, 1990; emphasis
added).
When adults engage in conversations or chats with babies, their interpretation of
the baby’s contributions is inescapably filtered by perception systems which have
been tuned by prior exposure to the kinds of experiences associated with a particular
culture. A fleeting twitch of the corners of the lips may be perceived as a social smile,
prompting the adult to respond with a full, even exaggerated, display of a ‘proper’
smile. Virtually any vocalisation which begins with a /m/ sound will be inescapably
pulled in by a perceptual attractor which will shape the mother’s response into
‘mum’ or ‘mama’, accompanied by plenty of encouraging, celebratory cues to mark
the pleasure and value attached to these sounds. Regardless of their intentions, the
cultural tuning of adults’ perception processes will tidy and smooth the baby’s
actions and sounds, assimilating them to a pre-existing cultural template. The adult
therefore serves as an ‘enhancing mirror’ (Trevarthen, 1995, p. 16) in which the
infant sees not an exact reflection, but a culturally edited, ‘retouched’ version of its
own actions. It is the combination of reassuring familiarity, resulting from the adult’s
efforts to affiliate with the baby, and stimulating novelty, resulting from the
differences between what the baby does and how the adult responds, which enables
babies to pick out valuable information about what matters in this particular cultural
context (Parker-Rees, 2004).
The benefits of repetition with variation: seeing the intention behind the act
Because infants enjoy the companionship and familiarity associated with seeing their
own behaviour returned to them with interest, they reward attentive adults with
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smiles, laughter and infectious joy, shaping the adults’ behaviour even as their own
behaviour is shaped by the adults’ editing. When adults find a form of interaction
that works, they will therefore be more likely to repeat it, giving babies the added
benefit of opportunities to find a pattern in a series of familiar, but not identical,
repetitions of a successful ‘play format’ (Bruner, 1983). Adults do not have to start
from scratch when it comes to finding what will appeal to babies because they are
likely to have been exposed to interactions between other adults and babies—both in
the flesh and in books, on TV and in other media. Every culture provides parents
with a ‘starter kit’ of games, such as ‘peekaboo’, giving and taking, boisterous jiggling
and swinging, funny noises and expressions, nursery songs and rhymes, which have
survived the rigorous processes of memetic selection as they have passed from
generation to generation. Each culture’s favoured styles of adult–child interaction,
for example, the extent to which the infant’s arousal is encouraged or damped down,
the degree of animation in voice and gestures and the nature and frequency of
physical contact, both emerge from and contribute to the more general behavioural
styles characteristic of the culture. Babies adopt, but also adapt, the patterns of
behaviour which adults share with them.
Every family has its own microculture of rituals and routines, around mealtimes,
bathtimes, bedtimes and playtimes, which offer infants frequent opportunities to
repeat familiar, culturally mediated patterns of interaction with a familiar partner.
This frequent repetition allows infants to construct mental models or ‘general event
representations’ (Nelson, 1986) that enable them to differentiate between
predictable (and therefore uninteresting) events and unexpected, novel or surprising
events, which merit more attention: ‘We are highly adaptive creatures. The
predictable becomes, by definition, background, leaving the attention uncluttered,
the better to deal with the random or unexpected’ (Ian McEwan, Enduring love, cited
in Wilson et al., 2005, p. 5).
One consequence of an increasing ability to predict how other people will behave
in a familiar context is that older infants begin to be able to pay more attention to
other people’s intentions. Gergely et al. (1995, in Gergely, 2002) have shown that by
the age of 9 months, infants will even appear to ascribe intentions to animated
shapes on a computer monitor. After seeing a small circle moving along and
‘jumping’ over a rectangle to ‘meet’ a large circle, they were shown two animations
in which the same circles featured, but without the rectangle ‘obstacle’. They looked
more intently at the animation in which the small circle followed the same path as
before (jumping over the place where the rectangle had been) than at the more
different animation, in which the small circle moved straight to the large circle. This
suggests that the infants were able to make allowances for the ways in which ‘reality
constraints’, such as obstacles, can change the form of action appropriate for
achieving a particular goal.
Just as adults perceive infants’ actions through the filter of perceptual systems
which have been tuned by exposure to a particular culture, so infants repeatedly
exposed to daily routines can begin to discriminate between incidental or accidental
‘noise’ in people’s behaviour and ‘information’ which is worthy of their attention.
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Gergely et al. (2002) repeated Meltzoff’s experiment in which infants watch an adult
who makes a box light up by touching it with her head, except that one group of 14-
month-olds saw a slightly modified demonstration. Half of the children saw the
unusual action performed by a model who was holding a blanket around her
shoulders, so that her hands were not free. Many more children in this group used
their hands to press on the box, rather than their heads, suggesting that they were
imitating what they understood to be the model’s intention, rather than just
mimicking the action they had seen. Meltzoff (1995) has also shown that 18-month-
olds will imitate an action that a model ‘failed’ to achieve (e.g. pulling a toy
dumbbell apart), rather than simply copying the model’s unsuccessful actions.
Other studies have examined the extent to which infants are influenced by a
model’s explicit verbal cues to differentiate between intended and unintended
actions. Carpenter et al. (1998) showed 14- and 18-month-olds an adult who
performed two actions on an object, saying ‘There!’ while performing one and
‘Whoops!’ while performing the other (the order being varied). After the second
action coloured lights, would suddenly turn on. All of the infants imitated the
‘intended’ (‘There!’) action significantly more than the unintended (‘Whoops!’) one,
suggesting that their attention was focused on making sense of what the model was
‘trying’ to do rather than simply repeating what the model did. Want and Harris
(2001) also used a verbal cue, ‘Oops!’, when showing older (2.5 and 3.5 years)
children how a toy figure could be removed from a tube by means of a stick. Pushing
the stick down one end of the tube would push the figure into a trap, pushing from
the other end would successfully push the figure out. Showing the wrong method,
saying ‘Oops!’, and then showing the right method proved to be significantly more
effective (for the older children) than just showing the correct method or a control
condition in which the stick was moved outside the tube. A later, similar study
allowed Harris and Want to show that a single exposure to the incorrect method
(‘Oops!’) followed by the correct method was significantly more effective than
repeated independent trial and error (Harris & Want, 2005).
While these studies do show how infants might derive pedagogical benefits from
social cues that help them to filter irrelevant actions out of their imitations, they still
suffer from the shortcomings identified by Donaldson (1978), in her criticism of
Piaget’s clinical experiments. When children are taken to laboratories and exposed
to carefully controlled and systemised peculiar events, they may reveal something
about how their minds work in this sort of isolated context, but we should be wary
about assuming that this is how their minds will work in the more normal context of
lively interaction with familiar confederates.
Emotions of companionship: conditions for playful exchanges
In real-world contexts, interactions with other people are suffused with emotional
significance as we carefully monitor not just what other people do but also how they
react to what we do and to what other people do. As Reddy and Trevarthen (2004)
have observed, from the age of about 6 months infants become considerably more
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self-conscious than neonates about their participation with others in imitative
engagements. As they turn from self-absorbed fascination with the development of
control over their bodies to a new interest in whatever interests their communication
partners (evidenced in social referencing and joint attention), they also become
acutely aware of how their own actions are appraised by others:
Cultural learning and everything to do with education and shared artificial knowledge
and skills involves communication in relation to a joint and mutual experience of the
world of objects, and that is where you get these very powerful emotions of pride, which
reflect the appraisal of other persons—pride in knowledge and pride in skill, and shame
in not being thought master of such things, to be thought unskilled or ignorant. These
emotions of companionship are crucial in the development of happy self-confidence at
any age. (Trevarthen, 2005, p. 97)
There are interesting parallels between these emotions of companionship and the
cues used by Carpenter et al. (1998) and Want and Harris (2001); ‘There!’ can be
seen as marking pride in successful action and ‘Whoops!’ signals a degree of
embarrassment or shame when an intended outcome is not achieved. But these
exclamations are no more than vestiges of much more powerful emotional forces that
are particularly associated with infants’ confident interactions with familiar and fully
engaged partners: ‘There is a kind of heroic glee in the navigating 6-month-old’s
spirit—an infectious pride signalled by presentation of previously imitated acts in
clever, exaggerated and surprising ways for the appreciation of others’ (Trevarthen,
2005, p. 97).
Such joyful inventiveness may play an important part in what makes human
culture so adaptable and so responsive to new ideas. Vygotsky (1988, p. 64) argued
that: ‘The very essence of cultural development is in the collision of mature cultural
forms of behaviour with the primitive forms that characterise the child’s behaviour;
and Donald (2001, p. 153) echoed this idea in his claim that; ‘the creative collision
between the conscious mind and distributed cultural systems has altered the very
form of human cognition.’ When fresh new minds collide (and collude) with the
cultural systems that shape the behaviour of people around them, they do not simply
mimic what they observe. Instead, they find or construct form and structure in the
patterning of their experience and, given propitious social contexts, they delight in
trying out their personal perspective on other people:
Babies come already ‘designed’, or ‘programmed’, to be deeply interested in the people
and world in which they find themselves. They are incredibly observant and selective, as
well as being extremely clever at interpreting what they witness. They learn best by
playing with things they find in their world, and above all by playing with the familiar
people who love them. (David et al., 2003, p. 150)
Children do not simply conform to the culture that surrounds them, they perform it
(Parker-Rees, 1999), communicating their own interpretation like a musician
performing a piece of music. Instead of passively copying what other people do,
taking up cultural habits as if they were a uniform, they adapt them, play with them
and dress up in them, and, in the process, encourage others to see new possibilities in
them. The creative process by which children make sense, rather than simply find it,
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appears, however, to be particularly vulnerable to the kinds of social pressures
associated with unfamiliar environments or interactions with unfamiliar people.
Challenges and implications for researchers and professional early years
settings
Because child development researchers seldom have time to develop a comfortable
familiarity with their subjects, ‘heroic glee’ is very seldom found in controlled
‘laboratory’ studies of infant behaviour. With a few notable exceptions from the
1980s (e.g. Tizard & Hughes, 1984; Stern, 1985; Dunn, 1988), and despite a
general trend towards the use of sociocultural models for understanding children’s
development, it is still difficult to find substantial studies which document very
young children’s participation in their natural habitat. As Engel (2005, p. 36) has
observed, ‘It is more respectable to study primates in their natural habitat than
human children in their homes’.
Even in the best-managed early years settings, it may also be difficult to achieve
the depth of shared experience and easy companionship which allows young children
to engage in bold, confident social participation. Allocating a key worker to each
child can certainly help both parents and babies to build trusting relationships with
professional carers (Goldschmied & Jackson, 2004) but this is not sufficient to
ensure that staff can regularly ‘find time to play, have fun, sing and laugh with young
babies’ (DfES, 2004, p. 5).
The issues for researchers and for practitioners are linked because lack of
experience of babies in their natural environment can lead to cultural assumptions
that filter adults’ perceptions of what counts as normal infant behaviour. Young
professionals whose only contact with children is in settings where staff are too busy
to nurture familiar relationships may have little experience of babies’ ‘full-on’
engagement in joyful interactions. When these practitioners come across reports of
laboratory studies which have been conducted with emotionally uncomfortable
children, they may therefore have little reason to challenge the limited view of
children’s potential which such studies can promote; and:
If we assume that the infant is unaware of our expectations or intentions we act
accordingly: we do not encourage the baby to cooperate with or play with our intentions
and expectations, and we do not engage with infants’ actions that may be attempts to
engage our expectations and intentions. For a playful parent, who enjoys the shared
emotions, this does not seem the right way to go. (Reddy & Trevarthen, 2004, p. 14)
One implication for the training and development of early years professionals is
that placement experience for the birth-to-3 stage should include opportunities to
spend time with parents and babies in home environments, or at least in
environments where parents and children can be seen engaging in confident,
playful interactions, as well as in professional settings. The English Early Years
Foundation Stage (EYFS) consultation document (DfES, 2006) encourages
practitioners to ‘find out as much as you can from parents and carers about young
babies before they join the setting, so that the routines you follow are familiar and
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comforting’ (p. 40), and to ‘find out from parents how they like to communicate
with their baby’ (p. 44), but valuable though such information may be, I am not
convinced that this will be sufficient to ‘recalibrate’ the perceptual tuning of early
years practitioners. Simply spending time with parents and children in a home
setting also may not be enough to change the way prospective early years
professionals think about the capabilities of babies. Susan Engel (2005, p. 42)
quotes a colleague who professed amazement at how little developmental
psychologists know about children, ‘even when they have some at home’, and
remember that Professor Elizabeth Bates was only able to recognize babies’ ability to
imitate when she observed imitation at first hand not with her own children, but with
her grandchildren.
It may be, however, that focused observation of babies’ interactions with familiar
adults in the home environment might help developing early years practitioners to
see and feel what babies can achieve, given optimum support. Direct, personal
experience of the close, familiar relationship which allows parents to understand and
support their young children may also contribute to a greater respect for parents.
There is always a danger that the professional development of early years
practitioners can result in somewhat critical attitudes to the parenting skills and
practices of ‘untrained’ parents and much work with very young children is in
situations where professionals can be seen as ‘taking over’ from parents. A
phenomenologically grounded, experiential understanding of the importance of
babies’ interactions with familiar adults might help practitioners to see that a very
important part of their role is valuing and supporting relationships between parents
and children (Barnes et al., 2006). Promoting parents’ understanding of the
pedagogical value of enjoying their children’s company should be an important part
of the early years professional’s role.
While commercial constraints and pressure of other tasks may make it difficult for
early years professionals to re-create the ‘attentive love’ (Noddings, 2002) which can
flourish in the depth of shared experience between parent and child, there is still much
that can be done to support the development of empathising as well as systemising
skills in early years settings. What such settings lack in opportunities for intimate
interactions between a child and a familiar adult can, to some extent, be compensated
by greater opportunities for children to practise getting to know each other.
Vivien Gussin Paley (Paley, 2001) has written a short but powerful account of
how one teacher, Mrs Tully, used ‘doing stories’ to help a group of 2-year-olds’ to
develop their own, shared culture and, in the process, to discover, assert and share
their own identities. The children would dictate stories to Mrs Tully throughout the
day and then, in the afternoon, they would all gather together to ‘do’ the stories, in
the manner Mrs Tully had learned from Paley’s book, Wally’s stories (Paley, 1981).
This involved Mrs Tully reading the story while the ‘author’ performed it in front of
the other children, sometimes recruiting some or all of them as co-players or props.
This was not, however, the end of the story. Once the author had performed, any of
the other children could perform their own version of the story and sometimes every
child would offer his or her own interpretation, as when the story was just the one
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word, ‘Mama’. As each child performed, they revealed aspects of themselves, as we
all do whenever we tell a story in our own way, but they also contributed to the
evolution of a shared understanding of the story and of their individual relationships
with it, an understanding which became part of the culture of this community of
two-year-olds. As Mrs Tully said: ‘When my babies do their stories, that’s when they
really see each other … that’s what we need to go after in school, the seeing and the
listening to each other’ (Paley, 2001, pp.11–12).
Babies can imitate movements and recognise when their own movements are
being imitated but these older children are already imitating stories and observing
what is revealed when different people each imitate a story in their own, unique way.
Adults engage in social conversation, sharing and responding to anecdotes both as a
way of getting to know each other and as a way of maintaining social relationships.
Kinsbourne (2005, p. 170) observes that this sort of ‘conversing’ has a ‘powerful
affiliative effect that binds people together socially and gratifies them emotionally’.
Like Mithen (2005), Kinsbourne suggests that this emotional function of ‘entrained’
or coordinated interaction developed before the emergence of language; we danced
together and sang together well before we started to talk to each other. Indeed, as
Rochat (2004) has argued, babies are social creatures well before they are able to
construct an individual identity of their own. It is perhaps odd, then, that our
understanding of pedagogy is still dominated by a rather narrow, systemising
approach to the assembly and profiling of individual intellectual abilities. We have
tended to assume that learning by imitation is a one-way process in which the learner
obtains information from a more competent model, and in which the relationship
between learner and model is of little or no importance. Research on reciprocal
imitation with familiar partners reminds us that our delight in the company of other
people lies at the very heart of the uniquely human process of intentional pedagogy.
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Introduction
Ways of knowing children
Rod Parker-Rees
In this chapter I offer an account of how the contributors to this book became
involved in exploring Steiner kindergarten teachers’ approaches to getting to know
children. I suggest some ways in which distinctive aspects of Steiner kindergarten
teachers’ ways of being with children can contribute to a wider examination of
how we help young children to extend their social world beyond their families. I
argue that the concept of meeting – an active, reciprocal adjustment to others
which incorporates the sharing of ideas within a more extensive and inclusive
communication of values and nuances – can inform our understanding of social
processes and communities in ways which extend well beyond the kindergarten
or nursery.
The ‘Meeting the child’ project had its origins in 2007 when Trevor Mepham,
the principal designate of the newly approved Steiner Hereford Academy,
approached the University of Plymouth to propose a study of approaches to
observation and assessment in Steiner kindergartens. This was at a time when the
UK government was introducing an Early Years Foundation Stage to coordinate
the regulation of all forms of provision for children from birth to the age of 5.
Janni Nicol, as the early childhood representative of the Steiner Waldorf schools
and kindergartens, was involved in negotiations about the proposed universal
requirements regarding ‘Early Learning Goals’ which all early years provision
would have to address. To meet some of these goals, especially those concerned
with the teaching of reading and writing and the introduction of information
technology, would require fundamental changes in Steiner kindergarten practices.
Members of the Steiner early years community were also concerned that the
approach to assessing and recording children’s development, in an extensive Early
Years Foundation Stage Profile document for each child, might come to exert
unhelpful pressures on kindergarten teachers. Although some exemptions from
these requirements were agreed for Steiner kindergartens, this issue highlighted
the need for further work to share awareness of different ‘ways of seeing’ as well
as different ways of working.
It was in this context that a group was formed, comprising early years academics
from the University of Plymouth (led by Professor David Reynolds), experts in
the training and professional development of Steiner kindergarten teachers and
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independent consultants, to undertake a small-scale study of the beliefs, values and
practices which inform Steiner approaches to getting to know children. From the
beginning of the project it was clear that the Steiner educators and academics in
the group welcomed the opportunity to meet with people who could offer an
‘outside perspective’ on what goes on in Steiner kindergartens. They were keen
for us to join them in the task of understanding what is distinctive about what
Steiner kindergarten teachers do, think and believe. The funding available for the
project was not sufficient to enable us to undertake a rigorous review or evaluation
across all Steiner kindergartens in England but we were able to organize a series
of observations in eight classes in five schools in different parts of the country and
to conduct interviews with nine teachers. The notes from observations and the
transcripts of the interviews were circulated among the project group and informed
extensive discussions at a series of whole-day meetings. At these meetings members
of the group were able to raise questions about aspects of what they had observed
or what they had read in notes from other observations and interviews, and our
conversations allowed us to share and address our different perspectives, impres-
sions, concerns and understandings.
In the summer of 2009 Mary Jane Drummond, Sally Jenkinson and Janni Nicol
worked together to use our data to address a series of questions raised by the
project group. Mary Jane and Sally went on to produce a report Meeting the Child:
Approaches to Observation and Assessment in Steiner Kindergartens (Drummond
and Jenkinson 2009) which may be accessed at http://www.routledge.com/
books/details/9780415603928/. We hoped that including extensive examples
from our data would help to ‘engage the reader in an imaginary internal dialogue
with the teachers’ (ibid.: 6), enabling others to join us in the process of meeting
the teachers and engaging with their beliefs, values and practices.
In this book we continue and extend our exploration of what Steiner approaches
can contribute to our wider understanding of how we engage with children, how
we get to know them and how we help them to get to know each other. We have
all interpreted what we have seen, read and discussed in relation to our own
understanding of what matters for young children, and we hope that readers will
be willing to meet us in the attempt to understand what we can learn from Steiner
kindergarten teachers’ ways of knowing the children with whom they work.
It is important to be clear that our intention is neither to sell Steiner ideas nor
to provide a rigorous critical evaluation of Steiner practices. We believe that early
years teachers in a wide range of settings will recognize the importance of ‘being
there’, of engaging fully with children, showing them that we care about them
and absorbing the countless, seemingly trivial signals which allow us to know them
as individuals and as members of various groups. Early years teachers around the
world are aware of the pressures of ‘performativity’ (Osgood 2006) which can
sometimes seem to promote a remote, ‘objective’ approach to observation and
assessment, driven as much by external demands for evidence of cost-effectiveness
as by the internal needs of a particular nursery or kindergarten community. We
cannot offer easy solutions which will allow educators to prevent these pressures
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from compromising their relationships with children and families, but we hope
that this book will prompt readers to think carefully about what really matters in
their practice, and especially about the important distinction between knowing
children and just collecting information about what they can do.
A variety of approaches
Our understanding of what is worth noticing in young children is rooted in our
own sociocultural contexts, and social and cultural changes are reflected in changes
in how and what we observe. Piaget’s careful ‘close-up’ study of individual children’s
active engagement with their world was motivated by dissatisfaction with the
prevailing behaviourist psychology which all but ignored the part played by children
in their learning. Piaget helped teachers to pay more careful attention to children’s
responses but perhaps the price paid for this was a shift towards a more ‘scientific’
approach to observation. Chris Athey was inspired by Piaget’s writing, and the
Froebel Early Education Project which she led in the 1970s enabled her to work
with teachers and parents to gather extensive and detailed observations of children’s
play over a period of several years. Careful analysis of this data led Athey (2007) to
argue that we can only understand the significance of children’s behaviour if we
follow them from activity to activity and look for the patterns, or ‘schemas’ which
can transform our perception of their activity from aimless ‘flitting’ to purposeful
‘fitting’ – actively transforming available resources to develop a sustained exploration
of a thematic interest such as ‘up and down’ or ‘round and round’. Athey’s work
led to much enthusiastic ‘schema spotting’, allowing early years practitioners 
to experience the satisfaction of working with parents to uncover important
information about each child which might otherwise have been overlooked. Much
has been made of Froebel’s belief that early years teachers should ideally be like a
‘mother made conscious’ (Steedman 1985) and the drive to professionalize work
with young children has tended to promote increasingly rigorous ‘conscious’ study
of children in early years settings (Ailwood 2007), resulting in valuable discoveries
about what children can achieve but also transforming relationships among adults
and children by widening the gap between the observer and the observed.
One of the most distinctive features of Steiner kindergartens, and one which is
likely to seem particularly ‘weird’ to other early years teachers, is the concern to
allow young children to continue in their ‘dreamy’, ‘unawakened’ or unmediated
engagement with their environment. Children are not encouraged to examine
their experiences, to answer questions about them or to focus on abstract ideas;
instead they are encouraged to ‘wallow’ in their actions and perceptions. This
could easily be taken to imply a romantic suspicion of intellectual processes but I
think it is better understood as an effort to maintain a balance between the ‘cool’
appeal of decontextualized ideas and the warmth of full engagement in experiences
and relationships. The ‘hunting’ orientation, which we see in the focused, pur-
poseful and professional pursuit of knowledge, can enable us to capture valuable
information but there is also much to be gained from the more relaxed, responsive,
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‘gathering’ orientation which is more characteristic of social interactions (Parker-
Rees 2010). When we meet new people and want to get to know them, we seldom
go about this by observing them and compiling lists of their abilities, likes and
dislikes. Instead we try to put ourselves in situations which allow us to engage with
them in informal social activities and chat, trusting that our largely intuitive social
processes will allow us to pick up and retain a rather fuzzy sense of what they are
like. When we realize that someone is observing or studying us, it just does not
feel the same as when someone is interested in us, likes us or even loves us. For
young children in particular, it can be difficult to move from a family environment,
in which, hopefully, one is known and loved by people one knows and loves, to a
nursery or kindergarten where one may be observed or studied by well-intentioned
strangers. Meeting with Steiner kindergarten teachers and responding at different
levels to their practices, beliefs and values can help us at least to reassess the balance
of our priorities by reminding us that our efforts to accumulate information about
children should not stand in the way of our getting to know them.
Margaret Carr (2001) has acknowledged that even after many years of
researching approaches to observation and assessment in the early years, she still
found herself slipping into what she described as a ‘folk model’ of assessment –
judging children against a variety of formal and informal developmental scales to
identify ‘gaps’ or ‘shortfalls’ which needed to be addressed if the child was to get
‘back on track’. This ‘child mending’ (Parker-Rees 2007a) approach is informed
by generalized, professional knowledge about where children ‘need’ to be. The
dispensing of an appropriate curriculum (Broström et al. 2010) is informed by a
diagnosis of what children cannot do, ‘guided not by tomorrow but by yesterday,
by the child’s weakness, not his strength’ (Vygotsky in Fleer 2002: 107). Carr
developed her ‘learning stories’ approach to observation as an alternative to this
folk model, one which would focus on what children do know and what they can
do rather than on the gaps between where they are now and where they ‘should’
be. Learning stories are narrative accounts which set a child’s activity within the
wider contexts of relationships, interests and previous experiences.
Where approaches to assessment have tended to adopt the cooler, more sys-
tematic, scientific frameworks which Bruner (1985) describes as the ‘paradigmatic’
mode of thought, writing learning stories encourages observers to adopt the
warmer, fuzzier ‘narrative’ mode which engages with our more intuitive, social
knowledge and in which tiny, barely perceptible nuances of gesture, eye contact
and facial expression can have a dramatic effect on how we interpret the significance
of actions and events. The difference between the folk model of assessment and
the use of learning stories may be understood in terms of the difference between
going into a forest, cutting down trees, stripping away their branches and dragging
out the logs for use elsewhere and going into a forest to study the trees where they
stand, in order to understand how they form part of their eco-system. Pressure to
‘log’ assessment information often comes from external requirements to complete
statutory profiling instruments which are of relatively little value in meeting the
internal needs of a learning community. Unfortunately, these pressures have
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pervasive effects which spread throughout the practices and priorities of early years
settings. Annica Löfdahl and Héctor Prieto (2009) have shown, for example, how
the requirement in Swedish preschools to publish ‘Quality accounts’ has tended
to encourage teachers to see ‘hard’ information, whatever can be measured,
evaluated and written about, as being more highly valued, and therefore in some
ways more important, than the softer, more local and particular aspects of their
caring interactions with individual children.
Writing learning stories still requires us to stand back as we observe and record,
but it can also remind us about the wide range of kinds of information which
contribute to our understanding of individual children. Trying to understand the
narrative of a child’s activity can make us more aware that our ability to ‘read’
children’s behaviour is dependent on the extent to which we have spent time with
them in informal social activities such as play, chat, mealtimes and outings.
Carr encourages observers to pay particular attention to children’s social
networks and relationships when writing learning stories but the process still
encourages a ‘one-by-one’ approach to observation, focusing on each child as an
individual problem-solver. In the celebrated preschools of Reggio Emilia, in
northern Italy, the teachers focus more on observing and recording the develop-
ment of projects than on compiling information about individual children.
Attention to the emergence of shared understanding is also distributed beyond
the adults, becoming an integral part of children’s activities as they are encouraged
and helped to document what they are learning from their projects (Forman and
Fyfe 1998; Rinaldi 1998). Here, teachers do not collect the leaves of observation
in order to preserve them in individual albums or profiles of children’s
achievements; instead adults and children feed their observations back into the
ecosystem, heaping them around the trees by making them available to children,
parents and staff. The documentation of projects, in photographs, models,
paintings, drawings and transcripts of children’s observations, comments and
questions, nourishes and informs the continuing development and sharing of
interests. The Reggio Emilia preschools are characterized by a particular emphasis
on using creative and artistic activities to explore and develop understanding.
Engaging together in using the ‘hundred languages of children’ to represent and
share understandings provides rich opportunities for adults and children to get to
know each other. The unique ‘feel’ of each child’s way of representing what they
have noticed about a particular topic, whether in the quality of their voice, the
rhythm of their lines or the flow of their movements, can be gathered by adults
and other children, allowing members of the preschool community to get to know
each other as well as to get to know themselves in relationship to others. There
are parallels here with the work of Vivian Gussin Paley, a kindergarten teacher in
the USA who, over many years, developed an approach to ‘doing stories’; sup-
porting children not only in performing their own stories but also in reinterpreting
each other’s. Paley has shown how sensitive children can be to the different
meanings which their peers reveal in their retellings of the ‘same’ story (Paley
1981, 2003, 2005).
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Where the Reggio Emilia preschools appear to buzz with the energy of children
busily engaged in studying all aspects of their world, Steiner kindergartens are
more likely to impress visitors with a pervasive feeling of calm, unhurried ‘just
being’ – more like a home than a studio or academy. Steiner kindergarten teachers
do not ‘do stories’ with children as Paley did but the children have rich oppor-
tunities to explore meanings, their own and other children’s, in extensive and
unstructured play.
The shape of the book
All of the chapters contain examples from our observations and interviews or from
the writers’ experience to illustrate what goes on in Steiner kindergartens, and they
all address aspects of the values and beliefs of the kindergarten teachers. They have
been arranged in a way which we hope will help the reader to proceed from a focus
on what happens in Steiner kindergartens (and why) to a focus on what Steiner
kindergarten teachers aim to do (and why), ending with chapters which set this
practice in the wider contexts of how teachers are supported by a tradition of
discussion, reflection and ‘inner work’ and how their approach to knowing children
may be challenged by pressures to focus on what can be recorded and reported
outside the kindergarten.
In Chapter 2 Mary Jane Drummond presents a series of commentaries by
different Steiner kindergarten teachers on one episode from our observations,
when children gathered with their teacher to squeeze apple juice, using an old,
mechanical apple press. By revisiting the episode several times Mary Jane illustrates
the way in which events can yield their significance progressively as they become
increasingly familiar. In Steiner kindergartens the same story will often be told
many times over the course of one or two weeks, allowing children to listen their
way into it, anticipating particularly powerful moments and responding to subtle
variations between separate tellings. In this way stories come to be experienced as
events, rather than as simple devices for delivering information, and the excitement
of novelty is balanced with a growing connoisseurship of the rhythms and patterns
of well-known tales. We hope that readers will themselves experience something
of this slower savouring of experiences as they encounter and re-encounter some
episodes from our data in a number of different chapters. Much as themes emerge
and spread in children’s play, particular moments from our data have stood out
for several of us, albeit for different reasons, and some have become familiar
reference points in our discussions. Mary Jane’s chapter both describes and
illustrates the gentle, unhurried pace of the Steiner kindergarten, where children
are allowed to ‘learn before being taught’, to join the activity as and when they
are ready and to make their own sense of shared events. When the younger children
suggest that ‘fairies and gnomes’ are responsible for the working of the apple press
some readers may see this as evidence of the weirdness of the Steiner environment,
but Mary Jane shows that the fairies and gnomes are no more than a form of
‘placeholder’, a device which allows younger children to defer explanation of how
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the apple press works, while the older ones are willing and able to explore the
interaction of parts in the mechanism.
The benefits of interaction between older and younger children, both directly and
indirectly, are explored by Sally Jenkinson in Chapter 3. In Steiner kindergartens
children normally stay with the same teacher for several years, from when they start
at age 3 to when they move on to class 1 at about the age of 6 or 7. This means that
teachers are able to get to know each child very well, following progress and noting
personal achievements and difficulties, but it also means that the children benefit
from living in a mixed-age community. In the extended periods of free play younger
children can watch older children’s play from the sidelines, sidling in as peripheral
participants as and when they are ready. Younger children can also learn from
observation of older children as they carry out routine tasks such as setting a table
for mealtimes, chopping vegetables for soup or putting things back where they
belong. Older children will sometimes remind the younger ones about ‘how we do
things here’ but more often than not this will not be necessary because the younger
children are able to learn before being taught. The older children also benefit because
they are able to enjoy the responsibility of helping the younger ones, as they were
once helped, reinforcing their own understanding by sharing what they have learned.
In the ‘Golden Key’ schools set up in Russia by Vygotsky’s grand-daughter,
Elena Kravtsova and her colleagues, the mixed-age approach is sometimes taken
even further, with older children spending some time in the full group and some
time in their own special lessons (Holzman 1997) so that a group can include
children ranging in age from 3 to 10. In these schools, as in the Steiner kinder-
gartens, ‘the role and position of the teacher is transformed from educating
children to sharing life with children’ (ibid.: 87, italics in original). The Russian
word obuchenie, sometimes translated as learning, sometimes as teaching or
instruction, has no real equivalent in English because in Russia learning is under-
stood to include all aspects of the interaction between a ‘teacher’ and ‘learner’,
and not just the ideas or concepts being taught. Ways of behaving, values and
principles are all learned in the course of educational encounters and it is therefore
important for teachers, including older children in a mixed age group, to offer a
model worthy of imitation. Sally makes a similar point when she cites John Dewey’s
observation that ‘the school must represent present life – life as real and vital to
the child as that which he carries on in the home, in the neighborhood, or on the
playground’ (Dewey 1897: 3). For the teachers in the Golden Key schools,
thinking and feeling are inextricably interwoven in perezhivanie; the fully engaged
activity of ‘living through’ and making personal sense of experience. In Russia
education has never separated off the development of the intellect from the
development of affect in quite the way we have seen in Europe and America:
affect and intellect are not two mutually exclusive poles, but two mental
functions, closely connected with each other and inseparable, that appear at
each age as an undifferentiated unity.
(Vygotsky 1998: 239)
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The mixed-age structure of the Steiner kindergarten is one of the features which
help to make it feel real and vital and more like a ‘home from home’, creating
opportunities for adults to notice how children engage in a wide range of inter-
actions, sometimes turning to others for support or reassurance and sometimes
offering encouragement where they notice that it is needed.
In Chapter 4 Sarah Rees and I present an account of our extended conversations
about the distinctive features of the environment which Steiner kindergarten
teachers aim to provide. We talked about the ‘what’ of the physical environment,
the ‘how’ of teachers’ day-to-day practice and the ‘why’ of values and traditions
which support and inform what goes on in the kindergartens. As we talked we
came up against several concepts which needed closer examination, often because
the language one of us was using did not quite fit with the other’s understanding.
When, for example, I suggested that the framework provided by familiar routines
might help to scaffold children’s learning, Sarah was not comfortable with this
analogy, feeling that scaffolding suggested a form of support which was rigid and
predetermined, applied from the outside rather than from within and constraining
as well as enabling development. I realized that my own concept of scaffolding
had ‘drifted’ away from the concrete reference of the image and that I was not
always sufficiently aware of the different connotations and associations which the
term might bring to mind in others. The long discussions and informal chats at
our project meetings offered a framework within which Sarah and I could come
to a shared understanding, enabling us to make sense of each other’s emails much
more effectively than would have been possible if we had never met. Our experi-
ence of negotiating a common understanding of what matters about the Steiner
kindergarten environment reminded us that what we know is always rooted in our
unique personal experience, and that meeting with another person’s ways of seeing
requires much more than a simple exchange of words and concepts. The meaning
of the physical environment of a Steiner kindergarten is rooted in the ways in which
materials are used and cared for. These practices are themselves rooted in the values
and beliefs of the kindergarten teachers so that the obuchenie experienced by
children weaves ideas, gestures, feelings, rhythms and routines into a richly
contextualized web of impressions. The values and beliefs of the teachers frame
the kindergarten environment but these are themselves framed by the history and
traditions of Steiner education. Tradition is something of a political trigger word,
signifying oppressive constraints to some while to others it speaks of reassuring,
tried-and-tested ways of doing things. While the Steiner tradition clearly offers
teachers a degree of confidence, enabling them to trust that they will come to
know their children through the processes of sharing life with them, it cannot be
allowed to ‘set’ into rigid dogma. Meeting with people whose work is grounded
in other traditions can help us revisit our values and beliefs as we see them reflected
in other eyes.
Another aspect of the meeting of traditions is illustrated in Chapter 5, in which
Sarah joins Sue Waite in an exploration of the ways in which imagination is
nurtured in Steiner kindergartens. This chapter exemplifies, in form and in content,
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a meeting of Steiner’s ideas with findings from the wider world of psychological
and pedagogical research. Imagination is presented as a bridge which connects
action to thought, a mediator between unconscious and conscious mental pro-
cesses, and play is presented as the primary means by which young children can
transform the external representation of their interests and concerns into internal
thinking. If we think of play as imagination ‘on the way in’, an enactive precursor
of internalized thinking and daydreaming, we can see how important it is to allow
children time and space to play both on their own and with a variety of peers. The
Steiner kindergarten teachers’ concern to protect a ‘dreamy’ space may also be
understood in terms of allowing children to wallow in their play, slowly absorbing
the rich and complex information about social relationships, roles and feelings
which will give colour and vitality to their understanding of their sociocultural
world. Standing back and trusting children to take what they need from their
active, playful transformation of simple, open play materials may not accelerate
their progress towards learning goals quite as much as more ‘hands-on’ approaches
but it may nurture a different, less easily measured form of knowing which is
equally important. Sue and Sarah invite us to consider whether the unhurried,
unstructured play which we observed in the Steiner kindergartens might prove
more effective in developing children’s understanding of relationships, feelings
and emotions than later lessons in ‘social and emotional aspects of learning’. In
the context of the present study we should also acknowledge how effective
children’s play can be in enabling children to get to know each other, and
themselves, and how much adults can ‘pick up’ about children without consciously
setting out to study them.
If adults can come to know children by giving them space and time to play, they
must also recognize that children will get to know them by picking up subtle cues
from the ways they do the things they do. In Chapter 6 Janni Nicol explains how
Steiner kindergarten teachers set out to present themselves to children as models
worthy of imitation, not telling children how they are expected to behave but
showing them. As teachers do the things that need to be done, preparing food,
mending and caring for materials, cleaning and decorating the classroom, they are
conscious not only of what they are doing but of how they are doing it and of
what this tells the children. Teachers are expected to develop all aspects of their
activity into an art of living, drawing children into careful, beautiful and joyful
ways of practising the ‘domestic arts’ and ‘artistic activities’ by making these
‘suitable for the child’s imitation through play’ (Steiner 1923/1988: 71). Teachers
seldom ask children to join them in an activity, preferring to allow children to
choose to join in. They use few words or instructions, preferring to model what
needs to be done or to ‘give the children a picture’, using words to engage with
a child’s imagination. By themselves modelling a full engagement in what they are
doing the teachers also invite children to ‘lose themselves’ in their tasks and, as
children are caught up in the ‘flow’ of the activity (Csikszentmihalyi 1991) they
reveal subtle details which help teacher, child and other children to get to know
each other in largely intuitive ways. Simple activities which are repeated regularly
Introduction 9
– tidying up, chopping vegetables, baking bread, painting and drawing, singing
and sharing stories – can offer particularly rich opportunities for noticing changes
in how a child is engaging, and the teachers’ careful awareness of their own
participation can sharpen their sensitivity to each child’s unique style.
In Chapter 7, John Burnett focuses on an interview with Carolyn Bond, one of
the Hereford teachers, in which she talks about the differences she has observed
between her earlier work in ‘mainstream’ schools and her work as a teacher in a
Steiner kindergarten. Carolyn talks of how, in the course of one of the regular
activities described by Janni in Chapter 6, she might notice that a bright, capable,
knowledgeable and well-adjusted child was experiencing difficulty in controlling
the pouring out of paint into little pots. This might alert Carolyn to the possibility
of some imbalance in the child’s development: ‘that the child has been a little bit
awakened in their thinking . . . and that’s obviously been at the cost of their
physical development’. John explains how this concern to protect children from
premature awakening of their intellectual faculties is grounded in Steiner’s under-
standing of the balance between the dreamy, unconscious realm, where action and
will are dominant, and the awakened, conscious realm which is dominated by
abstractions and ideas. Steiner studied the work of Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Kant,
and other philosophers, and concluded that achieving a balance between will and
representation, between action and thought, was one of the primary goals of
education. John points out that Carolyn’s concern is not that we should spend all
of our lives in the dreamy realm but only that we should allow children time to
enjoy their exploration and mastery of this realm before we ‘push them forward’
into more exclusively ‘head-based’ learning. John gives the example of a young
girl whose re-enactment of a baby’s cries and movements revealed an impressive
degree of mimetic sensitivity, well beyond what she would be able to describe if
asked what babies are like. Allowing children space to ‘live in their limbs’, to engage
fully in noticing how they and others act and move, enables them to develop their
‘participant consciousness’ rather than to become prematurely ‘heady’, floating
above their experiences like spectators or onlookers.
In Chapter 8 Mary Jane Drummond presents a vivid account of her own
conclusions about what sets Steiner kindergartens apart from the many other early
years settings in which she has observed. By focusing on ‘absences’, on what Steiner
teachers do not do, she suggests that the calm, respectful, trusting relationships
found in Steiner kindergartens may reflect the fact that the teachers do not float
above their classes as spectators. Because these teachers are fully immersed in the
process of sharing life with children, ‘not playing at school, but living together,
doing real-world things together’, they do not need to justify their behaviour with
reference to learning intentions, areas of learning or educational jargon. Because
they work hard at ensuring that they offer children a model worthy of imitation
they do not have to instruct and direct children; they can simply trust the children
to join them in doing what needs doing or in enjoying a creative activity. Because
they spend time with the children, quietly getting on with their own activities, they
do not need to bombard them with constant questions to find out about them:
10 Rod Parker-Rees
‘we wait for them to tell us something, rather than questioning them’. Like John,
Mary Jane points out that these teachers are not trying to prevent children from
developing as meaning-makers; indeed, they understand very well that children are
able to make sense in different ways – in their play, in their physical activity and in
their spoken language, especially in story and discussion. The children in Steiner
kindergartens are not deprived of opportunities to learn. As Karen, a teacher in one
of the Hereford kindergartens, said, ‘they are living being a four-year-old, a five-
year-old, a six-year-old to the absolute brim’. Enabling children to engage fully in
the experience of their lives requires a very high level of commitment from their
teachers. It can take many years to develop the confidence and experience which
will allow teachers to achieve the ‘apparent inactivity’ we observed in Steiner
kindergartens. Mary Jane concludes her chapter with Jill Taplin’s observation that
being a Steiner kindergarten teacher has ‘hardly been a job, it’s been a way of life’.
In Chapter 9, Sally Jenkinson explains how Steiner kindergarten teachers work
to develop the intuitive skills which will enable them to ‘read the book of the
child’. Exercises in learning to see help students avoid premature judgements about
what is worth noticing; instead of ‘hunting’ for predetermined indicators of
development, needs or abilities, they are encouraged to ‘gather’ tiny, apparently
insignificant details about a child’s appearance, movements, relationships, play
preferences and more. In time, and with the appropriate relaxed, calm state of
mind, these gleanings will allow a ‘picture’ of each child to emerge, ‘hovering
lightly in imaginative recreation’. What is particularly powerful about this way of
allowing one’s unconscious, intuitive mind to process information is that the
‘picture’ which emerges is dynamic and responsive. When teachers practise their
regular ‘inner work’ of bringing each child to mind, often in the evenings, just
before they go to sleep, they are able to ‘place’ each child in an imagined future
by asking themselves questions such as ‘what does this child need from me?’ When
they are able to still what Jonathan Schooler (in Claxton 1997: 90) describes as
the ‘ruckus’ generated by the chatter of thoughts in the ‘front’ of the mind’, new
interpretations can emerge in the back of the mind and, in Carolyn Bond’s words,
‘sometimes something will step out’, revealing a new significance in the infor-
mation they have gathered about the child. Teachers will also work, sometimes
alone, sometimes with colleagues, on an extended ‘child study’ which involves
focusing attention on the child over a period of days or even weeks, gathering little
details which will help to recalibrate their ‘picture’ of the child. Many of the
teachers in our study commented on how this focusing of attention could often
be enough to address some difficulty or concern in their relationship with a
particular child; the more we notice about someone else, the more we are able to
adjust appropriately in our interactions with them and the more they will notice
our attentiveness (Parker-Rees 2007b). What is distinctive about the practice of
Steiner kindergarten teachers is that they recognize the need to work on the
development of their intuitive processes through regular exercises and training; in
Carolyn’s words, ‘it is almost like developing muscles . . . the more you do, the
more something develops and becomes refined’.
Introduction 11
In the final chapter, Trevor Mepham considers some of the ways in which the
omnipresence of assessment has tended to distort our understanding of what
education is for. Like John Burnett in Chapter 7, he suggests that the habit of
assessment and appraisal can tend to turn us all into spectators of life, reducing
the tangle of messy experience to tidy but inert measures and standards. In stark
contrast to the progressive gathering of seemingly meaningless details from which
a clear picture of a child can emerge, this compulsive assessment can result in the
accumulation of masses of seemingly meaningful measures or observations which
cannot tell us anything useful about what children need from us. Recognition,
rooted in the messy, lively tangles of human relationships, proves much more
motivating than tangible rewards or inattentive praise. The will processes of
noticing, recognizing, valuing and understanding are part and parcel of all human
interactions and they enable us to get to know each other very effectively in social
contexts. Unfortunately, however, external demands for records of children’s
progress can reduce assessment to a process which values only what may be
recorded and measured.
The process of getting to know children which we experienced in Steiner
kindergartens cannot be fully recorded in words on a page. We hope that we can
give you a flavour of the environment enjoyed by children in the kindergartens by
including illustrative examples from our observations and interviews, but we also
hope that reading this book may encourage you to arrange to visit a Steiner
kindergarten near you and to engage in your own meetings with Steiner teachers.
We also aim to widen the scope of the ‘Meeting the child’ project, to include
meetings with teachers and teacher educators from other traditions, and we hope
that you will look out for opportunities to organize your own meetings with people
whose approach may be very different from your own. Even if you do not find
anything useful or interesting in their values, beliefs and practices, which is unlikely,
you are sure to learn more about your own approach in the process of answering
questions about it, explaining it and defending it.
12 Rod Parker-Rees
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This study is grounded in a research project, the CARITAS project (Collaborative Application
of Research Into Tutoring for Autonomous Study), which ran in our university from 2007 to
2009. Tutors from a variety of programmes collaborated to review literature and to investigate
both formal and informal support for students involved in ‘independent’ studies. Our approach
to the research was particularly informed by Boud and Lee’s (2005) notion of ‘becoming peer’,
the idea that students (and tutors) need to learn about, and get involved in the culture of aca-
demic practices as well as the topics of academic discourse. This paper presents ideas which
emerged from discussions held in focus groups with students undertaking undergraduate
research projects. Analysis of themes in these discussions highlighted the character and signifi-
cance of informal peer relationships. These relations played an important part in helping stu-
dents to give and take care and support, to manage their tasks and to enjoy the challenges of
self-directed study. We suggest that universities need to pay careful attention to creating and
sustaining supportive conditions and pedagogic spaces in which such informal social relations
can flourish. In thinking about academic success at university, proper recognition should be
given to the significance of such informal learning relations among students.
Keywords: undergraduates; peer learning; social networks; autonomy; research
supervision
Introduction
This paper emerges from a collaborative project which explored ways of support-
ing students involved in various forms of autonomous academic work, in the
course of their undergraduate study. The practical research associated with the
*Corresponding author. Email: rod.parker-rees@plymouth.ac.uk
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project, a series of relaxed, convivial conversations with students, made us increas-
ingly conscious of ways in which the students benefited not only from receiving
support from their peers but also from opportunities to give this kind of support
to one another. The programmes on which we teach, Early Childhood Studies and
Education Studies, both have an explicit focus on ethics in all areas of work. Edu-
cation Studies aims for a highly inclusive ethos, in terms of both content and ped-
agogy, and Early Childhood Studies is structured around a ‘core of care’; we are
concerned that students should not merely know about caring, they should also
have opportunities to experience caring relationships and to exercise the ‘soft skills’
which will enhance their ability to perform and to model the practice of care. As
tutors, we were fully aware of the benefits of peer processes such as study support
groups, discussion and debate but engaging with students in more extended and
informal conversations allowed us to get more of a sense of what it felt like to
belong to a supportive group.
As we searched for scholarly work to inform our understanding of ways of sup-
porting our students in autonomous study we found David Boud’s concept of
‘becoming peer’ (Boud & Lee, 2005) particularly helpful. Boud has shown how
the demanding but potentially rewarding process of conducting a research project
allows students to experience being part of an academic community. Boud and
Lee (2005) argue that research training should be reconceptualised as research edu-
cation, which takes place in a community of peers, including fellow students, tutors
and experts. Becoming peer is the process by which students (and newly appointed
tutors) feel their way in from peripheral to more central participation in the
cultural processes which constitute the practice of the community:
Learning with and from fellow students as peers, learning to participate in faculty-
based seminars alongside academics and visiting scholars, learning to participate in the
research, presentation and publication practices and learning to network internationally
with fellow researchers, for example, all involve complex notions of ‘becoming peer’.
(Boud & Lee, 2005, p. 512)
We came to feel, however, that Boud’s emphasis on participation in aca-
demic practice might not fully reflect the significance of the more informal,
social and affective aspects of coming to feel as if one ‘belongs’ in an aca-
demic community (Cartney & Rouse, 2006). There was a need to expand the
idea of ‘becoming peer’ to include the felt experience of being supported
within a community. This broader interpretation was, in fact, acknowledged by
Boud in an earlier paper co-authored with Geoff Anderson (Anderson & Boud,
1996) in which peer learning was described as ‘a type of mutual, complemen-
tary or reciprocal learning’, grounded in a particular socio-emotional context
and offering:
a means of dealing with educational issues difficult to handle in other ways and of
restoring and enhancing some of the social dimensions of learning frequently lost in
universities of today. (Anderson & Boud, 1996, p. 15)
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Both our programmes include the study of ways in which people have sought to
conceptualise and model the process of learning. This requires students to expand
their concept of learning beyond a set of curricular goals or assessed learning
outcomes:
What constructivists call learning is only part of a larger process of human change and
transformation, the process called learning by socioculturalists. Whether one attaches
the label “learning” to the part or to the whole, acquiring knowledge and expertise
always entails participation in relationship and community and transformation both of
the person and of the social world. (Packer & Goicoechea, 2009, p. 239)
Navigating the brave new world of autonomous research
Undergraduates undertaking research and independent study projects at our uni-
versity are expected to be able to make sense of research papers in specialised
domains, to get to grips with ethical and methodological issues and to take respon-
sibility for the planning and conduct of their research study. This shift in the locus
of control of students’ academic activities can create uncertainty. Tutors distin-
guish supervision of research projects from other forms of teaching, seeing under-
graduate research projects as exciting opportunities for students to venture into
new territory and explore areas of personal interest. However students often see
the task as ‘doing a project’ or ‘getting through’ a project. In pedagogic terms,
undertaking a research project can feel like entering a new and foreign world,
where authority and relationships are mysteriously reconfigured (Todd et al.,
2004).
It is not only students who may be uncertain about the nature of the tutorial
role. Boud and Costley (2007) argue that a supportive ‘adviser’ relationship may
be more appropriate when supporting undergraduates than the ‘supervisor’ rela-
tionship which is common in work with postgraduate students. Holmberg (2006)
has identified the wide variation in roles and relationship styles adopted by under-
graduate research tutors even within one department of one institution and Jawitz
(2007) highlights the challenges faced by novice tutors in working out what their
role is supposed be when they have very little explicit advice on this. On the other
hand, attempts to improve the effectiveness of tutorial support by providing practi-
cal frameworks, tutor handbooks or other forms of ‘top-down’ management have
not always proved helpful or successful (Schweinsberg & McManus, 2006), with
both tutors and students ambivalent about efforts to ‘rule out’ the uncertainties
associated with personal relationships (Todd et al., 2006). Smith (2007) contrasts
‘technical solutions’ to tutorial support, driven by concern to increase cost-
effectiveness, with ‘communicative responses’, arguing that education ‘contains
constituent elements of nurturing. In other words, it belongs to the domain of
human cultural interactions that should stand outside the world of commerce and
commodification’ (ibid., pp. 687–8). Smith is concerned that commercialisation of
higher education poses a threat to inclusive, ‘disinterested communicative action’,
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pointing out that ‘preferred’ students are increasingly contrasted with ‘iffy’ stu-
dents – the non-traditional students who may be more likely to choose ‘new’ uni-
versities because they feel they will ‘belong’ and feel more comfortable there than
in a more traditional university. Because new universities are less well resourced,
however, they are also more likely to face pressures to adopt managerialist ways of
reducing the costs of ‘processing’ their students (e.g. by offering ‘outsourced’ stu-
dent support packages rather than giving tutors the time and space to provide care
as an essential component of their educational support).
There is an extensive body of research on informal aspects of learning and care
in adult education but we have found that literature on care for students in higher
education often separates teaching from caring roles or services. We sought out
studies that highlight the integral nature of caring and social dimensions of teach-
ing and learning relationships. Bruffee (1999), for example, describes universities
as institutions of reacculturation, and accentuates the value of interdependence in
university learning. Hockings’ (2010) offers a valuable synthesis of the literature
on inclusive learning cultures which concludes that more needs to be done to
emphasise the creation of safe environments marked by mutual trust and respect,
empathy and open-mindedness, as well as better provision for responsive academic
support for individuals.
As we face significant challenges to the ways we are able to engage with our stu-
dents we have become particularly interested in exploring students’ perceptions of
the support they receive, not only from their tutors but also from their peers, and
not only in their ‘private’ times and spaces but also in the sorts of informal
provision described in Matthews et al.’s (2011) account of ‘social learning spaces’.
Methods and ethical considerations
This was a small scale qualitative study, exploratory in approach. A group of five
third year students from three of the School of Education’s BA programmes met
three times with two tutors from the CARITAS project team (the authors): in Jan-
uary, when the students were moving on from the first term’s focus on research
methods training and conducting their literature review to develop more detailed
planning; in March, when they had completed their data collecting and were ana-
lysing data and beginning to write up their studies, and in May, just after they had
submitted their research reports. This phase of the project was focused on the spe-
cific context of the third year undergraduate research project and we hoped that
relaxed conversations with the students, over a free lunch, would help us all to
understand how students can develop their ability to engage in autonomous study.
In the first focus group, to get the conversation going, we invited students to
make a drawing to represent their ‘ideal’ tutoring and support scenario for inde-
pendent study. Visual methods of eliciting responses from participants are increas-
ingly common (Thomson, 2008). We did not intend to make analyses of the
drawings. The activity was proposed to provide an imaginative focus for the
exploration of ‘support’ in both tutor/student and student/peer relations. It was a
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way of enabling the students to take a lead in establishing the initial ‘agenda’ for
these informal conversations. The conversations were audio-recorded and tran-
scribed. The analysis was thematic: both researchers independently identified
recurring issues in the transcripts, linked to the construct of ‘becoming peer’, and
then compared their readings.
The process of seeking and gaining ethical approval for our project highlighted
ambiguities and tensions in current constructs of tutoring roles. Our school’s eth-
ics committee pointed out that there might be a conflict between the intimacy and
disclosure associated with tutors engaging students in focus group discussions
about the process of supervision and the detachment required to assess students’
work. We recognised that students’ contributions in our focus groups might be
influenced by their awareness that we would be marking their research projects
and we were happy to do what we could to minimise this effect, for example by
ensuring that students knew that we would not be first-marking any of their work.
We were troubled, however, by the messages associated with the (implied) sugges-
tion that our ability to assess students’ academic performance might be compro-
mised by our discussions with them about how they experienced their tutorial
support. This concern is perhaps indicative of a wider mistrust of tutors’ ability to
combine professional authority with open, engaged relationships with students, a
mistrust which results in increasingly narrow professionalising and cooling of tutor/
student relationships (Smith, 2007) and which emphasises that students are a long
way from being seen as ‘peers’ with their tutors.
Discussion
Analysis of the transcripts identified tensions and possibilities around the process
of ‘becoming peer’ in the context of work on undergraduate research projects. We
have chosen three of the themes identified in our analysis of the recordings and
trancripts from the focus group to provide the focus for this paper because they
are particularly relevant to our interest in affective aspects of ‘becoming peer’: peer
feedback and ‘that crazy group work malarkey’; ‘being comfortable with one
another’ and ‘the best of both worlds’.
Peer feedback and ‘that crazy group work malarkey’
When we asked the students about their experience of offering each other feedback
on work in progress we encountered a rather uncomfortable sense of awkwardness:
you do kind of suss it out before you feel confident enough to say, to go up to that per-
son to say do you mind having a look at this for me? (January, 13)1.
Commenting on each other’s work was not, as we might have hoped, a well-
articulated, embedded practice, but more ad hoc and a matter of individual tutor
and student preference.
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Like some of the students in Todd et al.’s study (2004), students did not feel
able to offer feedback or reassurance on the academic level of their peers’ course-
work:
I can’t say to them yes I think you are doing well or I don’t think that is good enough
because I feel really mean saying that and I just, I am not qualified to say (January,
11).
Students were also rather wary of tutor-directed group tasks and activities.
Echoing other studies in this field, such as Gibbs’s (1995) identification of ‘free
riders’ and ‘social loafing’, such activities not only led to resentment but were
sometimes seen as unfair, particularly if group work formed part of the formal
assessment process which would affect a student’s degree classification:
how you feel about the group process in a kind of ungraded, unmarked, learning for
learning’s sake situation may be very different from how you feel about group process
when your life depends on you getting a good mark (March, 13).
However, students also resented group presentations that involved a lot of prep-
aration but which were not assessed, particularly if these were organised close to
coursework deadlines; ‘that crazy group work malarkey that comes at the end of
the year’ (March, 9).
We have got to do a presentation and it isn’t marked so I don’t give a stuff about it
really and I will do it the night before, probably (March, 3).
There was, however, widespread endorsement of the value of peer feedback in
the context of the research module seminar groups. These were small groups
(about 8 students and their tutor) which met every week throughout the autumn
term (and less frequently in the spring term) to discuss the content of the research
methods lectures and to discuss students’ plans for their own studies. These
groups were clearly valued as opportunities for mutual encouragement,
constructive criticism and sharing of wider perspectives and comments on whether
something ‘would actually work practically’:
because you have been with those people since their idea was a tiny little thing and you
watch it every week move on so it is like part of your work as well because it has gone
into influencing your projects (March, 13).
The students understood the effects of group dynamics, pointing out that ‘you
have already got people there who understand and can go through things at the
same time’. They accepted different individual preferences in approaches to work-
ing with others, ‘there are some people who want to be in a group situation and
some who don’t’, but the students were all clear that they did not want to do
group work just for the sake of it.
These responses reminded us that group work cannot simply be imposed in a
‘cold’, impersonal way but that we should aim to embed peer activities in social
frameworks of familiarity and trust.
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‘Being comfortable with each other’
Several of the students involved in this study had joined the third year of a BA
programme after completing a two-year Foundation Degree at one of the univer-
sity’s partner colleges. We were well aware of the challenges faced by these ‘Direct
Entry’ students, who have to adjust to a new working and learning culture at the
same time as they engage with the step change in expectations which comes with
entry into the final year of undergraduate study, so we were not surprised to hear
that this transition also presented social challenges:
you have got this huge problem of actually not being able to just sit down with people
and chat to them as if you’ve known them all your life because they are very cliquey
(March, 15).
What did surprise us was the positive glow which surrounded the direct entry
students’ perceptions of relationships between progressing students. This image of
easy, comfortable relationships seemed to be not so much an accurate impression
of how the ‘progressing’ students got on with each other as a wistful projection of
what the direct entry students felt they were missing:
‘everyone seemed to know somebody … there was just this feeling that there is a huge
constituency of people who all knew each other and were all comfortable with each
other and then this little, few bubbles of people that were coming in and that didn’t
know each other and were very much like small fish in a big ocean’ (March, 6-7).
This perspective from the direct entry students helped to make us more aware
of the importance to the students of feeling ‘comfortable’ with both tutors and
peers.
But students recognised that, as well as needing to know about tutors and fellow
students, they also wanted to feel they were known by these people. One student
in the pilot focus group had talked about the ‘quite personal’ and ‘embarrassing’
process of asking another student to comment on her work and this awkwardness
was mentioned again in the January group:
You have to have that relationship, yeah? Like for me, joining in the third year, I hardly
know anyone really and the people I did know … I have formed friends here anyway
but I still don’t think that if I gave my work to them and said, ‘Here, what do you
reckon?’, you know, they won’t honestly say what they thought or, like you say, they
would probably not feel comfortable because noone knows that I am a bit unsure
myself (January, 11).
Some tutors might respond to students’ desire for comfortable relationships with
talk of the need for academic ‘challenge’, as if comfort were an undesirable kind of
sedimentation or settling. For these students, however, being ‘comfortable’ did not
contrast with being challenged, so much as with being overcome by panic:
the tutor reactions are so widely different that it is throwing a lot of people off and it’s
like, they will get together with their normal dissertation group of friends and, ‘Oh you
Informal aspects of ‘becoming peer’ in undergraduate research 85
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Pl
ym
ou
th]
 at
 04
:03
 19
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
are doing that, oh mine hasn’t asked us to do that’ and they would start getting pan-
icked and then someone says, ‘Oh yeah I have got to do that’ (March, 16).
While students suggested that these feelings of panic could be reduced by the
availability of more consistent and clear information, later conversations suggested
that sustained involvement with a smallish group of peers had helped to provide a
comfortable, reassuring sense of familiarity, of knowing and being known. This
was particularly noticeable in the May meeting, at which students could look back
fondly on their now completed experience.The rather anodyne word ‘nice’, often
expressed in a hesitant, searching way (‘just kind of … nice’), seemed to gather
together their perhaps not fully conscious intimations about the value of the
emotional support provided by belonging to a group:
I thought the group tutorials were good and it was kind of nice to know, nice to share,
kind of what everyone was doing, even though you didn’t really help them, kind of by
saying, you know, ‘You might have mentioned …’ and ‘Oh, I read something about
that’ or things might have been mentioned but not actually helping them complete
their study, it was just nice to kind of, I guess, just share ideas and to, you do kind of
need to know that you are kind of on the right lines (May, 7).
Holmberg (2006) has shown how tutors working in the same department can
construct their understanding of their role in very different ways; as coach, consul-
tant or mother, depending on what they felt was an appropriate balance between
their academic repsonsibilities, towards their discipline, and their pastoral responsi-
bilities, towards individual students. Some tutors may be uncomfortable with the
idea that they should accept responsibility for the ‘comfort’ of their students, par-
ticularly in the light of critiques claiming that a growing ‘therapeutic turn’ threat-
ens to undermine the socially progressive role of education (Ecclestone & Hayes,
2009; Furedi, 2004).
While some tutors might have reservations about developing peer relationships
with students, it was interesting that the students seemed to see a clear distinction
between the different kinds of support they wanted from their tutors, some of
which was ‘work based’ while some was what one student characterised as ‘just a
hug’:
as I said different places, different times, you know sometimes it is nice to have an
informal chat just to catch up and regularly monitoring just because I myself need a lit-
tle bit of checking just to make sure, you know, I am not forgetting about it or leaving
it to the last minute … then sometimes it is good to have a formal kind of chat and be
somewhere quiet that you can just talk, it comes as different things you need at differ-
ent stages of your report throughout the year (January, 7).
Our experience suggests that the tutor-student relationship, whether coach, con-
sultant, mother or something else, has to be understood within the wider social
frame of the environment which, though it may be offered, supported and encour-
aged by tutors, is also co-produced by interactions between students. Getting to
know one’s peers and getting to be known by them, not just in terms of what they
think and know about study topics but also much more broadly, helps to produce
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the ‘kind of nice’, comfortable feeling of belonging which makes studying an
enjoyable and positive experience (Leach, 2009; Matthews et al., 2011). For many
students this feeling of social belonging may be more important than the more ele-
vated, academic membership which Boud and Lee (2005) seem to associate with
‘becoming peer’.
Undergraduate study will lead into an academic world of research and publica-
tion for a small minority of students but for most it will lead to further professional
training and employment outside the university. For these students, the experience
of supporting and being supported by a group of peers may be among the most
valuable learning opportunities which undergraduate study can offer.
‘The best of both worlds’
Although some of the students were quite frank about the amount of effort they
were prepared to put into ungraded presentations and ‘the crazy group work
malarkey that comes at the end of the year’, they did recognise the benefits of a
structured framework of support. Some of this structure came from the tutors, in
the form of ‘mini deadlines’ which provided an external framework for students’
autonomous study:
We had to give our literature review in initially, as part of our plan, which really helped
because it made you have to go and research the literature and look into it, so that was
good, so that was a big part of reading around the subject area (May, 2).
It was clear that membership of a tutorial group came to influence individual
students’ engagement with their studies. For some this influence was experienced
as a form of guilt:
I handed something in but it was always like a very small percentage of what I should
be and what everyone else was, and then I felt terrible because everybody had done all
this work and I hadn’t done it and then, you know, I tried to hide or run away (May,
3).
For others, however, this initial reluctance to engage gave way to recognition of
the benefits of being made to share ideas with peers:
once you had been to the first [seminar] you were kind of like ‘Oh, that was good’, you
know. It was getting over that kind of initial ‘Oh do I have to?’ (May, 9)
While this progression could be understood in terms of the internalisation
described in Vygotsky’s general genetic law (1981), from inter-psychological action
on the social plane to intra-psychological action on the psychological plane, such
an interpretation of students’ learning may not fully recognise the affective compo-
nent which is internalised along with graduate skills and abilities. Vygotsky insisted
that ‘affect and intellect are not two mutually exclusive poles but two mental func-
tions, closely connected with each other and inseparable’ (in Levykh, 2008, 87-8)
and his claim that ‘functions initially are formed in the group in the form of rela-
tions of the children, and then they become mental functions of the individual’
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(ibid., 97) can apply to undergraduate students as much as to children. The
‘higher mental functions’ which students are expected to develop in the course of
their research project work need to be securely grounded in positive feelings which
students learn to associate with the sharing of understandings:
It was set up really well, where we had group tutorials right at the beginning where we
needed it, where I found them, working in a group, a lot easier than on my own
because I might actually do something because other people are there, which is nice.
(May, 8).
starting off with a group everyone sort of came up with ideas and then went, ‘oh that
sounds good’ and ‘how about you do this’ and it gets you thinking about more things
and then I guess there comes a point where, you know, the trees start branching out
and everyone starts going in different directions; still connected but going our separate
ways. So I think we have probably got the best of both worlds in that respect, you
know, having the group discussions and then being able to go off on our own gives you
more confidence about it, but sometimes you need to sort of check in with someone
and say ‘Is that alright?’ (March, 12-13).
Christie et al. (2008), writing about the experience of students transferring from
a college to an e´lite university, emphasise the socially distributed and situated nat-
ure of learning competences; what students are able to do is not independent of
the context in which they are expected to do it:
Whilst it is important for universities to be concerned with the quality of their teaching
programmes, the social and collaborative aspects of students’ learning experiences, cap-
tured in the accounts of the social situatedness of learning, are also important determi-
nants of graduate outcomes, and should be included in efforts to enhance the quality
of student learning. (Christie et al., 2008, 12)
Offering students ‘the best of both’ requires us to acknowledge both the formal
aspects of ‘becoming peer’ in the sense explored by Boud and Lee (2005) and the
more informal, affective aspects of feeling comfortable in a learning community
(Cartney & Rouse, 2006; Matthews et al., 2011). If we want to offer sustainable edu-
cation and to support students in developing an enduring disposition for autonomous
study, we cannot afford to undervalue the importance of their social wellbeing.
Conclusion – sharing responsibility for supporting autonomous learning
We began the project out of which this study emerged at a time of upheaval and
transition, hoping to identify ways of adjusting the practices we had developed in
one learning environment to the rather different demands of a new dispensation
and a new setting. This context may well have predisposed both tutors and stu-
dents to pay more attention to the affective aspects of our work than might other-
wise have been the case. While the changes in our work environment helped to
highlight the importance of social factors in shaping what students learn from the
programmes and tasks which we provide for them, our findings are not limited to
such situations. Wilcox et al. (2005) interviewed first year students, some of whom
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withdrew before the end of the year, and found that their decision whether or not
to continue with their studies was often influenced more by aspects of their social
integration, or lack of it, than by academic challenges.
Similarly, Havnes (2008, 5) cites an observation from a student in Norway,
‘The curriculum is not difficult. What is difficult is to be a student. It is a new
way of life’. However, Havnes offers a rather different response to the challenge of
helping students to find their way in this new environment. Instead of looking for
ways for tutors to engage students in activities which will help to develop a sense
of comfortable belonging, he argues that students need to establish their own
autonomy in managing the social and affective aspects of university life. Where
David Boud (Boud et al., 2001; Boud & Lee, 2005) has argued that tutors should
formalise peer learning, drawing it into the curriculum so that it can be available
to all students, and Leigh O’Brien (2010) has made a compelling case for the
value of tutors themselves modelling caring behaviour, Havnes (2008) argues that
we should also recognise the importance of the contribution that can be made by
peer-mediated learning initiated and conducted by students themselves. This ech-
oes the student’s comment cited earlier, that structure, provided by tutors, com-
bined with opportunities for students to get to know, trust and support each other
can offer ‘the best of both’.
Havnes reminds us that we do not have to do everything for our students. We
can offer frameworks and patterns of expectation which will nudge students
towards experiencing the pleasure of learning alongside others but we should also
trust and expect them to demonstrate autonomy in developing their own
approaches to making learning an enjoyable and mutually supportive experience.
While we are concerned to help students to develop their autonomy and indepen-
dence we also hope that they will experience the rewards and pleasures of interde-
pendence, of being part of a mutually supportive community.
As we explore ways to meet students and adapt to a new, more marked separa-
tion between teaching spaces and academic and administrative territories, we are
also faced with the challenge of finding new ways to offer our students ‘the best of
both’. We hope to offer a rigorous and stimulating introduction to academic study
in an environment which also recognises the importance of the ‘comfortable’ and
‘nice’ aspects of social interaction. We believe that students who are encouraged to
develop and exercise their autonomy, both within the curriculum and beyond it, in
their ‘work’ and in their ‘play’, are more likely to associate their own learning and
personal development with the pleasures and rewards of social engagement and
participation. Becoming peer requires acquisition of knowledge, skills and experi-
ence but to feel peer, to feel comfortable in a learning community, also requires a
supportive social environment.
Note
1. Quotations from focus groups are referenced by the date of the meeting and the page number
from the transcript.
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INTRODUCTION
We see the self as originally an extension of 
experience of the other. (Fonagy et al. 2004: 8)
Attempts to understand learning in early child-
hood have tended to focus on the development 
of ‘higher mental functions’ (Vygotsky, 1981), 
which depend on information being tidied into 
generalised concepts. Because language has 
been the primary means of accessing what 
people know, remember and understand, the 
study of learning has focused on processes 
which result in consciously accessible, ‘speak-
able’ knowledge more than on the ‘softer’ 
processes by which we unconsciously adjust 
and tune our expectations, particularly about 
how the people around us are likely to behave. 
This chapter will focus on playful interactions 
which allow very young babies and their car-
egivers to gather soft knowledge about each 
other, enabling them to negotiate and co- 
construct roles and identities. Such interac-
tions include the closely attuned contingencies 
of primary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen and 
Hubley, 1978), individual and mediated atten-
tion to objects (Fogel et al., 2006), and 
‘triadic’ exchanges which reveal differences 
in people’s attention and perspectives.
Infants can perceive, shape and regulate 
their interactions with others well before 
their experience is organised into awareness 
of distinct ‘selves’. Interactions with more 
knowledgeable others and in culturally 
shaped environments provide opportunities 
for immersive, complex, intuitive learning. 
Playful interactions are particularly valuable 
because playfulness helps to loosen the hold 
of structures, social rules and constraints, 
making it easier for participants to find a fit 
between public, shared concepts and their 
own unique tangle of experiences. The intri-
cate process of fitting one’s responses to 
another person’s attention while acknowl-
edging and enjoying their interest in one’s 
own focus of attention constitutes a social 
situation of development which helps infants 
to begin to pick out distinctive patterns in 
their interactions with different partners. 
The undifferentiated ‘Great We’ of early 
30
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experiences (Vygotsky, 1998: 232) is gradu-
ally resolved into a great web of relationships. 
As they learn about the distinctiveness of 
others infants also come to learn who they 
are, co-constructing a personal social identity 
which will never be exclusively their own.
Recent work in developmental psychology 
has focused attention on the fundamental 
distinction between the detached, ‘spectato-
rial’ perspective favoured by experimental 
psychologists (Hutto, 2008) and a ‘participant’ 
perspective which acknowledges the impor-
tance of understanding how it feels to engage 
with another person (Engel 2005; Reddy 
2008, 2011; Schilbach et al., 2013). We expe-
rience relaxed, playful interactions with 
people with whom we are especially familiar 
and our playfulness allows us to reveal more 
of ourselves to each other, thereby further 
deepening our feeling of familiarity. Intimate 
relationships feel markedly different from 
contacts with strangers, when we need to be 
more consciously watchful for the cues 
which allow us to predict how another person 
is likely to behave. Partners who are particu-
larly familiar with each other can tune in to 
subtle cues which allow them to co-regulate 
their attention and their levels of arousal, 
making their interaction feel smooth and 
easy. As they explore what works in this par-
ticular context, their relaxed, open reciprocity 
can sometimes lift their interaction into 
exuberant playfulness, further reinforcing 
the intimacy of their relationship (Parker-
Rees, 2007).
GATHERING SOFT KNOWLEDGE
Babies clearly learn a huge amount in their 
first year of life but the way they gather 
information about patterns and consistencies 
in what happens around them is very differ-
ent from the conscious, purposeful pursuit of 
knowledge which is often associated with 
later forms of learning (Parker-Rees, 2010). 
Early experiences help babies to discover 
regularities and surprises in their actions, 
perceptions and responses, resulting in ‘soft’, 
intuitive ways of knowing quite unlike the 
kinds of learning which we associate with 
conscious mental activity and accessible, 
declarative ‘hard’ knowledge. Accounts of 
development which focus on how children 
ascend into hard mental activity have tended 
to undervalue the role of this soft, embodied 
thinking but recent accounts of the earliest 
stages of social development (e.g. Hobson, 
2002; Carpendale and Lewis, 2006; Seemann, 
2011a) have acknowledged its importance. 
Being fully human appears to be inescapably 
dependent on this primary, felt knowing, and 
playful interactions provide particularly rich 
opportunities for acquiring and refining the 
soft knowledge which lets us know what to 
expect from other people (Youell, 2008).
Playful interactions enable us to develop 
flexible social skills which allow us to par-
ticipate in different kinds of interaction with 
partners whose behaviour is also responsive 
to our own. The importance of play in the 
development of this social adaptability can 
be seen even in the development of rats. 
Over several decades, Pellis and Pellis (2009) 
have conducted a series of ingenious studies 
to research the effects of depriving juvenile 
rats of opportunities to engage in social play. 
They have gathered a strong body of evi-
dence to support their argument that without 
early experience of playful interactions, rats 
consistently fail to develop the ability to 
adapt their own behaviour to that of a co-
responsive partner. It would clearly not be 
acceptable to conduct similar studies with 
human infants, but these findings suggest 
that it is worth considering whether playful 
interactions might also provide rich opportu-
nities for infants to learn about how different 
people can be expected to respond to objects 
and events. Infants have to learn about socio-
cultural meanings – what different people 
like, value, want, fear and shun. Play helps 
them to learn what it feels like to interact 
with different partners and how to adjust 
their own participation in different kinds of 
interactions.
Playfulness and soft, social learning are 
bound in a virtuous spiral of mutual support. 
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When we interact with other people we 
adjust our behaviour to achieve a better fit 
(Shockley et al., 2003). We may not be con-
sciously aware of these adjustments but we 
experience them as physical responses which 
allow us to remember, anticipate and imagine 
how it feels to interact with a particular per-
son. When we know someone well we can 
predict their responses more reliably and we 
therefore feel more relaxed and comfortable 
with them. When we interact with familiar 
people we can be more playful because we 
are less reliant on the predictability offered 
by social scripts and conventions. As we 
develop greater trust and familiarity we 
reveal and learn more about each other and 
about ourselves, co-constructing a socially 
situated awareness of who we are.
PRIMARY INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Human infants are actively supported by 
older and more enculturated others who gen-
erally enjoy the experience of getting to know 
a baby, albeit in a variety of culturally distinc-
tive ways (Gaskin, 2006). While adults of 
other species tolerate interaction with infants, 
humans, to varying degrees in different cul-
tures, may encourage babies to join in with 
social interactions. Research suggests that 
mothers are usually particularly committed to 
building an intimate relationship which serves 
as a comfortable emotional ‘nest’ in which 
babies can develop the confidence and skills 
which will allow them to fly in future social 
encounters (Fonagy et al., 2004).
Colwyn Trevarthen (1979) offers a power-
ful account of the early development of 
primary intersubjectivity in the first few 
months of life. He argues that the combination 
of babies’ physical helplessness and their per-
ceptual capability affords rich opportunities 
for a particularly intimate form of interaction 
which has no topic other than developing the 
relationship itself. Babies soon learn that they 
can steer the flow of interaction, conditioning 
their caregivers through skilful deployment of 
smiles, gurgles, quivering lips, frowns and 
cries, and caregivers are usually more than 
willing to lose themselves in finding a connec-
tion with their baby.
Babies enjoy the feeling of being ‘liked’ 
(Parker-Rees, 2007) and specifically the feel-
ing of being the focus of another person’s 
attention (Reddy, 2011). They are finely 
attuned to detect contingency in the move-
ments of objects and people, and are quick to 
pick up on the fit between their own actions 
and those of another person who is actively 
engaging them in co-regulated interaction 
(Fogel, 1993). The playfulness of primary 
intersubjectivity provides opportunities for 
caregiver and baby to develop specialist 
expertise in adapting to each other’s shifting 
dynamics. The pleasure of ‘having a chat’ 
with a responsive baby increases the likeli-
hood that caregivers will make time for this, 
and every chat consolidates and reinforces 
mutual feelings of intimacy and familiarity.
Intimacy is experienced as an intensely 
affective response, partly because of the 
release of dopamine when we experience a 
match between what we expect and what we 
perceive (Frith, 2007). This pleasure response 
drives us to seek opportunities to engage in 
social interactions because these help us to 
refine our models of how we can expect oth-
ers to behave (Zeedyk, 2006). Within a 
communicative exchange, the spiral of 
shared enjoyment can result in moments of 
exuberance which are marked by increased 
levels of oxytocin, a hormone associated 
with pair bonding, trust and love (Feldman, 
2007). Playful interaction can escalate into 
exuberance only when the participants are able 
to relax into a flow of mutual ‘liking’ adjust-
ments and it is in this heightened form of 
intimate exchange that babies are able to bor-
row from their partner’s abilities, allowing 
them to appear ‘a head taller’ (Vygotsky, 1978: 
102). When playing a game like ‘peep-o’, 
for example, a baby who has delighted in 
being able to anticipate the excitement of his 
play partner’s ‘reveal’ may feel confident 
enough to introduce his own playful variations 
on the game, lifting his participation from pas-
sive observation to active contribution by 
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snatching at the cloth behind which she is 
hiding. Intimacy is highly context-specific 
and the tuning of fit between one’s own 
actions and another person’s responses 
requires an investment of ‘face-time’ before 
the co-regulation of interactions becomes 
easy, smooth and relaxed. It is perhaps for 
this reason that mutual playfulness acts as a 
reliable marker of familiarity as well as a 
powerful context for its development. Infants, 
like adults, do not like it when an unfamiliar 
person presumes to engage with them in an 
overfamiliar way.
It is difficult for playful interactions to 
blossom if either infant or adult is not suffi-
ciently relaxed; parents who are too 
concerned about tuning in to their babies 
may unwittingly communicate a degree of 
anxiety which makes interaction feel less 
playful. Beebe, Lachman and Jaffe (1997, in 
Fonagy et al., 2004) have shown that while 
high levels of coordinated interpersonal tim-
ing between mother and baby are predictive 
of high levels of cognitive performance in 
the baby’s later childhood, slightly lower 
levels of contingency are predictive of secure 
attachment and ‘easy’ temperament. Daniel 
Stern (2001) noted that levels of coordinated 
interpersonal timing between four-month-old 
babies and their mothers in their home were 
actually lower than when the same babies 
interacted with a stranger in a laboratory. The 
higher level of contingency in the less famil-
iar context may be due to ‘interactive 
vigilance’; both baby and adult were highly 
alert, working to sustain and manage their rela-
tionship, whereas in the familiar home 
environment mother and baby were able to 
relax, lower their guard and ‘just be’ together  – 
‘an active and necessary condition for play’ 
(2001: 145). In these very early months, the 
experience of easy, intimate interactions with 
a familiar partner provides a particularly fer-
tile example of what Vygotsky described as a 
‘social situation of development’:
The social situation of development ... determines 
wholly and completely the forms and the path 
along which the child will acquire ever newer 
personality characteristics, drawing them from the 
social reality as from the basic source of develop-
ment, the path along which the social becomes 
the individual. (1998: 198)
Vygotsky argued that successive social situa-
tions of development provide environments 
which both support opportunities for action 
and constrain them. Development therefore 
takes the form of a series of crises as indi-
viduals borrow from their social surroundings 
precisely the capabilities which will allow 
them to challenge the restrictions inherent in 
social participation. The close, familiar inti-
macy of primary intersubjectivity allows 
babies to develop the confidence and security 
which will allow them to ‘fly the nest’; to 
extend their sphere of action beyond the 
mother–baby dyad.
INDIVIDUAL AND MEDIATED 
ATTENTION TO OBJECTS
Parents and caregivers enjoy the intimacy of 
primary intersubjectivity but they are also 
usually responsible for sowing the seeds of the 
crisis which will turn their child’s attention 
away. Even in the earliest interactions with a 
baby, adults often introduce toys or everyday 
objects, placing things in the baby’s hands or 
using them to attract the baby’s attention. The 
extent to which adults’ use of toys is respon-
sive to the baby’s reactions will vary. Some 
adult–child dyads develop a strong focus on 
supporting the infant’s exploration of objects 
while others focus more on their social inter-
actions, inviting and expecting less attention 
to the objects themselves (Fogel et al., 2006). 
Decisions about what is introduced to the 
baby, what is placed where the baby can 
reach it and what babies are encouraged to do 
with the objects they handle are all mediated, 
in different ways in different cultures, by 
adults’ understandings about what babies 
need or are likely to want:
Objects are not things in themselves for infants in 
the first half year. Objects are enlivened by their 
embeddedness in social activities and become part 
of the infant’s world through their incorporation 
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into the historical process of the development of the 
parent-infant relationship. (Fogel et al., 2006: 40)
As babies become able to support themselves 
in a sitting position, freeing their arms and 
hands from their duties as body props, the 
golden time for primary intersubjectivity 
may be rather abruptly pushed aside in favour 
of exploration of physical objects. When an 
infant responds to the introduction of an 
object by actively refusing the caregiver’s 
efforts to engage, this can be experienced by 
caregivers as an unwelcome loss of intimacy. 
It may, however, be particularly important for 
babies to be able to explore their environment 
immediately, without their experiences being 
mediated through another person’s knowl-
edge and interests. In order to develop 
sensitivity to other people’s attention to other 
things, babies need to explore the nature of 
their own relationships with objects and 
events. Exploratory play with objects enables 
children to find out about the world and refine 
their movement schemes by poking, prodding, 
mouthing, banging and throwing things. This 
action-focused play also allows their own body 
and actions to become more perceptually 
transparent. Repeated handling of different 
objects enables babies to master motor control 
of arms, hands and fingers so that their use of 
these becomes automatic and effectively invis-
ible. Their attention can then be focused on the 
effects of their actions rather than on the 
actions themselves (Pacherie, 2011).
At the age of four or five months, babies 
are not yet in a position to be able to separate 
out hard facts about the properties of objects 
from their complex experience of what it 
feels like to interact with them. What they 
‘know’ about a teddy bear, for example, is a 
set of anticipations about how it will respond 
to their actions on it – how it will feel if they 
squeeze it, what it will smell like if they hold 
it against their face and how it has featured in 
their interactions with other people. By han-
dling objects, babies develop ‘action-guiding 
positions’ (Seemann, 2011b: 194) which link 
past experiences of interaction to possible 
future actions – objects which they have 
enjoyed eating will be linked with ‘good to 
eat’ connotations and an armchair may be 
associated with the experience of ‘cuddling 
up with mummy’. Babies do not come to 
know about a separate, external environ-
ment; rather they come to know about their 
own, felt experience of acting in the environ-
ment. Objects are known in terms of their 
affordances (Costantini and Sinigaglia, 
2012), not objective properties which are 
equally available to anyone but specific rela-
tionships between their features and the 
child’s own personal abilities. The skills 
which infants develop through handling 
objects are situated and context-specific: ‘a 
property not of the individual human body as 
a thing-in-itself, but of the total system of 
relations constituted by the presence of the 
organism-person in a richly structured envi-
ronment’ (Ingold, 1996: 178). When babies 
withdraw from the intensity of interactions 
with other people to focus on playing with 
inanimate objects, their situation remains 
inescapably grounded in the features and 
properties of their interactions. The objects 
available for them to play with, the opportu-
nities to play and the ways in which others 
respond to their play all contribute to their 
developing ability to participate in particular 
kinds of socially structured interactions.
NOTICING THE ATTENTION AND 
PERSPECTIVES OF OTHERS
Even as babies are honing their ability to 
focus attention on their relationships with 
objects and events around them, they are also 
developing awareness of the focus of other 
people’s attention. Vasu Reddy (2008) has 
charted a pattern of development in the pro-
gressive expansion of infants’ awareness of 
the objects of other people’s attention. From 
about four months (about when many infants 
are just beginning to switch their focus from 
their caregiver to exploring objects) they 
engage in triadic interactions with another 
person and an object in that person’s hand, 
where the connection between person and 
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object is explicit and physical. After a few 
months when they are intently focused on 
their own exploration of objects, they are 
likely to become increasingly sensitive, from 
about seven months, to other people’s atten-
tion to what they do – for example, to a 
parent who laughs when they bounce up and 
down in response to hearing music. At this 
age infants quickly learn that they can pro-
duce a predictable response by performing 
‘tricks’, but they may also show signs of self-
consciousness if too much attention is paid to 
their actions. They are able to regulate the 
level of attention they are receiving, either 
turning away to reduce their exposure or 
‘showing off’ to increase it.
From about eight months infants can share 
attention to objects in their own hands, par-
ticularly by handing things to another person, 
and it is not clear whether their attention is 
focused more on the object or on the social 
processes of ‘giving’ and ‘receiving’. Soon 
after their first birthday, infants demonstrate 
their ability to share attention to remote 
objects, both by following another person’s 
gaze and by themselves pointing to guide 
another person’s attention. Joint attention 
does not appear suddenly and fully formed 
towards the end of the first year. It emerges 
gradually, as infants develop their ability to 
focus attention on aspects of different kinds 
of interaction – particularly those, like exu-
berant play, which are associated with 
heightened emotions.
Reddy (2011) has argued that the affective 
charge of experiencing another person’s 
attention underpins and motivates the later 
expansion of awareness of people’s attention 
to objects which are beyond immediate 
reach. At each stage the infant’s attention is 
focused not on either an object or another 
person; rather it is on the relationship between 
person and object. Having felt the charge of 
being the focus of attention and of focusing 
attention (in the exploration of objects), 
infants are encouraged and helped to close 
the sides of the relatedness triangle (Hobson, 
2002), so that they are able to focus on 
another person’s attention to an object or 
event, to observe what things mean to other 
people. It has been assumed that the focus for 
infants’ learning then turns outward, that 
they begin to engage with the world in the 
same sort of way in which scientists, histori-
ans and ethnographers approach it, driven by 
a desire to know what it means and to explain 
it. While we can learn about the world by 
observing how other people respond to it, we 
can also learn about other people by noting 
how they respond to the world.
A shared focus of attention, such as a play 
format, can act as a reference point which 
allows people to notice differences between 
what they expect and what they observe. 
While babies are unlikely to have any con-
scious awareness of what they have learned 
about their mother, their response to engag-
ing in shared interactions with her will colour 
their expectations about how she is likely to 
behave in familiar situations. These anticipa-
tions of how their mother is likely to respond 
allow a baby to notice and interpret even 
slight variations in her responses. We do not 
need to be consciously aware of the adjust-
ments we make as we get to know each other 
but this process of ‘transactional calibration’ 
(Bruner, 1986: 62) continuously updates and 
fine tunes our ability to anticipate other peo-
ple’s actions, making them feel increasingly 
familiar. This allows us to relax more and to 
be more playful in our interactions with them 
and as a result we are able to get to know 
them better:
Infants do not learn about the social world mostly 
from third persons, from ‘‘he’s” and ‘‘she’s” whom 
they observe dispassionately from the outside. 
Instead, they learn, first and foremost from the 
‘‘you’s” with whom they interact and engage in 
collaborative activities with joint goals and shared 
attention. (Moll and Meltzoff, 2011: 398)
Sharing attention involves much more than 
simply observing another person’s response 
and comparing it with one’s own. Carpenter 
and Liebal (2011) offer an account of how 
triadic, person–object–person interactions 
are assembled, showing how they often cul-
minate in the affective reward of a ‘sharing 
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look’. First, one person notices something 
which strikes her as interesting and which, 
based on previous interactions, she expects 
the other person will also find interesting. 
She ‘catches his eye’ with an initiation look 
and then, when this look is acknowledged, 
and she has his attention, she guides his 
focus to the interesting object by turning her 
gaze onto it. She checks that he has followed 
her lead and that he has seen the noteworthy 
object and then both celebrate the recogni-
tion of their ‘togetherness’ with a ‘sharing 
look’. Both receive an affective boost from 
the confirmation that they know each other 
well enough to be able to share in each oth-
er’s interests; ‘I saw that and I knew you 
would be interested in it’. The sharing looks 
and knowing smiles which mark successful 
triadic interactions are evidence of what 
Bruner (1995) referred to as ‘meeting of 
minds’ and remind us that our main reason 
for sharing attention to other objects and 
events is less to extend our knowledge than 
to strengthen our relationships with other 
people. Carpenter and Liebal note that 
although ‘subjectively [sharing looks] feel 
utterly simple and directly perceived’ (2011: 
173), it is remarkably difficult to describe or 
define them in a way which does justice to 
the pleasure they both produce and display. 
This explanatory gap may be due to the fact 
that the soft knowledge on which social 
interactions are built is processed through 
fast, automatic channels which are largely 
inaccessible to direct, conscious observation. 
The sharing is felt more than observed.
The toddler’s interest in the details and 
distinctness of other people’s relationships 
with objects and events, what particular 
people like and dislike, what frightens them 
or disgusts them, what they prize and what 
they ignore, reminds us that meaning is ini-
tially an entirely relational property, an 
affordance or a relationship between an 
object and a person. It makes no sense, at this 
point, to talk about the meaning of an object 
or event; one can really only talk about what 
it means to a particular person. The sharing 
and exchange of attention, and specifically 
the shared attribution of meaning to objects 
and events, would appear to be a higher men-
tal function (Vygotsky, 1981) which must 
first be experienced in interactions with and 
between other people (on the social plane) 
before it can be internalised as the ability to 
observe one’s own attention and notice the 
personal meanings one has learned to associ-
ate with objects and events.
It has been widely recognised (Bruner, 
1986; Rogoff, 2003; Tronick, 2005; Trevarthen, 
2011) that as soon as infants develop the ability 
to notice how others respond to aspects of their 
environment, they gain access to a rich store of 
ready-made sociocultural information. ‘Social 
learning trains bodies to use each other’s 
brains’ (Cowley, 2004: 574). Children become 
increasingly skilled in identifying what other 
people can be expected to find funny, frighten-
ing, disgusting, desirable or shocking, and they 
are particularly interested in monitoring the 
affective responses of familiar people.
LEARNING WHO WE ARE: FROM ‘US’ 
TO ‘ME’
While most of an infant’s interactions may at 
first be with a particularly familiar partner, 
most often with his/her mother or primary 
caregiver, there will also usually be plenty of 
opportunities to meet other people, each of 
whom will occupy a particular position on a 
scale of familiarity, from cosily intimate to 
disturbingly strange. For the infant, each 
person will be associated with a distinct felt 
response, ranging from easy, relaxed and 
open to tense, anxious and vigilant and with 
distinct expectations – comfort or excite-
ment, high or low energy, cuddly or remote, 
etc. Without needing to be able to categorise 
features, distinguish between types or read 
minds, infants already have sufficient soft 
knowledge to begin to distinguish different 
patterns associated with their interactions 
with different people. Gradually, the ‘great 
we’ is resolved into increasingly distinct 
other identities, each of which is known not 
in terms of a set of properties of the person so 
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much as in terms of what it feels like to 
interact with that person. The ability to dif-
ferentiate between the felt experiences 
associated with interactions with different 
others also enables infants to begin to notice 
patterns in their response to interactions, pat-
terns which can become features of their own 
identity: ‘I like it when daddy throws me up 
in the air’, ‘I don’t like it when granny 
squeezes me too hard’, ‘that dog frightens 
me but mummy likes it’.
The emergence of a sense of self can be 
seen as the separation of a distinct identity 
out of the ‘Great We’, leaving behind a tan-
gle of ‘you’s and ‘they’s who no longer 
interfere in our uniquely personal engage-
ment with the world. From this perspective, 
participation in playful interactions enables 
us to differentiate ourselves by helping us to 
notice differences between other people’s 
ways of being with us, other people and 
things. We can then use our awareness of 
these differences between other people to 
begin to notice differences between other 
people and ourselves. The emergence of 
self-awareness can also be seen, however, as 
a reorganisation of relationships within the 
‘Great We’. From this perspective it is not so 
much that playful interactions help us to set 
ourselves outside our knowledge about other 
people as that they allow us to make that 
knowledge part of our identity. Our soft 
knowledge about other people’s ways of 
engaging with us, and with other people and 
things, is internalised in the form of knowl-
edge of social conventions, expectations and 
patterns of behaviour. This soft knowledge 
continues to inform decisions and opinions 
which we think of as ‘our own’:
We rarely recognize the extent in which our con-
scious estimates of what is worthwhile and what 
is not, are due to standards of which we are not 
conscious at all. But in general it may be said that 
the things which we take for granted without 
enquiry or reflection are just the things which 
determine our conscious thinking and decide our 
conclusions. And these habitudes which lie below 
the level of reflection are just those which have 
been formed in the constant give and take of 
relationship with others. (Dewey, 1916: 22)
SPECTATORS AND PARTICIPANTS, 
OUTSIDERS AND INSIDERS, THIRD-
PERSON AND SECOND-PERSON 
PERSPECTIVES
Our decisions about how we should ‘go on’ 
in day-to-day life are informed by what 
Shotter (2012) describes as ‘withness think-
ing’, the soft, fuzzy knowledge which comes 
from our experience as participants in inter-
actions with particular people in particular 
contexts. Until recently, however, the study 
of developmental psychology has been dom-
inated by models of learning which have 
favoured the adoption of a ‘third-person per-
spective’ (Reddy, 2008; Schilbach et al., 
2013), standing apart from interactions and 
observing them from the outside. The differ-
ence between the third-person, ‘I–it’ 
perspective and the second-person, ‘I–you’ 
perspective is illustrated by Reddy (2008) as 
the difference between what it feels like to 
see someone smiling at someone else and 
what it feels like when you notice that some-
one is smiling at you. The third-person 
perspective favoured by most psychologists 
has meant that concerns about managing and 
controlling variables have driven the study of 
early interactions into clinics and baby labs. 
As a result, we now know more about how 
infants and caregivers behave in unfamiliar 
situations than about how they behave in the 
privacy of their homes, where they are more 
likely to feel relaxed and comfortable enough 
to enter into playful interactions.
The problems associated with adopting an 
outside perspective when studying early 
interactions may be particularly evident in 
accounts of parenting practices in unfamiliar 
cultures. Accounts of mother–infant interac-
tions in several African tribal cultures, for 
example, have emphasised the absence of 
evidence of playful interactions. Le Vine and 
Le Vine (1963, in Tudge and Odero-Wanga, 
2009: 144) observed of the Gusii in Kenya 
that ‘Mothers do not play with their children, 
fondle them, or display affection for them 
openly’. The need for some caution in inter-
preting these findings is highlighted, however, 
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in an observation by Price-Williams (1975), 
cited by Rogoff (2003) in a discussion about 
cultural patterns of playfulness:
Among Hausa mothers, the custom is not to show 
affection for their infants in public. Now those 
psychologists who are concerned with nurturance 
and dependency will go astray on their frequency 
counts if they do not realize this. A casual 
[observer] is likely to witness only public interac-
tion; only when much further inquiry is made is 
the absence of the event put into its proper per-
spective. (2003: 27)
It is not only casual observers who risk this 
sort of misapprehension; even the most rigor-
ous of observers may fail to see events in 
their proper perspective if participants see 
them as outsiders. When it comes to the inti-
mate, playful interactions which characterise 
early adult–child relationships it may be 
particularly difficult for anyone to observe 
the play without, to some extent, compromis-
ing how relaxed and open the participants 
feel. Grondin went so far as to say that ‘one 
who observes the play with sovereignty from 
outside acts as a spoilsport, exactly because 
he does not play along’ (2000: 52). Anyone 
who has tried to video-record mothers ‘act-
ing naturally’ with their babies will know 
that this delicate, intimate relationship is 
often particularly private and easy to disrupt. 
A mother whose attention has been even par-
tially taken outside her interaction by her 
awareness of a video camera is, to varying 
degrees, less fully present for her baby.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
The earliest playful interactions are highly 
context-specific and it is becoming increas-
ingly evident that they cannot be fully 
experienced or understood without acknowl-
edging the support available from the 
intimacy of familiar relationships. Interest in 
the processes which allow babies to begin to 
connect with other people has grown as 
advances in technology have made it possi-
ble to document more and more of the 
intricacies of interpersonal exchanges. In 
recent years, researchers from different disci-
plines have shown increasing interest in 
exploring the borderlands between their 
fields. Easier access to research findings 
from all over the world and from different 
paradigms has meant that researchers are 
more and more able to ‘play’ with different 
ways of examining and understanding the 
topics they study.
Rapid advances in the range of technolo-
gies available for studying activity in the 
brain have made it possible to examine the 
neuronal processes which allow us to con-
nect, both consciously and intuitively, with 
the interests, feelings and concerns of other 
people (Keysers and Gazzola, 2012). This 
new understanding of social aspects of men-
tal processes has also led neuroscientists to 
explore the boundaries between their disci-
pline and neighbouring territories. Seemann 
(2011), for example, brings together a range 
of perspectives on joint attention from devel-
opmental and comparative psychology, 
philosophy of mind and social neuroscience. 
Schilbach et al. (2013) review the boundaries 
between neuroscience, developmental and 
social psychology and phenomenology, 
where the ‘spectatorial’ approach previously 
associated with hard science is challenged by 
a softer ‘second-person’ perspective.
The shift of focus from intrapersonal pro-
cesses to interpersonal spaces is also evident 
in work by Fogel et al. (2006). Fogel and his 
colleagues draw from Piagetian theory, soci-
ocultural theory, ecological theory and 
dynamic systems perspectives to develop a 
relational–historical research approach 
which examines interactions between car-
egivers and infants in order to study the 
development not of the infant but of the rela-
tionship itself. This approach has yielded 
fascinating insights into how the inevitable 
variation in familiar routines generates 
changes, some of which are amplified, played 
with and eventually adopted as new frames 
for interaction.
Interest in the finer details of how interper-
sonal exchanges are co-constructed has also 
informed therapeutic approaches, such as 
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Suzy Tortora’s (2006) ‘Dancing Dialogue’. 
Tortora works with children for whom social 
interaction is either difficult or unmotivating, 
basing her approach on what she has learned 
from very sensitive observations of interac-
tion between mothers and babies. She 
engages in a ‘dance’ with the child, echoing 
aspects of the child’s movement patterns in 
her own actions. Her playful, responsive 
style of interaction helps to support develop-
ment by loosening familiar structures, 
allowing for the wholesale reorganisation of 
existing abilities across the dyad and not just 
in one participant, the ‘learner’ or ‘patient’.
CONCLUSION
Careful examination of early interactions, 
from a variety of different perspectives, 
highlights the intricate subtlety of the pro-
cesses by which babies and caregivers come 
to know each other. This knowing is grounded 
in the gradual accumulation of soft knowl-
edge, as much about the feel of particular 
forms of interaction as about the features of 
another person. We can help babies to find 
out who they are by paying close attention to 
them and by letting them notice how we 
respond to them. Playful interactions with a 
familiar partner offer particularly rich oppor-
tunities for noticing, testing out and shaping 
new ways of being together. Vygotsky (cited 
in Kravtsov and Kravtsova, 2009: 207) urged 
professional pedagogues to abandon the tra-
ditional ‘outsider’, didactic perspective in 
favour of a more engaged relationship with 
children: ‘Do not teach and do not “bring 
up”, but live an interesting life together with 
children’. Our life together with children is 
likely to be more interesting if we recognise 
the importance of making time to be playful.
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13 Concepts of childhood: 
meeting with difference
Rod Parker-Rees
Introduction
Childhood is a concept which seems simple and straightforward but the more we 
examine it the more we understand not only about what it means to be a child but 
also what it means to be an adult and a member of a community. Individuals may tell 
themselves that they have ‘put aside childish things’, preferring the civilised order of 
adult behaviour, but communities do not have this option. Children are a necessary 
feature of any group which intends to survive beyond one generation and child-
hood, specifically the relationship between children and adults, is a defining feature 
of human society. We are made human by opportunities to find out how other peo-
ple behave and think but also by our interest in introducing newcomers to our ways. 
Teaching and learning (and assessing other people’s behaviour) are central to the 
cultural lives of human communities and human individuals.
Working with other people’s children obliges us to be critically aware of our own 
attitudes. We are bound to meet parents and colleagues whose perspectives on child-
hood will be different from ours and we have to recognise how our assumptions 
affect our judgements and our responses to other people. This chapter will examine 
the complexities involved in the development of concepts of childhood and will con-
sider how a deeper awareness of the nature of concepts can influence how we feel 
about meeting with people who do not see things quite as we do. I will argue that we 
should not be looking for a single, universally applicable, ‘best’ concept of childhood 
because children are better served by a continuing, critical discussion fuelled by a 
diverse range of voices and personal experiences. Indeed, we cannot understand child-
hood unless we recognise it as part of a dynamic process of interactions which allow 
both individuals and communities to adapt and adjust to changing environments. 
If you are interested in working with young children it is likely that you are more than 
usually comfortable with meeting people who do not see the world quite as you do. 
One of the characteristics of children is that they have not yet learned how to ‘fit in’ 
with the rules and conventions of their society and this means that they have a ten-
dency to confront us with embarrassing questions and fresh insights which help us to 
notice assumptions we might otherwise take for granted. For some people, particu-
larly those who like things to be clearly organised and predictable, this is distinctly 
uncomfortable. The history of the concept of childhood can be mapped out in terms 
of a centuries-long argument between adults who want to educate children out of 
childhood as quickly as possible and those who value the special contribution which 
children can make to a family or community.
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David Kennedy (Kennedy and Kohan, 2012) has characterised this argument as 
evidence of a tension between the child’s direct interest in what is different and the 
adult’s reliance on being able to count on other people seeing things in the same 
way. A degree of sameness in how people think and behave is a fundamental require-
ment for survival in closely packed groups. If we could not predict how others could 
be expected to behave we would have to be in a constant state of hypervigilance, 
unable to relax and always watching out for any sign of possible risk or threat. The 
social contract, which allows us to function in large groups with relatively infrequent 
explosions of violence, relies on shared concepts which have to be learned through 
participation in the social activity of a group. This need to ‘learn the ropes’, to gradu-
ally work out what is and is not OK in different social contexts, constructs a divide 
between those who know (adults) and those who don’t yet know (children). It also 
constructs a divide between the unique phenomenology and difference of individual 
experience and the partially shareable epistemology of uniquely human ‘higher mental 
functions’ (Vygotsky, 1997: 106). 
When we explore concepts of childhood we have to acknowledge differences in 
children’s and adults’ ways of engaging with the ideas which inform their culture. 
Our interactions with children remind us that the social conventions and habits of 
thought which frame our day-to-day interactions are inventions rather than given 
features of a natural order (James and Prout, 1997). Engaging in pedagogy, an ines-
capable feature of all human societies, regularly confronts us with the challenge of 
explaining and justifying everyday behaviours and practices which familiarity would 
otherwise render invisible. Spending time with children reminds us of the individual 
differences beneath the superficial sameness on which our social interactions depend. 
We can also remind ourselves of difference by studying the history of concepts of 
childhood. History provides valuable opportunities for trying to see how other people 
at other times, with other concerns, fears, hopes and priorities may have thought and 
felt about their relationships with children (Brockliss and Montgomery, 2013) and can 
help us to develop critical attitudes and dispositions which can inform our meetings 
with other people in the present (Cunningham, 2006). Even now, when we have so 
much more in common with most of the people we meet, there are still important 
differences between us. How we function as professionals will depend on how willing 
we are to engage with these differences, to learn from them, and sometimes to chal-
lenge them. It is easy to assume that if someone treats children in ways which make 
us uncomfortable they must be wrong and our professional duty is to educate and 
correct them. Our duty to safeguard children will sometimes require us to challenge 
abusive or neglectful behaviours but in many cases, if we are able to recognise that 
people may have compelling reasons for their choices and decisions, these can offer 
us windows into their life, allowing us to get to know them as complicated, different 
people rather than as interchangeable representatives of a category or type.
‘My’ childhood and ‘my’ concept of childhood?
It is widely recognised that young children do not have concepts of childhood in the 
way that adults do (Alderson, 2013) because concepts have to be distilled out of 
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experience. Whereas children live in their childhood, adults are able to think about 
childhood, to stand back from it and to consider it as an idea. To complicate mat-
ters further, we tend to imagine that our own concept of childhood is privileged 
because we have experienced it for ourselves, so we know what we are talking about 
(Kennedy, 2001). What we forget, when we remember our own childhood, is that 
remembering is a cognitive process which has to be learned. We do not have to 
learn how to have experiences but we do have to learn which aspects are notewor-
thy, which are worth keeping and which are too mundane and ordinary to bother 
with. This is why a three-year-old who is quite capable of talking about any aspect of 
her activities at nursery may be completely flummoxed when asked, at the end of a 
session, ‘What have you been doing today?’ It takes years to learn how to edit expe-
riences down to retrievable memories because we have to learn how we can expect 
other people to feel about things that have happened to us. Life is too short to allow 
us to recall every detail of any experience. We can’t spend a whole day remember-
ing one day, so we have to edit our experiences down to the highlights and our 
decisions about what deserves to be kept are informed by our growing awareness 
of how other people will respond – what will be interesting, shocking, amusing or 
impressive. Our awareness of a shared, public concept of childhood is constructed 
even as this public concept informs the way we selectively edit the memories which 
will define our ‘own’ childhood. 
Every year we ask our students to write a short account of ‘What childhood means 
to me’ and every year we are struck by the similarities between students’ responses. 
While some students will write about difficult and dark memories, and we are care-
ful to caution them that recalling their own childhood may be disturbing, the great 
majority of accounts feature the pleasure of freedom to explore outside, unsupervised 
by interfering adults, or special occasions, holidays, outings and time together with 
family. We then challenge our students to consider why they have these memories. 
Would they have any reason to remember them if they were ordinary events which 
happened every day?
We select and remember significant moments and moments which others remind us 
about and we forget the everyday experiences which barely required our attention. As 
a result our adult memories of our own childhood are inevitably more interest-filled 
(whether with happy or traumatic moments), rich and intense than our present-day 
experience of our own lives and the lives of today’s children. Because we are usu-
ally comparing our ‘edited highlights’ experience of our remembered childhood with 
our ‘live-streaming’ experience of children’s day-to-day lives it is not surprising that 
we should experience the feeling that something has been lost. Whereas we spent 
our time playing freely outdoors with friends, in the sunshine and on holiday, today’s 
children sit indoors on their own, huddled over their computers, their phones or their 
homework, waiting for the rain to stop. 
Although children do not think about their childhood in the same way that adults 
do, their childhoods are still shaped by adults’ concepts of childhood. Particularly 
in affluent, minority world societies, every detail of a child’s environment is con-
sidered, planned and managed, from her clothes, furniture and toys to the way 
people hold, feed, comfort and play with her. Even her attention to events in her 
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environment is tutored by her shared interest in what other people find interesting. 
Before she is one year old she will be aware of what others find alarming, interest-
ing, funny or disgusting and she will learn to use this growing social knowledge 
to inform her interactions (see Chapter 3). Although adult members of particular 
social groups are likely to share many aspects of their concepts of childhood, they 
will not agree on every detail and frequent, affectively charged disagreements, 
between mothers and fathers, between parents and grandparents and between 
parents and siblings, for example, help to ensure that we are often reminded about 
concepts of childhood.
We tend to claim ownership of our ideas in phrases such as ‘my concept of childhood’ 
or ‘my views on parenting’ but careful reflection will show us that these ideas are 
socially constructed and shared. Our feelings about how we ‘ought’ to behave or 
what we ‘should’ do are built out of our experiences of other people’s behaviours, 
beliefs and arguments. We gradually become aware of what different kinds of people 
do, approve and expect and we internalise these intricate webs of mutual expecta-
tions and obligations in the form of our ‘own’ feelings about what we ‘should’ do. 
These social rules vary across different contexts and learning their subtle variations 
takes many years, establishing a widening distinction between adults, who know how 
they are expected to behave, and children, who are still learning.
Communities develop their own strategies for managing the inevitable disagreements 
about how adults should treat children and we may need to step back from our focus 
on individuals to recognise how roles and responsibilities can be distributed within 
and across social groups or figurations (Gabriel, 2010). In families, for example, tra-
ditional distinctions between gender roles have contributed to the construction of 
different role expectations for mothers and fathers (Hrdy, 2011; Gray and Anderson, 
2012). Each family’s ways of arriving at decisions about what children need, what 
they deserve and what can be expected from them will involve different dynamics of 
argument, coercion, subterfuge and appeals to members of a wider family or social 
group. Even within the same family, there are likely to be differences between what 
sons and daughters learn about the roles expected of fathers and mothers. In larger 
social groupings we can expect to find a different kind of dynamic in the arguments 
between members of social factions differentiated by variations including levels of 
economic, social or cultural capital. So when adults come together to form new fami-
lies it is likely that they will bring with them different assumptions and expectations 
about childhood which may not become apparent until they have children of their 
own to argue about.
To say that our concepts of childhood are socially constructed is not to suggest that 
we are swept along by an irresistible force of social determinism. We are exposed 
to the richness and complexity of different attitudes and behaviours in our dealings 
with mothers, fathers, older brothers and sisters, grandparents, families of friends 
and media families in soap operas, sit-coms, films and ‘reality’ programmes. As we 
become more aware of the social appraisals associated with different patterns of 
relationships we are able, to varying degrees, to make choices about how we want 
to be seen by others. The names, clothes and hairstyles we choose for our children, 
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whether and for how long we breast-feed, whether we carry them or put them in 
a buggy, the way we talk to them and the way we discipline them are all signifiers 
which we can use to tell other people who we think we are and how we want our 
children to be seen. We have space to shape our ‘own’ concepts of childhood within 
the wider context of alternatives which we choose not to adopt but our choices 
about how we should treat our children are always informed by our sociocultural 
knowledge about how other people will judge the choices we make. 
Childhood v. Adulthood – an evolving dynamic
Acknowledging the subtleties of interactions between the different self-identities of 
individuals and the communities of sameness in which these identities are framed 
should make us cautious about attributing the same concept of childhood to whole 
social groups over extended periods of time. While the structures of authority in dif-
ferent families and communities will allow and forbid different kinds of challenges 
and disagreements, we have no reason to believe that any society has ever settled 
on a fully agreed and universally accepted approach to raising children. It can still 
be useful, however, to step outside the familiar disagreements of our own age to 
try to understand why people living in circumstances more different from our own 
may have developed more different ways of thinking about the relationship between 
childhood and adulthood. 
Concepts of childhood are always shaped and defined in relationship with concepts 
of adulthood and as our understanding of adulthood changes we can expect this 
to influence our understanding of childhood. What we think of as changes in con-
cepts of childhood may therefore sometimes be better understood as changes in 
concepts of adulthood or as changes in the relationship between childhood and 
adulthood. As our ability to travel and our access to information have grown, so has 
the threshold for attaining an ‘adult’ level of competence in an expanding range of 
social contexts. This has required changes both in the extent of childhood (there is 
just so much more to be learned) and in adults’ attitudes to childhood and children 
(Heywood, 2001). 
Throughout most of our recorded history we have assumed that learning to control 
our natural impulses, to subordinate our individual interests for the greater good of 
a tribe or family group, is a positive achievement. We have compared ourselves with 
other animals and prided ourselves on our ability to transcend our brutish nature. 
From this point of view, an adult is someone who has learned how to behave in dif-
ferent circumstances, understanding what will offend others, what will be admired 
and what will be punished. In the days of the great Persian, Egyptian, Greek and 
Roman empires, when large numbers of people were living in tightly packed cities, 
being civilised was an essential part of maintaining the social order. It is no accident 
that the words we still use to describe behaviour which acknowledges the interests of 
other people are drawn from words for large social groups; from civis we have civil 
and civilised, from polis we have polite, from urbs we have urbane and from court 
we have courteous. Of course in the days of empire only a few men, and very few 
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women, would be in a position to manage their own behaviour. For most people, 
social order would be imposed on them by others and they would never experience 
the personal autonomy which we nowadays associate with adulthood. For example, 
in a Roman household, the Pater Familias had absolute authority over the behav-
iour of other men, women, slaves and children in the household, together with the 
responsibility to protect both the well-being and the reputation of the family.
Philippe Ariès (1962: 125) famously argued that ‘in medieval society, the concept of 
childhood (le sentiment de l’enfance) did not exist’. Much has been made of the nar-
rowness of the evidence on which this claim was based and other historians (Pollock, 
1983; Hanawalt, 1986; Shahar, 1990; Hendrick, 1992; Crawford, 1999; Orme, 2001) 
have since shown that young children, certainly those under the age of about seven 
years, were clearly not treated like ‘mini-adults’ in the Middle Ages. Indeed the word 
‘adult’ was ‘not really naturalized’ in English before the middle of the 17th century 
(OED, 1971: 129).
Norbert Elias (2000) focuses on the ‘civilizing process’ which resulted in the progressive 
internalisation of the mechanisms of social control, a process which might be described 
as the invention of adulthood (Kennedy, 2006). A growing belief in learning, rea-
son and personal responsibility, rather than blind faith, can be traced back to the 
Renaissance but in England in the 17th century this focus on self-control was fuelled 
both by the puritan rejection of passive subservience to the authority of priests and 
by a radical political movement which rejected the authority of an overbearing and 
greedy nobility, resulting in civil war. 
We tend to associate puritanism with the doctrine of ‘original sin’, the belief that 
children were born with the guilt of Adam and Eve which must be purged by 
thorough moral and religious instruction. Where Roman parents might have seen 
childish tantrums, wilfulness and stubbornness as evidence of children’s uncivi-
lised, ‘natural’ condition, puritans were more likely to construe this as evidence of 
children’s inability to resist the temptations of evil. We should, however, remember 
that, just like today’s news media and, indeed, our own memories, history has a 
tendency to focus attention on what is exceptional. The attitudes of ‘mainstream’ 
puritans, who would have condemned violent disciplining of children as a failure 
of adult self-control (Morgan, 1986 in Cox, 1996), are less likely to catch our atten-
tion than the ‘fire and brimstone’ sermons preached by more ‘extremist’ ministers. 
Careful examination of historical evidence shows that use of corporal punishment 
in the 17th century was broadly similar to practice in the 20th century (Pollock, 
1983; Todd, 1987; Sommerville, 1992). Cox (1996) argued that the puritan empha-
sis on family life was driven by worries about the corruption of the ‘civilised’ world 
and a concern to protect children which is not so different from 21st-century 
withdrawal to the safety of the family home. Changes in how people lived with 
children led in turn to the development of a more personal, domestic approach to 
study and self-improvement.
John Locke (1690) argued that children’s minds are shaped by the experiences 
imprinted on them and in his letters advising a friend on the private education of 
14_Parker_Rees_BAB1504B0307_Ch_13_Part_4.indd   196 18-Jun-15   10:18:20 AM
Chapter 13  Concepts of childhood
 197
his son (Locke, 1693) he focused on the responsibility of fathers to guide their sons 
into a virtuous and reasonable adulthood by carefully managing the kinds of experi-
ences to which they would be exposed. He advised fathers to watch their sons as 
they played, looking out for signs of ‘Byass in their Natural Temper’ (1693: para 139) 
which could be gently corrected by exposure to positive models. The challenge of 
education, as he saw it, was to preserve the ‘Child’s Spirit easy, active and free’ 
(para 46) while introducing the habits of self-control and respect for others which are 
the hallmarks of virtuous adulthood:
All their innocent Folly, Playing, and Childish Actions, are to be left perfectly free and 
unrestrained, as far as they can consist with the Respect due to those that are present; 
and that with the greatest Allowance.’ (para. 63, my emphasis)
In the mid 18th century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau was deliberately controversial when 
he drew on popular accounts of the lives of native Americans to argue that the natu-
ral state of the ‘noble savage’ had been debased and corrupted by social affectations, 
leading to the absurd powdered wigs and elaborate costumes of the 18th-century 
gentleman and the dehumanising squalor of overcrowded cities. In ‘Émile, or On 
Education’, he issued a direct challenge to Locke’s celebration of Reason:
To reason with children was Locke’s great maxim. It is the one most in vogue today. Its 
success, however, does not appear to me such as to establish its reputation: and, as 
for me, I see nothing more stupid than these children who have been reasoned with so 
much. (Rousseau, 1762/1979: 89) 
Rousseau’s romantic celebration of the natural condition of childhood saw education 
not as an introduction to the rules and manners of civilised society but as arrogant 
interference with nature’s plan:
Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything 
degenerates in the hands of man. He forces one soil to nourish the products of 
another, one tree to bear the fruit of another. He mixes and confuses the climates, the 
elements, the seasons. He mutilates his dog, his horse, his slave. He turns everything 
upside down; he disfigures everything: he loves deformity, monsters. He wants 
nothing as nature made it, not even man; for him, man must be trained like a school 
horse; man must be fashioned in keeping with his fancy like a tree in his garden. 
(Rousseau, 1762/1979: 37) 
Kennedy (2006) and Davis (2011) have shown that Rousseau’s supposed invention 
of the romantic concept of childhood is actually grounded in a long tradition. In 
the 12th and 13th centuries St Francis and Bishop Anselm had argued that children 
are born in a state of pre-lapsarian innocence, like Adam and Eve before they were 
expelled from Eden, and the 17th-century poetry of Traherne, Vaughan and others 
celebrated the freshness and purity of children’s immediate engagement with expe-
rience. Fogel (2001: 729) goes back even further, suggesting that pre-agricultural 
hunter-gatherer communities ‘exemplify a primarily romantic culture’.
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It is also important to remember that history tends to record the ideas of those who 
hold power and we should not assume that everyone shared the ideas advanced by 
those who had the time to write. Rousseau reminds us, for example, that mothers 
and fathers do not always share the same concepts of childhood:
Mothers, it is said, spoil their children. In that they are doubtless wrong –but less 
wrong than you perhaps who deprave them. The mother wants her child to be 
happy, happy now. In that she is right … Fathers’ ambition, avarice, tyranny and false 
foresight, their negligence, their harsh insensitivity are a hundred times more disastrous 
for children than is the blind tenderness of mothers. (Rousseau, 1762/1979: 38n) 
While throughout most of our history, writers and thinkers have focused on how chil-
dren can be helped to acquire the knowledge and social understanding which will 
allow them to take their place among adults, they have also acknowledged what they 
would dismiss as ‘blind tenderness’ in the ‘fondness’ and ‘coddling’ demonstrated by 
the adults who spent more time with children. 
Childhood and Adulthood: without contraries  
is no progression
Rousseau’s Émile was particularly influential in England where it helped to inspire 
a radical Romantic movement at a time when revolutions in France and in America 
were challenging traditional assumptions about power and authority. At the heart 
of this Romanticism was the idea that difference and individuality were qualities to 
be nurtured and celebrated rather than flaws to be smoothed over by the uniform 
sameness of polite, obedient behaviour. 
In his ‘Songs of Innocence and Experience’ William Blake (1794/1988) integrated 
words and images on his illuminated plates, weaving foliage through the text of his 
poems which contrast the phenomenological innocence of childhood and nature 
with the concept-bound experience of adulthood and the city. In ‘London’ he alludes 
to the strictures of the ‘rational’ social order: 
In every Infant’s cry of fear … 
The mind-forg’d manacles I hear (1794/1988: 27) 
In ‘The Garden of Love’, a chapel has been built, ‘Where I used to play on the green’. 
‘Thou shalt not’ is written over the door, 
And Priests in black gowns were walking their rounds,
 And binding with briars my joys & desires (1794/1988: 26) 
Unlike Rousseau, however, Blake did not represent innocence as a higher condition than 
experience. His assertion that ‘without contraries is no progression’ (1790/1988: 34) rec-
ognises the energy which comes from the dynamic tension between Heaven and Hell, 
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Innocence and Experience, or childhood and adulthood. Blake argued that progression 
depended on interaction between contraries, illustrated in the community of ‘old folk’ 
and ‘little ones’ who enjoy each other’s company in ‘The Echoing Green’ (1794/1988: 8).
Romantic poets at the turn of the 19th century interpreted Blake’s celebration of the 
energy of a diverse community into a more internalised, personal balance between 
the lyrical, ineffable energy of direct, unmediated sensation and the clarity of rational 
thought, reimagining childhood as a continuing feature of a balanced individual 
identity. Wordsworth explored memories of his childhood in an effort to find ways of 
communicating a ‘sense sublime’ (Wordsworth, 1999), which could capture in words 
the sublime feelings inspired by nature. Coleridge (1840: 497) defined ‘Genius’ as 
‘the carrying on of the freshness and feelings of childhood into the powers of man-
hood’ and Jane Austen wrote, in ‘Sense and Sensibility’ about two sisters, Elinor and 
Marianne, learning to balance the impulsive energy of ‘sensibility’ with the rational 
self-control of ‘sense’. 
In the mid 19th century this romantic effort to integrate some of the qualities of child-
hood into adult life was diluted into a more sentimental ‘cult of the child’ (Coveney, 
1967; Davis, 2011) as many adults looked back to their edited memories of a simpler 
time, freed from the burdensome responsibilities of adulthood. It was also challenged 
directly by evangelical moralists like Hannah More who objected to a ‘spirit of inde-
pendence and disdain of control, which characterise the times’ (More, 1830: 109) and 
who sought to force children into a starchy uniform of ‘good habits’. It was this desire 
to bring children under control, as much as the philanthropic concern to protect them 
from exploitation in factories or to protect their innocence from the depravity and 
squalor of life on city streets, which led to the introduction of compulsory education. 
By the early 20th century, Freud had developed the romantic internalisation of child-
hood in his model of the childish id, the adult ego, and the parental/social super-ego 
but children had already effectively been removed from most areas of adult life.
Segregation of communities, whether on the basis of gender, ethnicity, age, (dis)ability 
or social class, reduces opportunities for encounters with difference. Adults who have 
become familiar with the reassuring sameness of the company of other adults may 
increasingly come to feel uncomfortable when they are faced with the different-ness 
of children. Children may then pose a double threat to adult equanimity, both because 
they don’t yet know how they are supposed to behave around other people, especially 
unfamiliar people, and because they may provoke uncivilised behaviour (e.g. sexual 
and violent responses) in adults who are not used to their company.
A romantic vision of an alternative world, where adults and children can safely play 
together, is offered in recent accounts of the social structures of hunter-gatherer com-
munities. Like Fogel (2001), Gray (2009) and Konner (2010) draw on ethnographic 
data from a wide variety of (just) surviving and recently studied hunter-gatherer socie-
ties to highlight the sometimes surprising extent to which adults and children appear 
to enjoy and benefit from living alongside each other in small communities. Rousseau had 
compared the individual noble savage of the Americas with the sophisticated gen-
tleman of 18th-century France but Gray and Konner focus on the social groups or 
bands which are a feature of hunter-gatherer life. They suggest that children benefit from 
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ACTIVITY 1
opportunities to learn, at first hand and with no need for schools, about all the things 
that adults do but also that adults enjoy a relaxed, playful environment in which 
adults as well as children are largely free to choose how they will spend their time. 
In these communities the behaviour of adults can be directly influenced by the inter-
ests of children. When Mbuti children have had enough of the bad atmosphere caused 
by adults’ arguments, they will perform the molimo madé ceremony, which involves 
them collaborating to imitate an angry elephant stamping through the camp, ‘a playful 
means by which the young people, without blaming any individual adult, can influence 
the adults’ behavior’ (Gray, 2009: 512). It takes children to raise a village.
Conclusion: meeting with difference
We cannot simply turn back the clock to return to our hunter-gatherer roots any 
more than we can return to the imagined golden age of our own childhood. We 
can, however, learn something from stepping outside the social frameworks which 
have shaped our adulthood. Encounters with other ways of thinking can help us 
to develop a critical plurality which makes us more willing and able to see past the 
sameness of concepts and to meet with difference.
It is our shared concepts, learned from our participation in social interactions with 
other people, which allow us to communicate with people who do not share every 
detail of our own experience. But in order to meet with other people we must be 
prepared to look below the smooth surface which concepts offer and to notice differ-
ences in the ways in which sameness is performed. Instead of assuming that everyone 
does or should mean just what we mean, we can take the trouble to step outside our 
assumptions to meet and learn from the differences which other people have to offer. 
David Kennedy (2006) argues that we can no longer understand the civilised adult as a 
discrete individual or homo clausus (Elias, 2000), instead we should acknowledge that 
we are intersubjects, who cannot be known, and indeed cannot exist, in isolation from 
the social figurations which shape us and are shaped by us. Kennedy argues that our 
existence and development as intersubjects depends on dialogue with others and that 
this dialogue can only take place when we are able to hold open space for difference. If 
the otherness of childhood is denied, repressed or absorbed by our adult self we cannot 
meet it in dialogue and benefit from the role that children can play as ‘valuable strangers’ 
(Harding in Kennedy, 2006: 142), helping us to trouble the surface of sameness.
Think back to your own childhood and try to recall some of the childcare issues which 
were contested in your family. This may take you back to arguments between your par-
ents, between your parents and grandparents or wider family about how you should eat, 
dress, behave, talk, etc. or between you and your siblings over differences in how you 
(Continued)
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ACTIVITY 2
were treated. You might also ask other members of your family about disagreements they 
can remember. (What childhood issues do your parents remember their parents arguing 
about?) What can you learn from these memories about different concepts of childhood 
within your own family?
With a small group of friends, consider the opportunities open to different sections of 
society for spending time with a variety of people of different ages, backgrounds, beliefs 
and values. What factors, including personal preferences, resources and time, might influ-
ence these opportunities? Can you think of any ways of helping or encouraging people to 
get to know a wider variety of different people? 
Cunningham, H. (2006) The Invention of Childhood. London: BBC Books.
This is an excellent introduction to the history of childhood from the Middle Ages to the 20th century. A 
CD or audio download of the BBC Radio 4 series based on the book is also available so you can listen 
while doing something else!
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Kennedy, D. (2006) The Well of Being: Childhood, Subjectivity, and Education. New York: State 
University of New York Press.
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and sociology. This is not a light read but it is well worth the effort!
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 THE MINDING OF TWO- YEAR- OLDS 
 Rod  Parker- Rees 
 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to encourage people who will play a part in the 
minding of two- year- olds to reconsider our understanding of how young children 
notice and make sense of their world. By focusing on the  minding of two- year- olds, 
rather than their minds, I  hope to contribute to a shift in understanding, from 
thinking about children in terms of what they have  acquired or  developed to noticing 
how they are encouraged and enabled to  participate in social communities. 
 This chapter will offer an exploration of the inextricably  social nature of ‘mind-
ing’, particularly as this informs our thinking about how we can support two- year- 
olds as they move out from the familiar, private context of home and family into 
the more public world of early childhood education and care settings. 
 Minds and minding 
 I want to stretch the use of the word ‘minding’ beyond its conventional use. We 
have come to separate the idea of ‘mind’, as a noun, from the many ways in which 
we use ‘mind’ as a verb (‘mind out!’ ‘Do you mind!’ ‘mind you …’ ‘mind your own 
business’ …) but I want to play with three related ways in which ‘minding’ can be 
understood: 
•  Minding is what minds do . We have become used to thinking in terms of 
people  having minds but this tends to hide the fact that minding is a process, 
and a shared process at that. It really makes no more sense to say that I have 
my ‘own’ mind than to say that I have my own conversations, interactions or 
even my own language. When we shift our attention from children’s minds to 
children’s minding, it becomes easier to recognise that this refers to the process 
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of directing and focusing attention, both in social contexts and in ‘private’ 
thought. 
•  Minding is the intentional sharing of ways of minding. This sense can 
be understood by comparison with verbs like ‘feeding’ and ‘clothing’. To feed 
or clothe someone is to offer what they need in order to be fed or clothed and 
while these terms can refer to the process of putting food in someone’s mouth 
or putting clothes on their body, they can also refer to the less intimate pro-
cess of making food and clothes available so that recipients can feed or clothe 
themselves. In a similar way, minding can be understood as the  pedagogical pro-
cess of intentionally sharing interests and attention with others, deliberately 
helping them to participate in the minding practices of a particular culture. 
•  Minding is looking after or caring for something or someone. This 
is the more familiar sense associated with what a childminder does. While it 
is often related to the first sense of minding (we expect childminders to focus 
their attention on the children they are minding), it can also have a rather pejo-
rative sense akin to ‘babysitting’ or looking after animals. When understood 
in this way, minding may have connotations of ‘just’ responding to needs; an 
outdated and inaccurate association which is vigorously challenged by child-
minder organisations. 
 The focus of this chapter will be mainly on the second of these – how interactions 
with carers such as parents, grandparents, siblings, friends and neighbours ‘scaffold’ 
and support the minding of two- year- olds. How do we enable children to find 
out about what matters to us (both as individuals  and as representatives of a shared 
culture) and how can we show  our interest in what matters to them? How can we 
equip children with the public, cultural resources (including language but also less 
explicit ways of expressing values and beliefs) which will enable them to share their 
private interests with others; to ‘make up their minds’ and also to learn what other 
people mind about? I will argue that minding children in this active, intentional 
way can best be understood in terms of sharing meaning – indeed, meaning and 
minding have much in common:
 Sharing the meaning of experience appears to be a unique motivation of 
human cognition incorporating the intertwined motivations of making sense 
and making relationships. 
 (Nelson,  2007 : 17) 
 I will begin by outlining the early stages of learning to share attention. Noticing 
what people notice, and how they respond, leads, usually by the end of the first 
year, to an interest in the relationships between people and things or events; what 
things  mean to particular people. This early awareness of differences in other peo-
ple’s minding enables infants to begin to separate various ‘you’s from the “Great 
We” ’ (Vygotsky, 1998:  232) of their first interactions and this also leads to the 
discovery of a self, initially perceived through the attention of other people. 
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Sharing experience and meanings with others allows children to become increas-
ingly aware of patterns in how other people can be expected to feel about things. 
Noticing, sharing and sometimes contesting the mindings of others (and par-
ticularly of others who have an active interest in supporting them) helps chil-
dren to develop skilful and culturally attuned management of their own minding. 
Becoming a member of a community involves learning how we are expected to 
fillet our experience – separating what is worth keeping, what we think will be 
interesting to other people, from what needs to be cut away/ edited out or ignored, 
either because it is uninteresting, bland or useless, or because it may be offensive, 
irritating or disgusting. 
 Our minding, how we direct our attention, is both our own and not our own. To 
be able to share experiences and relationships we need to acknowledge the interests 
and mindings of others as well as to allow others (and ourselves) to get to know 
what is distinctive about us. The social negotiation of attention requires a complex 
to- ing and fro- ing between a child’s ‘own’ interests and concerns and those of the 
people with whom these meanings and mindings are shared. Children internalise 
knowledge about other people’s relationships with their environment (what they 
like, care about, etc.) but they also externalise their own understanding of what they 
have observed, in their uniquely modulated responses, imitations, play, utterances 
and, in time, in their speech. Internalised values and judgements allow us to observe 
and evaluate our own externalisations, to see ourselves as others see us. 
 For both two- year- olds and their interaction partners, sharing understanding 
depends on a shared awareness of the child’s particular context. Familiarity with a 
shared world and a shared past allows familiar adults to ‘know where a child is com-
ing from’, making them more able to ‘scaffold’ the child’s minding. John Shotter 
( 2012 ) uses the term ‘withness thinking’ to describe this intensely ‘present’ way in 
which thinking and minding can be situated in, and supported by, the features of 
a context outside our heads. Shotter contrasts ‘withness thinking’ with ‘aboutness 
thinking’ – the ability (and habit) of lifting ourselves out of our immediate context 
so that we can think ‘about’ it rather than ‘in’ it. Perhaps one of the most impor-
tant distinctions between the minding of two- year- olds and of most adults is that 
two- year- olds have not yet mastered the trick of thinking ‘about’ things, thinking 
in concepts rather than in a context. For this they will need a few more years of 
practice in using language and in noticing how it is used by others. 
 Language has a special function as a mediating tool which allows public mean-
ings to be negotiated and shared while also allowing private meanings to be revealed 
in the ‘telling’ ways in which meanings are performed and expressed differently by 
different people. When children begin to ‘use words’ it is easy to imagine that they 
have already crossed the threshold of language but there is still a long way to go 
before they are able to join us in our use of public, dictionary- definable, conceptual 
and decontextualised meanings. 
 The chapter will conclude with a consideration of how we might understand 
the role of practitioners whose professional task is to furnish children with the 
opportunities and experiences which will enable them to enter into a minding 
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community. How can we help two- year- olds and even younger children to man-
age the transition from context- dependent minding, with the support of familiar 
people, places, things and routines, to the much more demanding task of minding, 
making sense and forming relationships among strangers in a strange, new setting? 
 Intersubjectivity: attention to attention and learning how 
to mind 
 jointness comes with being moved just enough to sense the psychological 
orientation of the other in oneself, but as the other’s. This happens through 
intersubjective engagement that is emotional in source and emotional in 
quality. 
 (Hobson,  2005 : 201) 
 Babies are not born with an inbuilt ability to share attention but they are born into 
communities which actively support their development of this ability. To under-
stand how children are helped into particular ways of minding, it may be helpful to 
clarify what is meant by attention and also how attention can be shared. 
 Peter Hobson ( 2005 : 187) describes attention as ‘psychological engagement’ 
and I think it is helpful to move away from the idea of attention as an internal 
psychological property of an individual, to see it more as a relational concept, 
a connection between people or between people and things. The development 
of these connections has been extensively studied by Colwyn Trevarthen and 
his colleagues, resulting in a clear account of consistent patterns in how babies 
are helped to develop intersubjective relationships (Trevarthen and Aitken,  2001 ; 
Trevarthen,  2011 ). Beginning with the purely social interpersonal ‘conversations’ 
which frame primary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen,  1979 ) – whether in face- to- 
face ‘chatting’ or skin- to- skin connectedness – babies are brought into engage-
ment with enculturated adults in a two- way process of mutual familiarisation. 
Babies appear to enjoy participating in interactions with a partner who pays close 
attention to them (Parker- Rees,  2007 ) and Ed Tronick and colleagues (Cohn and 
Tronick,  1983 ; see also Adamson and Frick,  2003 ) showed how sensitive they can 
be to interruptions in this flow of mutual engagement. If the caregiver switches 
to ‘still face’, not responding to the baby’s cues, or even if an artificial delay is 
introduced between action and response, when baby and caregiver are linked 
remotely via cameras and monitors (Murray and Trevarthen,  1986 ), babies will 
quickly start to show signs of unease, first by actively trying to provoke a contin-
gent response, e.g. by waving arms, vocalising and making eye- contact, and then 
writhing and crying to signal their distress. Even very young babies are clearly 
sensitive to differences between attuned, intersubjective minding and less atten-
tive forms of interaction. 
 Trevarthen noted that babies who are able to sit up, making their hands avail-
able for exploration of their environment, may switch the focus of their attention 
to objects they can pick up and manipulate. This ‘epoch of games’ (Trevarthen, 
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 1977 ) can be seen not so much as an interruption in the development of inter-
subjectivity as a shift of focus to relationships with things, allowing babies to 
tune up their understanding of the affordances of different objects without the 
direct mediation of another person’s responses. Handling things allows the baby 
to explore her relationships with what different objects allow and enable her to 
do. Reddy ( 2008 ) has shown that this apparent shift from a highly social, ‘second- 
person’ perspective, to a more ‘Piagetian’, ‘third- person’ perspective on what can 
be done with things is preceded by heightened interest in other people’s hands 
and in their manipulation of objects. So what looks like a very private form of 
exploration may well be motivated, at least in part, by an early awareness of other 
people’s relationships with things. It is important to recognise that most of the 
objects encountered and handled by a baby will have been  selected as ‘safe’ and 
‘appropriate’ by adults or older children who are versed in a particular culture. So 
even when a baby is ‘alone’ with objects to play with, she is still wrapped in the 
mindings of her community. 
 Towards the end of the first year, the infant’s experience of primary intersub-
jectivity and of ‘first- hand’ exploration of objects enables her to notice another 
form of relationship in her social environment. Where primary intersubjectivity is 
focused on the experience of mutually responsive interaction with another per-
son, secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen and Hubley,  1978 ) involves attention 
to the relationship between another person and a  topic with which that person is 
engaging; for example, different adults may respond to a spider with interest, fear 
or disgust. Familiarity with persons and with objects allows the infant to focus on 
differences between people’s responses to particular objects, events or other people. 
This is another important step in the continuing development of the infant’s ability 
to communicate and opens up opportunities for participation in the negotiation of 
shared ways of minding. By focusing attention on what other people are interested 
in, how they respond to things and what they do with things, the infant can now 
discover what things  mean to particular people. 
 At this point, meanings are not understood as properties of objects (‘spiders are 
interesting/ scary/ disgusting’) but as features of relationships between persons and 
things, events or other people (‘Dad is scared of spiders’). This growing awareness of 
structure in the patterning of interactions already relies on an ability to generalise 
across different events, to notice consistencies and repetitions which inform expec-
tations and allow the infant to predict how familiar people are likely to respond 
in familiar situations (‘Dad  is scared of spiders’ vs. ‘Dad  was scared of the spider’ – 
though of course this understanding is not yet held or expressed in this verbal 
form!). 
 Social referencing, the outsourcing of interpretation by paying attention to the 
way other people respond to things, is widely recognised as a powerful strategy for 
‘harvesting’ cultural information which other people have already learned. There 
is, however, much more to this process than just the acquisition of knowledge. 
Sharing attention is, first and foremost, a way of connecting and communicating 
with the minding of other people and it is important to recognise the affective, 
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social qualities associated with this experience. Hobson ( 2005 : 201) has argued that 
‘one can only have joint attention if one has the capacity to ‘join’ another person’ 
but he has also pointed out that this ‘joining’ is more complicated than it might 
at first appear. When we talk about infants developing the ability to share in joint 
attention with others, it is easy to imagine a meeting of previously separate minds 
but this is an example of the common tendency to project our adult ways of mind-
ing into our interpretation of the experience of children. It is easy to forget that 
our earliest experiences are not clearly differentiated between ‘mine’ and ‘yours’. We 
begin our lives in the flow of what Vygotsky described as the ‘Great We’, immersed 
in interactions, supported and swept along by them and alert to their felt quali-
ties. We enjoy the ‘fit’ of attuned interaction with a familiar partner and we feel 
distress when the flow is disturbed but we do not yet understand our interactions 
in terms of exchanges between a clearly distinct ‘you’ and ‘me’: ‘at times interact-
ing caregiver- infant dyads are neither one individual nor two, but somewhere in 
between’ (Spurrett and Cowley,  2010 : 308). 
 I have argued (Parker- Rees,  2014 ) that recognising differences between other 
people’s ways of responding to objects and events enables infants to construct 
assemblies of attitudes and behaviours which can be associated with particular per-
sons who have distinct ways of minding. Infants do not need to construct a theory 
of mind before they can understand that different people demonstrate different 
kinds of attention to things, but once they are aware of other people’s attention 
they can begin to recognise  themselves as objects of this attention. Joint attention 
may not be so much about bringing ‘our’ attention into line with someone else’s 
as about learning to separate ourself and others  out of the flow of interaction 
between us. 
 There is an important distinction between undifferentiated attention and shared 
attention, which requires awareness of both joint experience and a distinct, expe-
riencing self. Carpenter and Liebal ( 2011 ) offer a powerful account of the pleasure 
shown by two- year- olds when they register that they are sharing attention, as when 
a child notices that someone else is imitating her actions. The smile which often 
accompanies this ‘sharing look’, after a child has successfully ‘locked on’ to another 
person’s attention, is evidence of the pleasure which we associate with the sharing 
of experience, and this pleasure is itself evidence of the value and importance of 
shared minding. 
 For most people, sharing attention is a powerful motivator, whether in ‘gos-
sip’ about social matters or publication of academic arguments and findings. 
Developments in social media have highlighted our preoccupation both with 
sharing our experience and with getting feedback (‘likes’) from others, not least 
because this sharing allows individuals to function as parts of a sociocultural ‘super- 
organism’, both contributing to and fed by information and understanding which 
extends far beyond our own first- hand experience. Our first steps into a ‘shared life’ 
(Heal,  2005 : 40) mark the beginnings of our participation in interactions which 
will both open up a world of other people’s experiences and enable us to find our-
selves reflected in the eyes and mindings of others. 
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 Internalising and externalising 
 Human agency is realised through participation in practices that are ‘ours’ 
before they can be ‘mine’. 
 (Rouse,  2007 : 514) 
 Sharing in the minding of others involves both internalising, taking on board aware-
ness of how others can be expected to act and react, and externalising, ‘performing’ 
one’s own interests and intentions. Participation in the shared life of familiar others 
ensures that infants are exposed to the patterns in people’s behaviour, not only what 
they do but also, to varying degrees, what they like and dislike, what they value and 
what they fear. As infants become increasingly adept at interpreting the intentions 
and feelings behind people’s actions, they are able to use this awareness to find out 
more about how  they are perceived and  who they are. 
 It is easy to think of babies as passive receivers of information, overlooking the 
extent to which our minding is enabled and constrained by our motor capabilities. 
Our ability to notice other people’s attention and intentions is, however, always 
informed by what we ourselves are able to  do . We have seen how the motor skills 
required for manipulation of objects allow the four- to six- month- old infant to 
focus her attention on exploring the properties of things, motivated in part by 
her interest in what other people do with their hands. Esther Thelen, Linda Smith 
and colleagues (Smith et al.,  1999 ) have shown that older infants who are already 
able to move autonomously (usually by crawling) are significantly more likely to 
‘understand’ the significance of a change of place in the ‘A not B’ task. This task 
involves showing the infant an object at location A, covering it and encourag-
ing the infant to ‘find’ it. When the child is adept at uncovering the object at 
location A it is then moved, in full sight, to a different location (location B) and 
again covered. While young infants will typically continue to search for the object 
at location A, those who are already independently mobile, and who therefore 
have personal experience of dealing with changes in their geographical relation-
ships with their environment, are more likely to switch their attention to location 
B. Children who are not yet independently mobile can also be helped to ‘succeed’ 
in this task simply by changing their position (height) between the location A and 
location B trials. 
 Campos et al. ( 2000 ) have studied links between independent mobility towards 
the end of the first year and a range of social and cognitive changes including joint 
attention, fear of heights, distance and size perception and separation anxiety, as well 
as performance on the ‘A not B’ task. Of particular interest here is their conclusion 
that the ability to move away from a caregiver is associated with increased checking 
of the caregiver’s position and focus of attention. As noted in the previous section, 
it is only when the infant is aware of a separation between her own attention and 
that of her caregiver that she can recognise and appreciate the  sharing of attention. 
 As infants grapple with developing motor skills, they have frequent oppor-
tunities to notice differences between what they  want to do and what they are 
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 able to do, helping them to lay the foundations for an understanding of  intention . 
Carpenter and Liebal ( 2011 ) describe studies by Liszkowski and colleagues, who 
examined attempts by 12- month- old infants to share attention by pointing at 
objects and vocalising. By observing infants’ responses when an adult responded 
to a pointing gesture either by focusing only on the child or only on the object 
pointed at, the researchers found that infants were clearly not ‘satisfied’ by these 
unnatural responses. They would repeat their pointing gesture and became less 
likely to point in future trials. These infants were willing to work to repair their 
messages to achieve the result they wanted, which was shared attention to a 
specific target, and this experience of persevering to achieve a social goal may 
help infants to notice the intentions behind the actions of other people. When 
Andrew Meltzoff ( 1995 ) showed 18- month- old infants a demonstration of a per-
son manipulating objects (e.g. ‘trying’ to pull the ends off a dumb- bell) he found 
that most infants, when given the object, would not simply imitate the adult’s 
actions but would ‘complete’ them, suggesting that they had inferred an intention 
in the adult’s actions. 
 Children are not left to find out about the social world of attention and inten-
tions on their own. To varying degrees in different cultures, parents and caregiv-
ers actively participate in children’s minding, responding with interest to bids for 
shared attention, providing a ‘running commentary’, helping children to achieve 
their goals and/ or distracting them from undesirable intentions. Nelson ( 2007 : 102) 
has described this shared minding as ‘parental externalisation of intent’ and this 
unusually explicit co- construction of meaning clearly supports children’s entry into 
the particular values and priorities of the caregiver’s culture. 
 Children are also increasingly able to externalise their own interests and atten-
tion, contributing to social interactions with others. As they begin to imitate actions, 
for example, their versions show exactly which aspects have caught their attention, 
providing subtle cues which can be picked up by attentive caregivers and which 
inform the familiarity which enables caregiver and child to understand each other. 
Bruner ( 1996 : 23) noted the special function of externalisation in making aspects 
of our knowing ‘accessible’ to appraisal and interest, not only to others but also to 
ourselves:
 Externalisation produces a  record of our mental efforts. One that is ‘out-
side us’ rather than vaguely ‘in memory.’ It is somewhat like producing 
a draft, a rough sketch, a ‘mock- up.’ … ‘It’ relieves us in some measure 
from the always difficult task of ‘thinking about our own thoughts’ while 
often accomplishing the same end. ‘It’ embodies our thoughts in a form 
more accessible to reflective efforts.  The process of thought and its product 
become interwoven. 
 (Bruner,  1996 : 23) 
 Vygotsky ( 1978 : 201) described early pretend play as ‘memory in action’ and we 
can understand this not only as physical re- enactment of features which have caught 
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a child’s attention but also as the processing of these features, externalising them so 
that the child can make personal sense of them, allowing a personal understanding 
to be internalised. As a child plays with a particular way of acting, observing her 
own performance and noticing what she notices, she is also contributing to her 
developing awareness of herself. 
 For a two- year- old, living and minding in the small private world of personal 
experience, the boundary between ‘in here’ and ‘out there’ is far from clear- cut. 
Judy Dunn’s study of the lives of two- year olds in their homes (Dunn,  1988 ) pro-
vided powerful evidence of the extent to which these very young children were 
enabled by their familiarity with the patterns of interaction in which they had 
grown up. Among members of their family, these children showed that they could 
participate in a wide range of social activities, including teasing, arguing, telling 
jokes and making excuses, which, at the time of the study, had not been observed 
in ‘laboratory’ studies of two- year- olds. It would perhaps be an over- simplification, 
therefore, to say that the children observed by Dunn had ‘internalised’ knowledge 
of their home environment. This knowledge depended on their ability to interact 
directly with people, places and things; it was not yet ‘in’ them, available to be used 
(with the same degree of confidence) elsewhere. 
 In familiar environments young children (and indeed all of us) are supported by 
‘withness thinking’ (Shotter,  2012 ); our minding is extended across people, places 
and things which ‘remind’ us about what we might do. For adults this might include 
a bookshelf filled with books which remind us of ideas we have read about, but a 
two- year- old is more likely to draw from the affordances of toys and other objects 
which carry reminders of what can be  done with them and, of course, from inter-
subjective relationships with other people. Two- year- olds live in, from and into the 
space around them. They will not be able to join us in standing apart from this 
space and thinking ‘about’ it until they have developed much more sophisticated 
language skills. 
 Language and access to shared meanings 
 It is through the relationship with the other that the I emerges, is constructed 
and maintained; and likewise it is through the relationship with internal oth-
ers that refection itself emerges and is constructed and maintained. 
 (Kennedy,  2006 : 147) 
 It is particularly difficult for adults, who are deeply immersed in a mental world 
organised largely by language, to comprehend how different the minding of two- 
year- olds (and even three- and four- year- olds) really is. 
 Preverbal minding, as a form of ‘withness thinking’, is framed, supported and 
guided by the immediate context in which the child finds herself; whereas verbal, 
conceptual minding opens up the possibility of ‘aboutness thinking’, allowing us 
to stand back and apart from our physical environment and to venture into alter-
native worlds, remembering past events, planning or anticipating future ones and 
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exploring possible and imagined contexts. Language allows us to share access to 
concepts which carry generalised meanings – not the personal, particular mean-
ings first noticed by children in the behaviours and responses of individuals but 
public, common meanings which are co- constructed in the continuing negotiation 
and exchange of verbal interactions. Concepts are abstractions, literally ‘pulled out’ 
from particular contexts and freed from the tangle of messy details which compli-
cate each person’s unique, individual experience. Concepts allow different people 
to share attention to  kinds of things without requiring that everyone has previous 
experience of precisely the same contexts. Most importantly, concepts are con-
stantly renegotiated and recalibrated as people share their interest in what others 
can be expected to know, feel and care about. 
 But this extensive web of conceptual knowledge is not acquired or internalised 
suddenly, as soon as children begin to produce and respond to words. Two- year- 
olds, who have usually just begun to use a few words, still rely on a concrete, present 
context to support and enable their minding. They are still some years away from 
developing the ability to ‘lift off ’ or step out from their immediate context into the 
more public space of conceptual thinking, but their social environment is usually 
richly organised in ways which will help them to participate in conversations with 
other people. 
 Participating in a social environment enables children to develop familiarity with 
what can be expected to happen in particular places, at particular times and with 
particular people. Engagement in mealtimes, dressing and undressing, bathtimes, 
bedtimes, going to the shops, etc., exposes children to patterns in these daily rou-
tines, allowing them to develop expectations about what is likely to happen next. 
Although every mealtime will be slightly different, there are likely to be common 
elements which are repeated with enough consistency to allow them to become 
part of a familiar ‘script’. Because parents and other caregivers are themselves par-
ticipants in wider social and linguistic communities, these scripts, while slightly 
different in every family, are likely to resemble those of other families which share 
a similar culture. The shared mindings of cultural groups are built into the language 
and practices of individuals through their conversations with family members and 
other people, online forums, books, TV programmes and a wide variety of other 
media. This means that, within a particular cultural group, the unique, private con-
texts experienced by individual children are still likely to have much in common 
with the contexts experienced in other families. 
 Patterns and routines in everyday life, shaped by the wider framing of cultural 
norms, enable children to begin to differentiate between what  feels familiar and 
what is interestingly (or alarmingly) novel, well before they are able to recall spe-
cific memories about previous occasions. Children may delight in playful varia-
tions in the details of particular scripts, variations which help to confirm a shared 
understanding of what is ‘normal’ and what is ‘silly’. Katherine Nelson ( 2007 ) has 
noted that by the age of three, children appear to be able to differentiate between 
‘script’ knowledge (about what  usually happens) and accounts of a specific event. 
Nelson argues that, for young children, what we call the ‘present’ tense is actually 
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used to signify the normal features of script knowledge (‘I get out of bed, I get 
dressed and I have my breakfast’ or ‘Dad is afraid of spiders’) while the past tense 
is used when referring to specific events (‘I fell out of my bed’ or ‘Dad was scared 
of the spider’). This suggests that distinctions between what usually happens and 
novel, interesting or remarkable events may be particularly salient for young chil-
dren who are just beginning to ‘work out’ the regularities and patterns in what 
happens around them. 
 Because adults are embedded in linguistic, conceptual ways of minding, 
they tend to engage with children ‘as if ’ they were already members of the 
language users club. This assumption is reinforced when they begin to pro-
duce sounds which can be taken for words. When adults chat with children or 
offer a ‘running commentary’ on the child’s actions, attention and intentions, 
they help to develop associations between particular contexts and particular 
sounds but they also provide cultural information about what  they think is 
 worth saying. When familiar adults condense aspects of a child’s experience 
into a verbal narrative, the sifting out of what is ‘remarkable’ from what ‘goes 
without saying’ provides valuable information, not only about shared, common 
understandings of what can be expected but also about the unique features of 
different people’s ‘ways of seeing’. When older children struggle to respond 
to the familiar question, ‘what did you do at nursery/ school today?’ their dif-
ficulty may be more to do with deciding  what will be interesting than with 
knowing  how to express themselves. 
 Nelson ( 2007 ) notes that advances in language, like earlier advances in mobility, 
may result in a need for new strategies to monitor relationships with other people. 
Two- year- olds are usually still firmly rooted in contextual minding and largely 
unable to engage in conversations about other times and places, so they do not  need 
to notice differences between ‘what happened to me’ and ‘what someone told me 
about’. As they develop more sophisticated language skills, however, allowing them 
to stray further away from the here- and- now, it will become increasingly neces-
sary for them to keep track of this distinction between their ‘own’ experience and 
‘hearsay’ – information about other people’s experience. The development of an 
‘autobiographical self ’ is driven by this need to differentiate between what is pri-
vately ‘mine’ or ‘yours’ and what is publicly ‘ours’. 
 Implications for the minding of two- year- olds 
 Children’s intellect develops through their encounters with the socially 
mediated world of people doing things in places. 
 (Engel,  2005 : 71) 
 Other chapters in this volume will elaborate on the details of what two- year- olds 
need from their caregivers, whether at home or in an early years setting. Here I can 
only touch on the possible implications of a shift towards seeing children’s minding 
as a shared, social process. 
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 The growing focus on naturalistic observation of very young children in social 
situations, particularly by female researchers (Dunn,  1988 ; Rogoff,  2003 ; Engel, 
 2005 ; Nelson,  2007 ; Reddy,  2008 ), has helped to highlight the context- dependent, 
situated nature of early forms of thinking, focusing, noticing and remembering. 
Instead of trying to devise artificial ways of identifying patterns of development in 
what individual children are able to do without the support of a familiar context, 
these researchers have examined the ways in which the ordinary, day- to- day life of 
communities performs the important pedagogical function of helping children to 
join in and enjoy the experience of sharing meanings. 
 Political pressure to get mothers ‘back to work’ has perhaps contributed to con-
cerns that children are being hurried into care settings which struggle to provide 
the familiar, intimate kinds of support which children need. The emphasis, in out-
of-home settings, on ensuring that every child has a consistent key worker, can be 
seen as a way of trying to smooth the transition from the familiar context of home 
to the new, strange and bustling environment of an early years setting but it is 
important to recognise that these settings can offer rich and exciting opportunities 
for children to ‘move on’ from the security and familiarity of ‘home’ to the novelty 
and stimulation of ‘away’. 
 While it is certainly possible for children to move on from context- dependent 
‘withness thinking’ to more conceptual, linguistic ‘aboutness thinking’ within the small 
world of their immediate family, encounters with a wider variety of different perspec-
tives can contribute to development of broader, more flexible concepts. Like the nurs-
eries of Reggio Emilia, we perhaps need to focus more on supporting communities 
of children and adults which allow minding to be shared. Instead of worrying about 
how an early years practitioner can provide fully attuned attention to each child, we 
should perhaps consider how practitioners can work to maintain and develop a com-
munity in which attention is more distributed. Ideally, perhaps, this community would 
include parents, grandparents, caregivers and other family members so that children 
have opportunities to participate in a wide range of different kinds of interactions, not 
only with other two- year- olds, and so that parents and others can also experience the 
pleasure of joining in with a community beyond the home. 
 In the past it would have been easy to argue that two- year- olds are not ‘ready’ 
to participate in communities outside their family and the assumption that they are 
developmentally unable to form worthwhile peer relationships could find support 
in group situations where children were encouraged to explore their own interests. 
However, when children are expected and helped to take an interest in each other’s 
interests, as well as in those of familiar adults, they can surprise us with their ability 
to share their minding. 
 In her deceptively simple account of the relationships between Mrs Tully and 
the two- year- olds in her classroom, Vivien Gussin Paley ( 2001 ) provides a powerful 
image of how a sensitive adult can support the minding of two- year- olds, helping 
them to broaden each other’s horizons as they get to know each other. Mrs Tully 
uses Paley’s approach to ‘doing stories’ (Paley,  1981 ), which involves writing down 
the children’s stories and then, later in the morning, encouraging the children to 
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perform them for each other. Paley describes the children’s engagement with Alex’s 
one- word story, ‘Mama’. After watching Alex’s performance, all of the other chil-
dren eagerly take turns at presenting their own interpretation of ‘Mama’:
 Each acts the role according to some inner logic: this one walks on his toes, 
another bends to touch the rug, someone else closes her eyes and sways. … 
Their ability to bring a character to life and reveal something about them-
selves at the same time is astonishing’. 
 (Paley,  2001 : 4– 5) 
 As each child externalises and shares a personal response, the whole group, includ-
ing Mrs Tully and the performer, is able to share and internalise new meanings. 
Noticing how other children notice different aspects of the idea of ‘Mama’ does 
two important things:  it expands what may previously have been a very private 
association between word and sense into something more like a shared concept and, 
at the same time, it allows each child (and Mrs Tully) to get to know more about 
the distinctiveness of each child’s unique perspective. 
 Paley notes that the sign on Mrs Tully’s door reads ‘Lillian Tully, director and 
head teacher’ but I think this account of her ability to draw children into a com-
munity of shared meanings shows that she was also a highly skilled childminder. 
 Questions 
 When you spend time with two- year- olds, what do you do that might help 
them to join you in your social world? 
 Is it possible to establish a clear boundary between ‘your’ minding and the 
children’s? 
 Recommended reading 
 Nelson ,  K. ( 2007 ).  Young Minds in Social Worlds: experience, meaning and memory .  Cambridge, 
MA :  Harvard University Press . 
 Katherine Nelson offers an excellent review of research into the distinctive features of young 
children’s thinking. In this book she traces the fascinating, shifting relationships between 
what children are able to do and what they learn from participating in the everyday interac-
tions which make up their social worlds. Nelson shows how children are minded by interac-
tions with older children and adults who actively help them to join in. 
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Chapter 8 - General discussion and further works 
 
Assembling this selection of my published works has been like putting together 
an issue of the journal ‘Early Years’, a process which often results in the 
unexpected discovery of common themes and issues from the juxtaposition of 
individual papers. This collection is different in that all of the works were 
published under the same name. However, spanning a period of 10 years, they 
have not been written by entirely the same person any more than the different 
authors represented in an issue of a journal can be seen as entirely distinct 
individuals – lists of references will often attest to elements of a shared heritage 
and common assumptions. Each work acquires a new set of meanings through 
its position among the others just as each individual person acquires a new 
identity through her relationships with other people: “through others we become 
ourselves” (Vygotsky, 1997/1931, p. 105). 
I have always felt uncomfortable with the idea that a PhD thesis should 
represent an original contribution to a field of knowledge because this risks 
undervaluing the ‘Creative Collaborations’ (John-Steiner, 2000) behind every 
text. There is something odd, also, about the idea that successfully defending a 
PhD thesis grants one the right to ‘become peer’, to take one’s place in an 
academic community. This idea seems to be related to the understanding of 
education as a process of furnishing learners with all the equipment they may 
need to be able to make their way among the perils of the next stage of life. We 
fill learners’ backpacks and then, like the marshals who check that participants 
in the Ten Tors challenge have everything they need, we assess them to make 
sure they are ready to move on. In the process of looking back over my 
published works I have realised that I have been trying to make a case for a 
different perspective, one which sees learning as the product rather than the 
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pre-requisite of participation in social practices. If we want, in Vygotsky’s words, 
to ‘live an interesting life together with children’ (in Kravtsov and Kravtsova, 
2009, p.207) we will need to shift our focus. Instead of trying to determine how 
to equip children for our adult world, we will need to consider what we can do to 
make our world more inclusive so that children can live and learn in it with us. If 
I have fulfilled the requirements for achieving a PhD not in order to prepare me 
for an academic career but as a result of my participation in the life of academic 
communities, I am at least practising what I preach. 
In chapter 6, ‘Concepts of childhood: meeting with difference’, I note that it is 
not only children who may be disadvantaged by their exclusion from many 
aspects of everyday living. The separation of childhood from adulthood has 
been associated with a hierarchical epistemology which values mind over body, 
thinking over feeling and ‘masculine’, ‘adult’ reason over ‘feminine’, ‘childish’ 
emotion. As Vygotsky noted in ‘Thinking and Speech’:  
Among the most basic defects of traditional approaches to the study of 
psychology has been the isolation of the intellectual from the volitional and 
affective aspects of consciousness. The inevitable consequence of the 
isolation of these functions has been the transformation of thinking into an 
autonomous stream. Thinking itself became the thinker of thoughts. Thinking 
was divorced from the full vitality of life, from the motives, interests, and 
inclinations of the thinking individual. (Vygotsky, 1987, p.50) 
 
My focus on the very early interactions between preverbal children and their 
caregivers has enabled me to pay close attention to kinds of communication 
that allow minding to be shared within a particular context, without recourse to 
the ‘public’ meanings provided by language. Preverbal infants can learn a huge 
amount about other minds by observing other people’s attention (e.g. what they 
look at and what they handle), their intentions (see Warneken and Tomasello, 
2006, 2010) and their attitudes (the nature of their relationships with objects and 
events). Active participation in seemingly trivial everyday activities enables 
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infants to develop familiarity with the habitudes or habitus of the people with 
whom they share an interesting life. This familiarity is highly context specific and 
difficult to share with others but it allows us, particularly infants but also older 
children and adults, to read meaning into very subtle variations in the ways in 
which routine actions are performed. I have argued that we are more able to 
share in other people’s minding when we have opportunities to meet them in 
relaxed social contexts that allow us to build a degree of familiarity with their 
ways of being, feeling and thinking. I hope that my writing about meeting and 
minding will make some contribution to a wider reappraisal of the role of ‘soft’ 
knowledge in shaping the lens through which each individual refracts shared 
experiences into a unique perezhivanie which can in turn influence the minding 
and sense-making of others.  It is by engaging with the eddies and currents of 
the flow of minding that individuals may contribute, for good or ill, to the 
constant regeneration and adaptation of prevailing attitudes.   
 
 
Future work 
I gave a presentation on my work on the minding of two-year-olds at the ISCAR 
(International Society for Cultural-Historical Activity Research) conference in 
Quebec in September 2017. During the conference, I was able to participate in 
a series of extended round-table discussions around the subject of 
perezhivanie, particularly as this concept was developed by Vygotsky in the last 
years of his life. Following these conversations, another participant, Nikolai 
Veresov, invited me to spend some time as a visiting scholar at Monash 
University in Melbourne, where Veresov leads the Early Years Academic 
Community. I have also been asked to co-edit and contribute to a forthcoming 
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book on ‘Drama, Perezhivanie and Development’ to be published before the 
next ISCAR conference, in Brazil in 2020. Veresov’s interest in the relationship 
between drama and perezhivanie focuses on the role of peak, ‘dramatic’ events 
or crises which shape the refractive ‘lens’ of individuals’ perezhivanie or sense-
making. My contribution will be to offer a rather different perspective, focusing 
on the ‘daily-ness’ of the micro-performances through which we gather 
information about other people’s attitudes and reveal (to ourselves as well as to 
others) aspects of our own interpretation of events; our distinctive perezhivanie 
or smysl. 
 
At the 2017 ISCAR conference, I was also able to meet Fernando González 
Rey whose ‘post-Vygotskian’ theory of distributed subjectivity has been very 
helpful in the development of my own thinking about minding as a process that 
cannot be adequately understood in terms of the discrete processes, contents 
and capabilities of isolated brains. González Rey argues that individual sparks 
of ‘subjective sense’ (similar but not identical to Vygotsky’s felt sense or smysl) 
which inform our sense-making or perezhivanie are themselves influenced by 
wider, sociocultural ‘subjective configurations’. These subjective configurations, 
like Dewey’s ‘habitudes’ (1916) and Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ (2000) are gathered 
from participation in social interactions and provide the degree of ‘sameness’ or 
common sense which is essential if people are to be able to communicate. Our 
shared knowledge of these scripts or scores enables us to make sense of 
individual ‘performances’, to infer the subjective sense or smysl revealed by 
subtle variations. González Rey insists that there is an indivisible reciprocity 
between subjective configurations and the flashes of subjective sense which are 
framed by them but which also contribute to their development and evolution. 
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González Rey has worked extensively with the Cultural-Historical research 
team at Monash, contributing to a special issue of their journal, International 
Research in Early Childhood Education which focused on new interpretations of 
perezhivanie (González Rey and Mitjáns Martínez, 2016) and co-editing a book 
on ‘Perezhivanie, Emotions and Subjectivity’ with Marilyn Fleer and Nikolai 
Veresov (Fleer et al. 2017). His collaboration with the Monash team provides an 
example of his theory of subjectivity. Like all readers of Vygotsky’s work, 
González Rey, Fleer and Veresov will each have responded with unique 
moments of subjective sense because each reader brings a distinctive personal 
history that shapes their perezhivanie—the way they make sense of their 
experiences. At the same time, every reader belongs to a variety of cultural 
groups, each of which offers webs of subjective configurations that encourage 
some interpretations and discourage others. In the case of Vygotsky there are 
also complex issues of translation and editing (Yasnitsky and van der Veer, 
2016) so that the subjective configurations which may once have informed 
Vygotsky are overlaid by different sets of associations from different languages 
and different scholarly traditions. As Fleer, Veresov, González Rey and others 
meet and argue about their interpretation of what Vygotsky did and could mean, 
they also contribute to the subtle reconfiguration of their own and, through their 
publications and teaching, other people’s ways of understanding Vygotsky’s 
work. For each, their subjective sense is to some degree constrained by co-
constructed subjective configurations but it also informs, challenges and shifts 
those configurations. 
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González Rey (2017a, 2017b, 2018) has drawn from the work of a wide variety 
of thinkers, including John Shotter and Karen Barad, to challenge a particular 
feature of the social configurations that have framed the way we understand 
subjectivity. He argues that we should question the deep-rooted assumption 
that subjectivity can be thought of as a property of discrete, individual ‘subjects’ 
and his insistence on the flowing ‘transpersonal’ nature of the reciprocal 
influences between shared social configurations and distinctive instances of 
subjective sense provides a useful configuration for my own thinking about 
meeting and minding. 
 
The contribution which I am able to make to future work on perezhivanie, 
performance and subjectivity will be through drawing attention to what can be 
learned from careful and sensitive exploration of the very earliest interactions 
between infants and caregivers. In his final years Vygotsky revisited and re-
examined his earlier insistence that ‘the isolation of the intellectual from the 
volitional and affective aspect of consciousness’ was ‘among the most basic 
defects of traditional approaches to the study of psychology’ (Vygotsky, 1987, 
p.5). The active, participatory engagement of preverbal infants with deeply 
enculturated caregivers provides particularly rich opportunities to study what 
Vygotsky recognised as ‘the very essence of cultural development … the 
collision of mature cultural forms of behaviour with the primitive forms that 
characterise the child’s behaviour’ (Vygotsky, 1988, p. 64). 
 
After being invited to visit UNESP, the State University of Sao Paolo, Brazil as a 
visiting scholar, in October 2017 I am currently working with staff and post-
doctoral students to develop doctoral work on helping caregivers to read the 
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body-signs of one-year-olds, with a view to publishing this work to a wider 
audience, beyond Brazil. I am also working with another researcher at UNESP 
on a future special issue of the journal ‘Early Years’ which will feature papers 
from Latin American countries and which will also be published ahead of the 
next ISCAR conference in Brazil in 2020. 
 
My interest in ‘liking’ (2007a), ‘primary communication’ (Parker-Rees, 2007b), 
‘gathering’ (Parker-Rees 2010, 2015d), ‘meeting’ (Parker-Rees, 2011a), and 
‘minding’ (Parker-Rees, 2017) has developed from my belief that interactions 
with very young children can help adults to recognise the profound importance 
of the ‘trivial’, day-to-day, ordinary events which shape the way we perceive and 
interpret our social environment. It is this soft knowledge that allows us to read 
and interpret the smysl or subjective sense behind the znachenie or subjective 
configurations of culturally shaped behaviour. This sensitivity to telling 
performances enables us to get to know both other people and ourselves. 
  
60 
 
 
 
  
61 
 
References 
 
Letters after a reference indicate that it was cited in one or more of the 
published works: 
        
(a)  2007a - Liking to be liked: imitation, familiarity and pedagogy in the first 
years of life 
(b)  2011b - Meeting the Child in Steiner Kindergartens, Ch 1: Introduction: 
ways of knowing children 
(c)  2013 - (with Joanna Haynes) Informal aspects of ‘becoming peer’ in 
undergraduate research: ‘still connected but going our separate 
ways’ 
(d)  2014a - Playfulness and the co-construction of identity in the first years 
(e)  2015c - Concepts of Childhood: meeting with difference 
(f)   2017 - The minding of two-year-olds 
 
 
Adamson, L., and Frick, J. (2003) ‘The still face: a history of a shared 
experimental paradigm’, Infancy, 4(4), pp. 451-473. (f) 
Ailwood, J. (2007) ‘Mothers, teachers, maternalism and early childhood 
education and care: some historical connections’, Contemporary Issues in 
Early Childhood, 8 (2), pp. 157-165. (b) 
Alderson, P. (2013) Childhoods real and imagined. Volume 1: an introduction to 
critical realism and childhood studies (Ontological Explorations). London: 
Routledge. (e) 
62 
 
Anderson, G. and Boud, D. (1996) ‘Extending the role of peer learning in Higher 
Education’, Research and Development in Higher Education, 19, pp. 15-
19. (c) 
Ariès, P. (1962) Centuries of Childhood. Translated by Robert Baldick. London: 
Jonathan Cape. (e) 
Athey, C. (2007) Extending thought in young children: a parent - teacher 
partnership. 2nd edn. London: Sage. (b) 
Barad, K. (2007). Meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the 
entanglement of matter and meaning. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press. 
Barnes, J., Leach, P., Sylva, K., Stein, A., Malmberg, L. E. and FCCC Team 
(2006) ‘Infant care in England: mothers' aspirations, experiences, 
satisfaction and caregiver relationships’, Early Child Development and 
Care, 176(5), pp.  553–573. (a)  
Baron‐Cohen, S. (2003) The essential difference: the truth about the male and 
female brain. New York: Basic Books. (a) 
Beebe, B., Lachman, F. and Jaffe, J. (1997) ‘Mother–infant interaction 
structures and presymbolic self and object representations’, 
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 7(2), pp. 133–82. (d) 
Blake, W. (1988) The complete poetry and prose. Edited by David V. Erdman. 
New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group. (e) 
63 
 
Booth, A., McLean, M. and Walker, M. (2009) ‘Self, others and society: a case 
study of university integrative learning’, Studies in Higher Education, 34(8), 
pp. 929-39. (c) 
Boud, D. and Costly, C. (2007) ‘From project supervision to advising: new 
conceptions of the practice’, Innovations in Education and Teaching 
International, 44(2), pp. 119-130. (c) 
Boud, D. and Lee, A.(2005) '”Peer learning” as pedagogic discourse for 
research education’, Studies in Higher Education, 30(5), pp. 501-516. (c) 
Boud, D., Cohen, R. and Sampson, J. (2001) Peer learning in Higher Education: 
learning from and with each other. London: Kogan Page. (c) 
Bourdieu, P. (1990) In other words: essays towards a reflexive sociology. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (2000) Pascalian meditations. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Brockliss, L. and Montgomery, H. (2013) ‘Childhood: a historical approach’, in 
Kehily, M. J. (ed.) Understanding childhood: a cross disciplinary approach.  
Bristol: Policy Press/Open University. (e) 
Broström, S., Hansson, O. and Jensen, A. (2010) ‘Critical perspectives on 
Danish early childhood education and care: between the technical and the 
political’, Early Years: an international journal of research and 
development, 30(3), pp. 243-54. (b) 
Bruner, J. S. (1995) ‘From Joint Attention to the Meeting of Minds’, in Moore, C.  
and Dunham, P. (eds), Joint attention: its origins and role in development. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp.1-14. (d) 
64 
 
Bruner, J. S. (1985) 'Narrative and paradigmatic modes of thought', in Eisner, E. 
(ed.) Learning and teaching the ways of knowing. Chicago: National 
Society for the Study of Education, pp. 97-115. (b) 
Bruner, J. S. (1986) Actual minds possible worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. (d) 
Bruner, J. S. (1996) The culture of education. Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press. (f) 
Bruner, J. S. (1983). Child's talk. New York: Norton. (a) 
Buber, M. (2004/1923) I and thou. London: Continuum. 
Campos, J., Anderson, D., Barbu-Roth, M., Hubbard, E., Hertenstein, M. and 
Witherington, D. (2000) ‘Travel broadens the mind’, Infancy, 1(2), pp. 149-
220. (f) 
Carpendale, J. and Lewis, C. (2006) How children develop social 
understanding. Oxford: Blackwell. (d) 
Carpenter, M. & Liebal, K. (2011) ‘Joint attention, communication and knowing 
together in infancy’, in Seeman, A. (ed.) Joint attention: new developments 
in psychology, philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, pp.  159-81. (d, f) 
Carpenter, M., Akhtar, N. and Tomasello, M. (1998) ‘Fourteen‐ through 18‐
month‐old infants differentially imitate intentional and accidental actions’, 
Infant Behaviour and Development, 21, pp. 315–330. (a) 
65 
 
Carr, M. (2001) Assessment in early childhood settings: learning stories. 
London: Paul Chapman Publishing. (b) 
Cartney, P. and Rouse, A. (2006) ‘The emotional impact of learning in small 
groups: highlighting the impact on student progression and retention’, 
Teaching in Higher Education, 11(1), pp. 79-91. (c) 
Christie, H., Tett, L., Cree, V.E., Hounsell, J and McCune, V. (2008) ‘”A real 
rollercoaster of confidence and emotions”: learning to be a university 
student’, Studies in Higher Education, 33(5), pp. 567-581. (c) 
Claxton, G. (1997) Hare brain tortoise mind. London: Fourth Estate. (b) 
Cohn, J. and Tronick, E. (1983) ‘Three-month-old infants’ reaction to simulated 
maternal depression’, Child Development, 54(1), pp. 185-193. (a, f) 
Coleridge, S. T. (1840) The works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, prose and verse: 
complete in one volume. Philadelphia: Thomas, Cowperthwaite & Co. (e) 
Corballis, M. (2002) From hand to mouth: the origins of language. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. (a) 
Costantini, M. and Sinigaglia, C. (2012) ‘Grasping affordance: a window onto 
social cognition’, in Seemann, A. (ed.) Joint attention: new developments 
in psychology, philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, pp. 430–60. (d) 
Coveney, P. (1967) The Image of childhood: the individual and society: a study 
of the theme in English literature. Harmondsworth: Penguin. (e) 
66 
 
Cowley, S. (2004) ‘Contextualizing bodies: human infants and distributed 
cognition’, Language Sciences, 26, pp. 565–91. (d) 
Cox, R. (1996) Shaping childhood: themes of uncertainty in the history of adult-
child relationships.  London: Routledge. (e) 
Crawford, S. (1999) Childhood in Anglo-Saxon England. Stroud: Sutton 
Publishing. (e) 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1991) Flow: the psychology of optimal experience. New 
York, NY: Harper Perennial. (b) 
Cunningham, H. (2005) Children and childhood in western society since 1500. 
2nd edn. Harlow: Pearson Longman. (e) 
Cunningham, H. (2006) The invention of childhood. London: BBC Books. (e) 
David, T., Goouch, K., Powell, S. and Abbott, L. (2003) Birth to three matters: a 
review of the literature (DfES Research Report 444). Nottingham: DfES. 
(a) 
Davis, R. A. (2011) ‘Brilliance of a fire: innocence, experience and the theory of 
childhood’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 45(2), pp. 379-97. (e) 
Decety, J., Grèzes, J., Costes, N., Perani, D., Jeannerod, M., Procyk, E., 
Grassi, F. and Fazio, F. (1997) ‘Brain activity during observation of action: 
influence of action content and subject's strategy’, Brain, 120, pp. 1763–
1777. (a) 
DfES (Department for Education and Skills) (2004) Birth to three matters: a 
framework to support children in their earliest years. Nottingham: DfES. (a) 
67 
 
DfES (Department for Education and Skills) (2006) The early years foundation 
stage: consultation on a single quality framework for services to children 
from birth to five. Nottingham: DfES. (a) 
Dewey, J. (1897) ‘My Pedagogic Creed’, The School Journal, 54(3) (January 
16, 1897), pp. 77-80. Online. Available at: 
http://dewey.pragmatism.org/creed.htm (Accessed: 6 March 2018). (b) 
Dewey, J. (1909) How we think. London: D.C. Heath and Co. 
Dewey, J. (1916) Democracy and education. New York, NY: Macmillan. (d) 
Dijksterhuis, A. (2005) ‘Why we are social animals: the high road to imitation as 
social glue’, in Hurley, S and Chater, N. (eds) Perspectives on imitation: 
from neuroscience to social science. Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
pp. 207–220.  (a) 
Donald, M. (2001) A mind so rare: the evolution of human consciousness. New 
York: Norton. (a)  
Donaldson, M. (1978) Children's minds. London: Fontana. (a) 
Drummond, M. J. and Jenkinson, S. (2009) Meeting the child: approaches to 
observation and assessment in Steiner kindergartens. A report from the 
Faculty of Education, University of Plymouth and the Steiner Waldorf Early 
Years Research Group. Plymouth: University of Plymouth. (b) 
Dunn, J. (1988) The beginnings of social understanding. Oxford: Blackwell.  (a, 
f) 
68 
 
Ecclestone, K. and Hayes, D. (2009) The Dangerous Rise of Therapeutic 
Education. London: Routledge. (c) 
Eisner, E. (1990) ‘The role of art and play in children's cognitive development’, 
in Klugman, E. and Smilansky, S. (eds) Children's play and learning: 
perspectives and policy implications.  New York: Teachers College Press, 
pp. 43–56.  (a) 
Elias, N. (2000) The civilizing process. 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. (e) 
Engel, S. (2005) Real kids: creating meaning in everyday life. Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press. (a, d, f) 
Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Pavesi, G. and Rizzolatti, G. (1995) ‘Motor facilitation 
during action observation: a magnetic stimulation study’, Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 73, pp. 2608–2611. (a) 
Feldman, R. (2007) ‘Parent–infant synchrony and the construction of shared 
timing; physiological precursors, developmental outcomes, and risk 
conditions’, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 48(3–4), pp. 329–
54. (d) 
Fleer, M. (2002) ‘Sociocultural assessment in early years education: myth or 
reality?’ International Journal of Early Years Education, 10(2), pp. 105-20. 
(b) 
Fleer, M, González Rey, F. and Veresov, N. (eds) (2017) Perezhivanie, 
emotions and subjectivity: advancing Vygotsky’s legacy. Singapore: 
Springer. 
69 
 
Fogel, A. (2001) ‘The history (and future) of infancy’, in Bremner, G. and Fogel, 
A (eds), The Blackwell handbook of infant development. Oxford: Blackwell. 
(e) 
Fogel, A. (1993) Developing through relationships: origins of communication, 
self and culture. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. (d) 
Fogel, A., Garvey, A., Hsu, H-C and West-Stroming, D. (2006) Change 
processes in relationships: a relational-historical research approach. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (d) 
Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E. and Target, M. (2004) Affect regulation, 
mentalization, and the development of self. London: Karnac Books. (d) 
Forman, G. and Fyfe, B. (1998) ‘Negotiated learning through design, 
documentation and discourse’, in Edwards, C., Gandini, L. and Forman, G. 
(eds), The hundred languages of children: the Reggio Emilia approach – 
advanced reflections. 2nd edn. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, pp. 239-260. (b) 
Frith, C. (2007) Making up the mind: how the brain creates our mental world. 
Oxford: Blackwell. (d) 
Furedi, F. (2004) Therapy culture: cultivating vulnerability in an anxious age. 
London: Routledge. (c) 
Gabriel, N. (2010) ‘Adults’ Concepts of Childhood’, in Parker-Rees, R. and  
Leeson, C. (eds.), Early childhood studies: an introduction to the study of 
children’s worlds and children’s lives. 3rd edn. Exeter: Learning Matters, 
pp.  137-151. (e) 
70 
 
Gallese, V. (2005) ‘”Being like me”: self–other identity, mirror neurons and 
empathy’, in Hurley, S. and Chater, N., Perspectives on imitation: from 
neuroscience to social science. Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 
101–118.  (a) 
Garrels S. (2004) ‘Imitation, mirror neurons, and mimetic desire: generative 
mechanisms in religious, cultural, and psychosocial structures’. Available 
at: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.133.189&rep=re
p1&type=pdf  (Accessed: 6 March 2018) (a) 
Gaskin, S. (2006) ‘Cultural perspectives on infant-caregiver interaction’, in 
Enfield, N. and Levinson, S. (eds), Roots of human sociality: culture, 
cognition and interaction. London: Berg Publishers, pp. 279–98. (d) 
Georgeson, J., Campbell-Barr, V., Mathers, S., Boag-Munroe, G., Parker-Rees, 
R. and Caruso, F. (2014) Two-year-olds in England: an exploratory 
study. Available at http://tactyc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/TACTYC_2_year_olds_Report_2014.pdf 
(Accessed: 20-03-2018) 
Gergely, G. (2002) ‘The development of understanding self and agency’, in 
Goswami, U. (ed.) Blackwell handbook of childhood cognitive 
development, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 26–46.  (a) 
Gergely, G., Bekkering, H. and Király, I. (2002) ‘Rational imitation in preverbal 
infants’, Nature, pp. 415: 755. (a) 
Gibbs, G. (1995) Learning in teams: a tutor guide. Oxford Centre for Staff 
Development. Oxford: Oxford Brookes University. (c) 
71 
 
Godfrey, R. (2004) ‘Can everybody be a researcher?’ in Hayes, D. (ed), The 
Routledge guide to key debates in education. London and New York: 
Routledge, pp. 207-210. (c) 
Goldschmied, E. and Jackson, S. (2004) People under three: young children in 
day care. 2nd edn. London: Routledge. (a) 
González Rey, F. (2009) ‘Historical relevance of Vygotsky’s work: its 
significance for a new approach to the problem of subjectivity in 
psychology’, Outlines, 11(1), pp. 59-73. 
González Rey, F. (2011) ‘A re-examination of defining moments in Vygotsky’s 
work and their implications for his continuing legacy’, Mind, Culture and 
Activity, 18(3), pp. 257–275. 
González Rey, F. (2016) ‘Vygotsky’s concept of perezhivanie in The 
Psychology of Art and at the final moment of his work: advancing his 
legacy’, Mind, Culture and Activity, 23(4), pp. 305-314. 
González Rey, F. (2017a) ‘The topic of subjectivity in psychology: 
contradictions, paths and new alternatives’, Journal for the Theory of 
Social Behavior, 47(4), pp. 502-521.  
González Rey, F. (2017b) ‘Advances in subjectivity from a Cultural-Historical 
perspective: unfoldings and consequences for cultural studies today’, in 
Fleer, M, González Rey, F. and Veresov, N. (eds), Perezhivanie, emotions 
and subjectivity: advancing Vygotsky’s legacy. Singapore: Springer, pp. 
173-93. 
72 
 
González Rey, F. (2018) ‘Subjectivity and discourse: complementary topics for 
a critical psychology’, Culture and Psychology, DOI: 
10.1177/1354067X18754338 
González Rey, F. and Mitjáns Martínez, A. (2016) ‘Perezhivanie: advancing on 
its implications for the cultural-historical approach’, International Research 
in Early Childhood Education, 7(1), pp. 142-160. 
Gopnik, A., Meltzoff, A. and Kuhl, P. (1999) How babies think: the science of 
childhood. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. (a) 
Gray, P. (2009) ‘Play as a foundation for hunter-gatherer social existence’, 
American Journal of Play, 1(4), pp. 476-522. (e) 
Gray, P. B. and Anderson, K. G. (2012) Fatherhood: evolution and human 
paternal behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (e) 
Grondin, J. (2000) ‘Play, festival and ritual in Gadamer: on the theme of the 
immemorial’. Translated by Lawrence, K. Schmidt, in Schmidt, L.K. (ed.) 
Language and Linguisticality in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, pp. 51-58. (d) 
Hanawalt, B. (1986) Growing up in medieval London. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. (e) 
Harris, P. L. and Want, S. (2005) ‘On learning what not to do: the emergence of 
selective imitation in tool use by young children’, in Hurley, S and Chater, 
N. (eds) Perspectives on imitation: from neuroscience to social science. 
Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 149–162.  (a) 
73 
 
Havnes, A. (2008) ‘Peer-mediated learning beyond the curriculum’, Studies in 
Higher Education, 33(2), pp. 193-204. (c) 
Heal, J. (2005) ‘Joint attention and understanding the mind’, in Eilan, N.,Hoerl, 
C., McCormack, T. and Roessler, J. (eds) Joint attention: communication 
and other minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 34-44. (f) 
Hendrick, H. (1992) ‘Children and childhood’, ReFresh (Recent Findings of 
Research in Economic and Social History), 15 (autumn) 1-4. Available at: 
http://www.ehs.org.uk/the-society/assets/Hendrick15a.pdf (Accessed: 6 
March 2018). (e) 
Heywood, C. (2001) A History of Childhood: children and childhood in the west 
from Medieval to Modern Times (Themes in History). Oxford: Polity Press. 
(e) 
Hirschfeld, L. (2013) ‘The myth of mentalizing and the primacy of folk sociology’, 
in Banaji, M. R. and Gelman, S. A. (eds.) Navigating the social world: 
what infants, children, and other species can teach us. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 101-106 
Hobson, P. (2002) The Cradle of Thought: exploring the origins of thinking. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. (d) 
Hobson, P. (2005) ‘What puts the jointness into joint attention’, in Eilan, 
N.,Hoerl, C., McCormack, T. and Roessler, J. (eds) Joint attention: 
communication and other minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 185-
204. (f) 
74 
 
Holmberg, L. (2006) ‘Coach, consultant or mother: supervisors' views on quality 
in the supervision of bachelor theses’, Quality in Higher Education, 12(2), 
pp. 207-216. (c) 
Holzman, L. (1997) Schools for growth: radical alternatives to current educational 
models. London: Routledge. (b) 
Hrdy, S. B. (2011) Mothers and others: the evolutionary origins of mutual 
understanding. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (e) 
Hurley, S. and Chater, N. (2005) Perspectives on imitation: from neuroscience 
to social science. Vols 1 and 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (a) 
Hutto, D. (2008) Folk psychological narratives: the sociocultural basis of 
understanding reasons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (d) 
Iacoboni, M., Woods, R., Brass, M., Bekkering, H., Mazziotta, J. and Rizzolatti, 
G. (1999) ‘Cortical mechanisms of human imitation’, Science, 286, pp. 
2526–2528. (a) 
Ingold, T. (1996) ‘Situating action V: the history and evolution of bodily skills’, 
Ecological Psychology, 8(2), pp. 171–82. (d) 
James, A. and Prout, A. (eds) (2014) Constructing and reconstructing 
childhood:  contemporary issues in the sociological study of childhood. 
London: Routledge. (e) 
Jawitz, J.  (2007) ‘New academics negotiating communities of practice: learning 
to swim with the big fish’, Teaching in Higher Education, 12(2), pp. 185-
197. (c) 
75 
 
John-Steiner, V. (2000) Creative Collaboration. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Kärtner, J., Holodynski, M. and Wörmann V. (2013) ‘Parental ethnotheories, 
social practice and the culture-specific development of social smiling in 
infants’, Mind, Culture, and Activity, 20(1), pp. 79-95. 
Kennedy, D. (2001) ‘Parent, child, alterity, dialogue’, Philosophy Today, 45(1), 
pp. 33-42. (e) 
Kennedy, D. (2006) The well of being: childhood, subjectivity and education. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. (e, f) 
Kennedy, D. (2013a) ‘Epilogue: becoming child, becoming other: childhood as 
signifier’, in Muller, A. (ed.), Childhood in the English Renaissance. 
Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, pp.145-153. 
Kennedy, D. (2013b) ‘One argument for why we should listen to children’, in 
Marsal, E., Weber, B. and Gardner, S. T. (eds.), Respect: how do we get 
there? A philosophical inquiry.  Zurich: LIT Verlag, pp. 35-46. 
Kennedy, D. and Kohan, W. O. (2012) ‘Aión, Kairós and Chrónos: fragments of 
an endless conversation on childhood, philosophy and education’, 
Childhood & Philosophy, 4(8), pp. 5-22. (e) 
Keysers, C. and Gazzola, V. (2012) ‘The Vicarious Brain’, Nature and 
development of social connections: from brain to group, Herzliya 
Interdisciplinary Centre, Israel, 2-5 April, 2012,  pp.1-42. Available at: 
http://portal.idc.ac.il/en/Symposium/HSPSP/2012/Documents/ckeysers12.
pdf (Accessed: 19-03-2018). (d) 
76 
 
Kinsbourne, M. (2005) ‘Imitation as entrainment: brain mechanisms and social 
consequences’, in Hurley, S. and Chater, N. (eds) Perspectives on 
imitation: from neuroscience to social science. Vol 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, pp.163–172. (a) 
Konner, M. (2010) The Evolution of childhood: relationships, emotion, mind. 
Cambridge MA: Harvard/Belknapp. (e) 
Kravtsov, G. G. and Kravtsova, E. E. (2009) ‘Cultural-historical psychology in 
the practice of education’, in Fleer, M., Hedegaard, M. and Tudge, J. (eds) 
World yearbook of education 2009, Childhood studies and the impact of 
globalization: policies and practices at global and local levels. Abingdon: 
Routledge, pp. 202–12. (d) 
LeVine, R.A. and LeVine, B.B. (1963) ‘Nyansongo: A Gusii community in 
Kenya’, in Whiting, B. (ed.) Six cultures: studies of child rearing. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, pp. 15-202. (d) 
Levykh, M. G. (2008) ‘The affective establishment and maintenance of 
Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development’, Educational Theory,  58(1), pp. 
83-101. (c) 
Locke, J. (1690) Essay concerning human understanding. Available at: 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/761 (Accessed: 19-03-2018). (e) 
Locke, J. (1693) Some thoughts concerning education. Available at: 
http://www.bartleby.com/37/1/ (Accessed: 19-03-2018). (e) 
Löfdahl, A. and Prieto, H. (2009) ‘Institutional narratives within the performative 
preschool in Sweden: “If we write that we're no good, that’s not good 
77 
 
publicity!”', Early Years: an international journal of research and 
development, 29(3), pp. 261 –70. (b) 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1990) ‘Foundations for developing a concept of self: the role of 
imitation in relating self to other and the value of social mirroring, social 
modelling, and self practice in infancy’, in Cicchetti, D. and Beeghly, M. 
(eds) The self in transition: infancy to childhood. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, pp. 139–164. (a) 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1995) ‘Understanding the intentions of others: re-enactment of 
intended acts by 18-month-old children’, Developmental Psychology, 
31(5), pp. 838-850. (a, f) 
Meltzoff, A. N. (2005) ‘Imitation and other minds: the “Like me” hypothesis’, in 
Hurley, S. and Chater, N. (eds) Perspectives on imitation: from 
neuroscience to social science. Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 
55–77.  (a) 
Meltzoff, A. N. and Moore, M. (1977) ‘Imitation of facial and manual gestures by 
human neonates’, Science, 198, pp. 75–78. (a) 
Meltzoff, A. N. and Moore, M. (1999) ‘Persons and representations: why infant 
imitation is important to theories of human development’, in Nadel, J and 
Butterworth, G.(eds) Imitation in infancy. Cambridge studies in cognitive 
and perceptual development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
9–35. (a) 
Mitchell, P. (2011) ‘Acquiring a theory of mind’, in Slater, A. and Bremner, J. G. 
(eds), An introduction to developmental psychology (3rd ed.), Hoboken, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 381–406, 
78 
 
Mithen, S. (2005) The singing Neanderthals: the origins of music, language, 
mind and body. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. (a) 
Moll, H. and Meltzoff, A. N. (2011) ‘Joint attention as the fundamental basis of 
understanding perspectives’, in Seemann, A. (ed.), Joint attention: new 
developments in psychology, philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 393–413. (d) 
Monahan, T. (2002) ‘Flexible space and built pedagogy: emerging it 
embodiments’, Inventio, 4(1), pp. 1-19. (c) 
More, H. (1830) The works of Hannah More. Volume V: Strictures on Female 
Education. London: T. Cadell. (e) 
Murray, L. and Trevarthen, C. (1985) ‘Emotional regulation of interactions 
between two‐month‐olds and their mothers’, in Field, T. M. and Fox, N. 
(eds) Social perception in infants. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, pp. 177–197. (a) 
Murray, L. and Trevarthen, C. (1986) ‘The infant’s role in mother-infant 
communications’, Journal of Child Language, 13(1), pp. 15-29. (f) 
Nelson, K. (1986) Event knowledge: structure and function in development, 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. (a)  
Nelson, K. (2007) Young minds in social worlds: experience, meaning and 
memory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (f)  
Noddings, N. (2002) Starting at home: caring and social policy. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. (a) 
79 
 
O'Brien, L. M. (2010) ‘Caring in the ivory tower’, Teaching in Higher Education, 
15(1), pp. 109-115. (c) 
O’Doherty, M. (2006) ‘Definitions of independent learning: initial overview’, 
Learn Higher. Manchester: The University of Manchester. Available at: 
http://archive.learnhigher.ac.uk/resources/files/Independant%20Learning/I
ndependent_Learning%5B1%5D.pdf (Accessed 19-03-2018) (c) 
OECD (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2006) 
Starting Strong II: Early Childhood Education and Care. Paris: OECD 
Publications. 
OED (Oxford English Dictionary) (1971) (compact edition). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. (e) 
Orme, N. (2001) Medieval children. New Haven: Yale University Press. (e) 
Osgood, J. (2006) ‘Professionalism and performativity: the feminist challenge 
facing early years practitioners’, Early Years: an international journal of 
research and development, 26(2), pp. 187-99. (b) 
Pacherie, E. (2011) ‘The phenomenology of joint action: self-agency versus 
joint-agency’, in Seemann, A. (ed.), Joint attention: new developments in 
psychology, philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, pp. 343–89. (d) 
Packer, M. J. and Goicoechea, J. (2009) ‘Sociocultural and constructivist 
theories of learning: ontology, not just epistemology’, Educational 
Psychologist, 35(4), pp. 227-241. (c) 
80 
 
Paley, V. G. (2005) A child's work: the importance of fantasy play. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. (b) 
Paley, V. G. (1981). Wally's stories: conversations in the kindergarten. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  (a, b, f) 
Paley, V. G. (2003). In Mrs Tully's room: a childcare portrait. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. (a, b, f) 
Parker-Rees, R. (1997a) ‘A tale of a task: learning beyond the map’, in Pollard, 
A. Filer, A. and Thiessen, D. (eds) Children and their curriculum: the 
perspectives of primary and elementary school children. London: Falmer, 
pp. 34-48. 
Parker-Rees, R. (1997b) ‘Playing the system:  learning to think playfully’, in 
Burnett, J. and Rodd, J. (eds) Realising children's potential (proceedings 
of ‘Realising Children’s Potential’ conference, Plymouth Sept 97), 
Exmouth: University of Plymouth, pp. 91-100. 
Parker-Rees, R. (1997c) ‘Making sense and made sense:  Design and 
Technology and the playful construction of meaning in the early years’, 
Early Years: an international journal of research and development, 8(1), 
pp. 5-8. 
Parker‐Rees, R. (1999). ‘Protecting playfulness’, in Abbott, L. and Moylett, H. 
(eds) Early education transformed. London: Falmer, pp. 61–72. (a) 
Parker-Rees, R. (2000) ‘Time to relax a little: making time for interplay of minds 
in education’, Education 3-13, 28(1), pp. 29-35. 
81 
 
Parker-Rees, R. (2001) 'The visiting academic's tale: on rambling - making time 
to step out of the tramlines', in Mountstephen, P. (ed.) Primary tales: 
learning by heart, Birmingham: National Primary Trust, pp. 31-35. 
Parker‐Rees, R. (2004). ‘Developing communication: enjoying the company of 
other people’, in Willan, J., Parker‐Rees, R. and Savage, J. (eds) Early 
childhood studies: an introduction to the study of children's worlds and 
children's lives. Exeter: Learning Matters, pp. 33–42. (a) 
Parker-Rees, R. (2007a) ‘Liking to be liked: imitation, familiarity and pedagogy 
in the first years of life’, Early Years: an international journal of research 
and development, 27(1), pp. 3–17. (b, d, f) 
Parker-Rees, R. (2007b) ‘Primary communication – what can adults learn from 
babies?’, in Moyles, J. (ed.) Early years foundations: meeting the 
challenge. Open University/McGraw Hill, pp. 24-36. (b) 
Parker-Rees, R. (2010) ‘Hunting and gathering: how play helps us to let in, as 
well as to get in, information about our environment’, in Moyles, J. (ed.) 
The excellence of play. Maidenhead: Open University Press, pp. 67–79. 
(d) 
Parker-Rees, R. (ed.) (2011a) Meeting the child in Steiner kindergartens: an 
exploration of beliefs, values and practices. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Parker-Rees, R. (2011b) ‘Introduction: ways of knowing children’, in Parker-
Rees, R. (ed.) Meeting the child in Steiner kindergartens: an exploration of 
beliefs, values and practices. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 1-12. 
82 
 
Parker-Rees, R. (2013) ‘Collaborative recreation: “…more is learned than is 
taught”’, in Lake, R. and Connery, C.M. (eds) Constructing a community of 
thought: letters on the scholarship, teaching and mentoring of Vera John-
Steiner. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, pp. 172-176. 
Parker-Rees, R. (2014a) ‘Playfulness and the co-construction of identity in the 
first years’, in Brooker, L., Edwards, S. and Blaise, M. (eds) Sage 
handbook of play and learning in early childhood. London: Sage, pp. 366-
77. (f) 
Parker-Rees, R. (2014b) ‘De nós para você para mim: a co-construção da 
identidade nas interações na pequena infância’ (From us to you to me: the 
co-construction of identity in early interactions). Translated by S. Mello. 
Perspectiva, (Brazil) 32(3), pp. 901-917. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2175-795X.2014v32n3p901 (Accessed 19-03-
2018). 
Parker-Rees, R. (2015a) ‘Introduction’, in Parker-Rees, R. and Leeson, C. (eds) 
Early childhood studies: an introduction to the study of children’s lives and 
children’s worlds. 4th edn. London: Sage/Learning Matters, pp. 1-11. 
Parker-Rees, R. (2015b) ‘Developing communication: getting to know each 
other’, in Parker-Rees, R. and Leeson, C. (eds) Early childhood studies: 
an introduction to the study of children’s lives and children’s worlds. 4th 
edn. London: Sage/Learning Matters, pp. 42-56. 
Parker-Rees, R. (2015c) ‘Concepts of childhood: meeting with difference’, in 
Parker-Rees, R. and Leeson, C. (eds) Early childhood studies: an 
introduction to the study of children’s lives and children’s worlds. 4th edn. 
London: Sage/Learning Matters, pp. 191-203 
83 
 
Parker-Rees, R. (2015d) ‘Hunting and gathering: two distinct forms of learning 
from play’, in Moyles, J. (ed.) The excellence of play. 4th edn. McGraw 
Hill/Open University Press, pp. 74-83. 
Parker-Rees, R. (2017) ‘The minding of two-year-olds’, in Georgeson, J. and 
Campbell-Barr V. (eds) Places for two-year-olds in the early years; 
supporting learning and development. London: Routledge, pp. 8-22. 
Parker-Rees, R. and Haynes, J. (2013) ‘Informal aspects of “becoming peer” in 
undergraduate research: “still connected but going our separate ways”’, 
Pastoral Care in Education, 31(1), pp. 79-91. 
Parker-Rees, R. and Leeson, C. (eds) (2015) Early childhood studies: an 
introduction to the study of children’s lives and children’s worlds. London: 
Sage/Learning Matters. 
Parker-Rees, R. and Rees, S. (2011) ‘How the Steiner kindergarten 
environment helps adults and children to get to know each other’, in Parker-
Rees, R. (ed.) Meeting the child in Steiner kindergartens: an exploration of 
beliefs, values and practices. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 41-52. 
Pellis, S. and Pellis, V. (2009) The playful brain: venturing to the limits of 
neuroscience. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. (d) 
Pepperberg, I. (1999) The Alex studies: cognitive and communicative studies on 
grey parrots. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (a) 
Phillips, A. (1998) The beast in the nursery. London: Faber and Faber. 
Pollock, L. A. (1983) Forgotten children: parent-child relations from 1500 to 
1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (e) 
84 
 
Premack, D. and Woodruff, G. (1978) ‘Does the chimpanzee have a theory of 
mind?’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), pp. 515–526. 
Price-Williams, D. R. (1975) Explorations in cross-cultural psychology. San 
Francisco: Chandler and Sharp. (d) 
Prinz, W. (2005a) ‘An ideomotor approach to imitation’, in Hurley, S. and 
Chater, N. (eds) Perspectives on imitation: from neuroscience to social 
science. Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 141–156. (a) 
Prinz, W. (2005b) ‘Construing selves from others’, in Hurley, S. and Chater, N. 
(eds) Perspectives on imitation: from neuroscience to social science. Vol. 
2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 180-182. (a) 
Reddy, V. (2000) ‘Coyness in early infancy’, Developmental Science, 3(2), pp. 
186–192. (a) 
Reddy, V. (2008) How infants know minds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. (d, f) 
Reddy, V. (2011) ‘A gaze at grips with me’, in Seemann, A. (ed.) Joint attention: 
new developments in psychology, philosophy of mind, and social 
neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 137–57. (d) 
Reddy, V. and Trevarthen, C. (2004) ‘What we learn about babies from 
engaging with their emotions’, Zero to Three, 24(3), pp. 9–15. (a) 
Rinaldi, C. (1998) ‘Projected curriculum constructed through documentation – 
Progettazione: an interview with Lella Gandini’, in Edwards, C., Gandini, L. 
and Forman, G. (eds) The hundred languages of children: the Reggio 
85 
 
Emilia approach – advanced reflections. 2nd edn. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, pp. 
113-125. (b) 
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L. and Gallese, V. (1996) ‘Premotor cortex 
and the recognition of motor actions’, Cognitive Brain Research, 3, pp. 
131–141. (a) 
Rochat, P. (2004) ‘Emerging co‐awareness’, in Bremner, G. and Slater, A. (eds) 
Theories of infant development. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 258-83 (a) 
Rogoff, B. (2003) The cultural nature of human development. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. (d) 
Rouse, J. (2007) ‘Practice Theory’, Division 1 Faculty Publications. Paper 43. 
Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University, pp. 499-540. Available at: 
http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/div1facpubs/43 (Accessed: 19-03-2018). 
(f) 
Rousseau, J. J. (1789/1979) Émile, or on education. Translated by A. Bloom. 
New York: Basic Books. (e) 
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T. 
and Vogeley, K. (2013) ‘Toward a second-person neuroscience’, 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(4), pp. 393-414. (d) 
Schweinsberg, S. and McManus, P. (2006) ‘Exploring the transition: coursework 
to research-based study in the geography honours year’, Geographical 
Research, 44(1), pp. 52–62. (c) 
86 
 
Seemann, A. (ed.) (2011a) Joint attention: new developments in psychology, 
philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
(d) 
Seemann, A. (2011b) ‘Joint attention: towards a relational account’, in 
Seemann, A. (ed.) Joint attention: new developments in psychology, 
philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
pp.183–202. (d) 
Shahar, S. (1990) Childhood in the Middle Ages. London: Routledge. (e) 
Shockley, K., Santana, M. V. and Fowler, C. A. (2003) ‘Mutual interpersonal 
postural constraints are involved in cooperative conversation’, Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: human perception and performance, 29(2), pp. 
326–32. (d) 
Shotter, J. (2012) ‘More than cool reason: “withness-thinking” or “systemic 
thinking and thinking about systems”’, International Journal of 
Collaborative Practices, 3(1), pp. 1–13. (d, f) 
Smith, L., Thelen, E., Titzer, R. and McLin, D. (1999) ‘Knowing in the context of 
acting:  the task dynamics of the A not B error’, Psychological Review, 
106(2), pp. 235-260. (f) 
Smith, R. (2007) ‘An overview of research on student support: helping students 
to achieve or achieving institutional targets? Nurture or de-nature?’, 
Teaching in Higher Education, 12(5+6), pp. 683-695. (c) 
Sommerville, C. J. (1992) The discovery of childhood in Puritan England. 
Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. (e) 
87 
 
Spurrett, D. and Cowley, S. (2010) ‘The extended infant: utterance activity and 
distributed cognition’, in Menary, R. (ed.) The extended mind. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, pp. 295-324. (f) 
Steedman, C. (1985) ‘”The Mother Made Conscious”: the historical 
development of a primary school pedagogy’, History Workshop Journal, 
20(1), 149-163. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/20.1.149 
(Accessed 19-03-2018) (b)    
Steiner, R.(1923/1988) The child’s changing consciousness and Waldorf 
education. New York: Anthroposophic Press. (b)  
Stern, D. (1985) The interpersonal world of the infant, New York: Basic Books. 
(a) 
Stern, D. (2001) ‘Face-to-face play: its temporal structure as predictor of socio-
affective development. Commentary on Jaffe et al. 2001’, Monographs of 
the Society for Research in Child Development, 66(2), pp. 144–49. (d) 
Stetsenko, A. (2013) ‘The challenge of individuality in Cultural-Historical Activity 
Theory: “collectividual” dialectics from a Transformative Activist Stance’, 
Outlines - Critical Practice Studies, 14(2), pp. 7-28. 
Tizard, B. and Hughes, M. (1984) Young children learning: talking and thinking 
at home and at school, London: Fontana. (a) 
Todd, M. (1987) Christian Humanism and the Puritan social order. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. (e) 
Todd, M., Bannister, P. and Clegg, S. (2004) ‘Independent inquiry and the 
undergraduate dissertation: perceptions and experiences of final-year 
88 
 
social science students’, Assessment and Evaluation in Higher Education, 
29(3), pp. 335–55. (c) 
Todd, M., Smith, K. and Bannister, P. (2006) ‘Supervising a social science 
undergraduate dissertation: staff experiences and perceptions’, Teaching 
in Higher Education, 11(2), pp. 161-73. (c) 
Tomasello, M. (1999) The cultural origins of human cognition, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. (a) 
Tortora, S. (2006) The dancing dialogue: using the communicative power of 
movement with young children. Baltimore, MD: Paul H Brookes Publishing. 
(d) 
Trevarthen, C. (1977) ‘Descriptive analyses of infant communication behaviour’, 
in Schaffer, H. R. (ed.) Studies in mother-infant interaction. Proceedings of 
the Loch Lomond Symposium, Ross Priory, University of Strathclyde, 
September, 1975. London: Academic Press. (f) 
Trevarthen, C. (1979) ‘Communication and cooperation in early infancy: a 
description of primary intersubjectivity’, in Bullowa, M. (ed.), Before 
speech: the beginning of interpersonal communication. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 321–47. (d, f) 
Trevarthen, C. (1995) ‘The child's need to learn a culture’, Children and Society, 
9(1), pp. 5–19. (a) 
Trevarthen C. (2005) ‘First things first: infants make good use of the 
sympathetic rhythm of imitation, without reason or language’, Journal of 
Child Psychotherapy, 31, pp. 91-113. 
89 
 
Trevarthen, C. (2011) ‘The generation of human meaning: how shared 
experience grows in infancy’, in Seemann, A. (ed.), Joint attention: new 
developments in psychology, philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 73–114. (d, f) 
Trevarthen, C. and Aitken, K. (2001) ‘Infant intersubjectivity: research, theory 
and clinical applications’, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 
42(1), pp. 3-48. (f)  
Trevarthen, C. and Hubley, P. (1978) ‘Secondary intersubjectivity: confidence, 
confiding and acts of meaning in the first year’, in Lock, A. (ed.), Action, 
gesture and symbol: the emergence of language. London: Academic 
Press, pp. 73–113. (a, d) 
Tronick, E. Z. (2005) ‘Why is connection with others so critical? The formation of 
dyadic states of consciousness: coherence governed selection and the co-
creation of meaning out of messy meaning making’, in Nadel, J. and Muir, 
D. (eds), Emotional development: recent research advances. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 293– 315. (d) 
Tudge, J. and Odero-Wanga, D. (2009) ‘A cultural-ecological perspective on 
early childhood among the Luo of Kisumu, Kenya’, in Fleer, M., 
Hedegaard, M. and Tudge, J. (eds), World yearbook of education 2009. 
Childhood studies and the impact of globalization: policies and practices at 
global and local levels. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 142–60. (d) 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1962) Thought and language. Translated by Eugenia 
Hanfmann and Gertrude Vakar. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1971) The psychology of art. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
90 
 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1978) Mind in society: the development of higher psychological 
processes. Edited by Michael Cole, Vera John-Steiner, Sylvia Scribner 
and Ellen Souberman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (d, f) 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1981) ‘The genesis of the higher mental functions’, in Wertsch, 
J. (ed.) The concept of activity in Soviet psychology. Armonk, NY: M. E. 
Sharpe, pp. 144–88. (c, d) 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). Problems of general psychology. Vol. 1. The collected 
works of L.S. Vygotsky. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press.     
Vygotsky, L. S. (1988) ‘The genesis of higher mental functions’, in Richardson, 
K. and Sheldon, S. (eds) Cognitive development to adolescence. New 
York: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 61-80. (a) 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1993) The fundamentals of defectology (abnormal psychology 
and learning disabilities). Vol. 2. The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. 
New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press. 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1994) ‘The problem of the environment’, in Van der Veer, R. 
and Valsiner, J. (eds) The Vygotsky reader. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
pp. 338-354. 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1997) The history of the development of Higher Mental 
Functions. Vol. 4. The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky. New York: 
Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press. (e) 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1998) Child psychology. Vol. 5. The collected works of L.S. 
Vygotsky. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press. (b, d, f) 
91 
 
Want, S. and Harris, P. L. (2001) ‘Learning from other people's mistakes: causal 
understanding in learning to use a tool’, Child Development, 72, pp. 431–
443. (a) 
Warneken, F. and Tomasello, M. (2006) ‘Altruistic helping in human infants and 
young chimpanzees’, Science, Vol 311, pp. 1301-1303. 
Warneken, F. and Tomasello, M. (2010) ‘Experiments with altruism in children 
and chimps’, Youtube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-
eU5xZW7cU (Accessed: 11-06-2018) 
 Watson, J. S. (1979) ‘Perception of contingency as a determinant of social 
responsiveness’, in Thoman, E. B. (ed.) The origin of the infants' social 
responsiveness. New York: Erlbaum, pp. 33–64. (a) 
Wilcox, P., Winn, S. and Fyvie-Gauld, M. (2005) ‘“It was nothing to do with the 
university, it was just the people”: the role of social support in the first-year 
experience of higher education’, Studies in Higher Education, 30(6), pp. 
707-722. (c) 
Wilson, T. D., Centerbar, D. B., Kermer, D. A. and Gilbert, D. T. (2005) ‘The 
pleasures of uncertainty: prolonging positive moods in ways people do not 
anticipate’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88(1), pp. 5–21. 
(a) 
Woods, P. (1996) 
‘“The good times” creative teaching in primary school’, Education 3-
13, 24(2), pp. 3-12. 
Wordsworth, W. (1999) The complete poetical works. Bartleby.com. Available 
at: http://www.bartleby.com/145/ (Accessed:19-03-2018). (e) 
92 
 
Yasnitsky, A. and  van der Veer, R. (2016) ‘“Lost in translation” talking about 
sense, meaning, and consciousness’, in Yasnitsky, A. and van der Veer, 
R. (eds) Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky Studies. New York: Routledge,  
pp. 217-226 
Youell, B. (2008) ‘The importance of play and playfulness’, European Journal of 
Psychotherapy, Counselling and Health, 10(2), pp. 121–9. (d) 
Zeedyk M. S. (2006) ‘From intersubjectivity to subjectivity: the transformative 
roles of emotional intimacy and imitation’, Infant and Child Development, 
15, pp. 321–44. (d) 
Zlatev, J. (2002) ‘Mimesis: the “missing link” between signals and symbols in 
phylogeny and ontology?’, in. Pajunen A. (ed.) Mimesis, sign and 
language evolution. Turku: University of Turku press, pp. 93-122.  
  
 
  
93 
 
Copyright permissions 
 
Chapter 2  
Liking to be liked: imitation, familiarity and pedagogy in the first years of life 
 
Chapter 3  
Meeting the child in Steiner kindergartens: an exploration of beliefs, values and 
practices - Introduction: ways of knowing children 
   
94 
 
Chapter 4 
Informal aspects of “becoming peer” in undergraduate research: “still connected 
but going our separate ways” 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Playfulness and the co-construction of identity in the first years 
 
On 25 April 2018 at 16:42, Robert Patterson <Robert.Patterson@sagepub.co.uk> wrote: 
 
Hi Rod, 
Thanks for reaching out. 
 Sorry for the delay in responding to your email. 
 The good news is you are freely allowed to reuse the material published in the Handbook as long as 
the original work is referenced. This is because the Handbook published over 2 years ago. Please see 
page two of your contributor agreement (attached) for the details of this. 
Do let me know if you have any more questions about reusing your work. 
All the best, 
Rob. 
 Robert Patterson 
Commissioning Editor – Psychology 
T: +44(0) 20 3215 0140 
www.sagepublishing.com 
 SAGE Publishing is a trading name of SAGE Publications Ltd, Registered in England No.1017514 
Los Angeles | London | New Delhi 
Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne 
95 
 
From: Rod Parker-Rees [mailto:rparkerrees@gmail.com]  
Sent: 17 April 2018 15:01 
To: Robert Patterson <Robert.Patterson@sagepub.co.uk> 
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